# Is Turkmenistan helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Turkmenistan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€4m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €578m (1.5% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 1.5% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.91% toward Russia to 7.6% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 83%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#TKM)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

1.5% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 83%

likely from 0.91% toward Russia to 7.6% toward Ukraine · €574m · ≈ 0.33%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 1.5% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 83%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.01%

€4m

likely from 0.11% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

1.5%

€578m

likely from 0.89% toward Russia to 7.7% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 84%

Russia kept €578m (1.5% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.6% of GDP less (€589m; likely from 0.86% toward Russia to 7.7% toward Ukraine)
- Turkmenistan's own gain from trade with Russia: Turkmenistan kept 0.03% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€11m; likely from 0.30% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €123m (0.33% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Bought 92% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €656m in 2021, €1.3bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €698m of the net's €574m.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 83%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 83% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €4m

| Turkmenistan kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €2m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Turkmenistan kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.5% · €578m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +1.9% | €698m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.33% | €123m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.06% | €23m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.03% | €10m |
| Turkmenistan kept more from selling to RussiaC | −0.02% | €8m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Turkmenistan's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Turkmenistan kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€0.17bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€2m | +€144m | +€143m | +0.38% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€1m | +€173m | +€171m | +0.84% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€1m | +€94m | +€94m | +1.1% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€1m | +€24m | +€23m | +1.1% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€1m | +€143m | +€142m | +1.5% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Turkmenistan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Money flowing back | −€3msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€4m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.66bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.3bn in 2025 (+92%). It sold €90m to Russia in 2021 and €0.35bn in 2025 (+290%). For Turkmenistan: €123m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Turkmenistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Turkmenistan. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#TKM)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €13m extra from 2022 (0.03% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.16bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Turkmenistan; what its firms kept of it, €3m, is taken off its support.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| Turkmenistan | +1.5% · +€0.57bn · likely toward Ukraine · 83% |
| [Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kazakhstan/) | +0.02% · +€55m · essentially zero |
| [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) | −1.5% · −€0.24bn · very likely · 98% |
| [Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/country/uzbekistan/) | −4.1% · −€4.1bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Laos](https://warbalance.org/country/laos/) | +0.14% · +€20m · likely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| [Brunei](https://warbalance.org/country/brunei/) | +3.1% · +€0.45bn · likely toward Ukraine · 85% |

## How the number is backed

26 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 98% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (97%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf, mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept less from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Turkmenistan kept more from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)

## Questions

### Does Turkmenistan trade with Russia?

It bought €1.3bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.66bn in 2021), and sold €0.35bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €578m (1.5% of GDP) less than without the war.

### What decides Turkmenistan's number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 83%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 83% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Is Turkmenistan helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +1.5% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.91% toward Russia to 7.6% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 83%). Chance toward Ukraine: 83%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €578m (1.5% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How does Turkmenistan compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Turkmenistan +1.5%, Kazakhstan +0.02%, Afghanistan −1.5%, Uzbekistan −4.1%.

### Where do the numbers for Turkmenistan come from?

26 sources back its parts, 6 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept less from services sold here: [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Turkmenistan have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Turkmenistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Turkmenistan.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

- [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) · +3.3% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€3.1bn · 95%
- [Brunei](https://warbalance.org/country/brunei/) · +3.1% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€453m · 85%
- [Lebanon](https://warbalance.org/country/lebanon/) · +2.8% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€578m · 84%
- Turkmenistan+1.5% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€574m · 83%
- [Greenland](https://warbalance.org/country/greenland/) · +1.5% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€46m · 67%
- [Kosovo](https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/) · +1.1% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€106m · 91%
- [Cameroon](https://warbalance.org/country/cameroon/) · +0.99% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€452m · 94%

## More about Turkmenistan

### Groups

- [Central Asia](https://warbalance.org/group/central-asia/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Extra sales to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/sales-to-ukraine/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Extra services sold to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

26 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#TKM) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/turkmenistan/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/turkmenistan/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/turkmenistan/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/turkmenistan/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/turkmenistan/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/turkmenistan/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/turkmenistan/