# Does Türkiye support Russia? What the money flows show

Türkiye's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.16bn (0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €32.8bn (3.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€20.5bn of €32.8bn). The net is 3.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia; very likely · 96%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#TUR)

Toward Russia by

3.1% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 96%

likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia · €32.7bn · ≈ 0.66%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 3.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on gas contracts, largest in 2022).

Chance toward Russia: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.02%

€160m

likely from 0.07% below zero to 0.07% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

3.1%

€32.8bn

likely 0.20% to 5.2% toward Russia very likely · 96%

Russia kept €32.8bn (3.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€20.5bn of €32.8bn).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.9% of GDP more (€31.1bn; likely 0.05% to 5.0% toward Russia)
- Türkiye's own gain from trade with Russia: Türkiye kept 0.16% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1.7bn; likely 0.06% to 0.37% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €20.5bn (1.9% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €5.5bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €1.4bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €145m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.02% · €160m

| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.01% | €156m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €54m |
| Türkiye kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €28m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €27m |
| Türkiye kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereD | −<0.01% | €26m |
| Türkiye kept part of others' aid, spent hereD | −<0.01% | €14m |
| Türkiye kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D | −<0.01% | €13m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €6m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 3.1% · €32.8bn

| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −1.9% | €20.5bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −1.0% | €11.1bn |
| Türkiye earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsC | −0.10% | €1.0bn |
| Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansB | +0.06% | €611m |
| Türkiye's companies made more profit in RussiaC | −0.03% | €300m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.02% | €163m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxC | −0.02% | €162m |
| Türkiye kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −0.01% | €140m |
| Türkiye kept more from shipping Russian oilC | −0.01% | €108m |
| Türkiye kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −<0.01% | €92m |
| Türkiye kept more from selling to RussiaD | −<0.01% | €89m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €40m |
| Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD | −<0.01% | €21m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereC | +<0.01% | €13m |
| Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD | −<0.01% | €5m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€15bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.11bn in 2022 to €8m in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€112m | −€15.1bn | −€15.0bn | −1.4% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€29m | −€5.2bn | −€5.2bn | −1.9% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€1m | −€6.2bn | −€6.2bn | −2.5% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€8m | −€4.3bn | −€4.3bn | −2.9% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€10m | −€1.9bn | −€1.9bn | −3.1% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Türkiye's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €49mrange €30m to €0.62bn; Kiel: €66m |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €27mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €27m |
| Humanitarian aid | €5m |
| Refugee hosting | €6m |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.16bn |
| Money flowing back | −€82msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.16bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €22.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €31.6bn in 2025 (+41%). It sold €4.8bn to Russia in 2021 and €6.1bn in 2025 (+27%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 54.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Türkiye: €20.5bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 91% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Türkiye's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €33.8bn | €20.8bnrange €13.4bn to €28.6bn | €25.8bn | C (estimate; customs do not name the supplier) |
| Oil products | €44.5bn | €32.5bnrange €23.8bn to €42.4bn | €60.7bn | C (estimate) |
| Pipeline gas | €48bn | €43.9bnrange €29bn to €59.9bn | €38.2bn | C (estimate; customs do not name the supplier) |
| LNG | €0m | €0m | €1.2bn | – |
| Coal | €13.4bn | €12.2bnrange €9.2bn to €15.6bn | €14.2bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €58.4bn | €58.7bn | – | – |
| All goods | €198bn | €168bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

No. Türkiye has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (1 March 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Türkiye. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Turkish Foreign Minister, 1 March 2022 (news report)](https://bianet.org/haber/minister-turkey-wants-invasion-to-end-but-has-no-inclination-to-join-sanctions-against-russia-258490) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#TUR)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €4.1bn extra from 2022 (0.38% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €5.5bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Refugees from Ukraine

2,645 refugees from Ukraine, 0.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €6m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Türkiye: €6m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €70m; counted here: €54m — donated weapons at their market value.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€5.1bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Türkiye; what its firms kept of it, €82m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Türkiye's companies made more profit in Russia: €0.30bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia more tax: €0.16bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russia took €551m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €138m to €1.8bn; 0.05% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.16bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Türkiye kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.11bn (0.01% of one year's GDP). Türkiye kept more from settling Russia's trade: €92m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €5m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €501m to €2.0bn); €31m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 7 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. NATO members: number 2 of 2 members toward Russia. Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion: number 3 of 4 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) | +3.3% · +€3.1bn · likely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| [Greece](https://warbalance.org/country/greece/) | +0.08% · +€0.18bn · essentially zero |
| [Armenia](https://warbalance.org/country/armenia/) | −0.17% · −€37m · likely toward Russia · 69% |
| [Azerbaijan](https://warbalance.org/country/azerbaijan/) | −2.5% · −€1.7bn · very likely · 99% |
| Türkiye | −3.1% · −€32.7bn · very likely · 96% |
| [Georgia](https://warbalance.org/country/georgia/) | −4.1% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Azerbaijan](https://warbalance.org/country/azerbaijan/) | −2.5% · −€1.7bn · very likely · 99% |

## How the number is backed

51 sources back its parts: 18 official statistics, 14 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 2% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 97% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- research · [Brunei's Hengyi refinery and Turkish ports relabelling Russian fuel: CREA, CSD, Eurostat Comext, UN Comtrade, Kpler-based reporting](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/CREA\_CSD\_A-Kremlin-pit-stop\_The-EU-imported-EUR-3-bn-of-oil-products-from-Turkish-ports-handling-Russian-oil.pdf)

### Türkiye earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions C

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans B

- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)

### Türkiye's companies made more profit in Russia C

- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [War-time gas price windfall under the pre-war no-war price paths: World Bank and IMF October-2021 forecasts, IMF/EIA/ECB January-2022 views, ICE TTF futures of mid-February 2022 and of early 2021 (TTF Cal-22 at EUR 16.7-18.1/MWh, January-March 2021); each contract's TTF/oil formula](https://www.ice.com/products/27996665/Dutch-TTF-Natural-Gas-Futures/data)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- research · [Brunei's Hengyi refinery and Turkish ports relabelling Russian fuel: CREA, CSD, Eurostat Comext, UN Comtrade, Kpler-based reporting](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/CREA\_CSD\_A-Kremlin-pit-stop\_The-EU-imported-EUR-3-bn-of-oil-products-from-Turkish-ports-handling-Russian-oil.pdf)
- research · [Russian crude refined in Turkey and India and exported as fuel: refinery reports, UN Comtrade, CREA, Global Witness](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=792&cmdCode=2710&flowCode=X&period=2024)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- official · [EPDK (Turkish Energy Market Regulatory Authority): natural gas and oil market reports, imports by country of origin 2005-2026](https://www.epdk.gov.tr/Detay/Icerik/3-0-94/dogal-gazyillik-sektor-raporu)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- research · [Russian-owned metals, mining and chemicals plants abroad (Rusal, NLMK, Nornickel, EuroChem): company filings and parent reports](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=A&reporter=IE&partner=RU&product=281820&flow=2&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- research · [Gold and hidden payment channels to Russia not in customs data: Swissaid, Reuters, Hong Kong and Kyrgyz trade gaps](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)

## Questions

### Does Türkiye support Russia?

In money terms the net is −3.1% of one year's GDP (likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia; very likely · 96%). Chance toward Russia: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €32.8bn (3.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€20.5bn of €32.8bn). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Türkiye trade with Russia?

It bought €31.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€22.4bn in 2021), and sold €6.1bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €32.8bn (3.1% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€20.5bn of €32.8bn).

### Türkiye–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €31.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€22.4bn in 2021), and sold €6.1bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.16bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −3.1% of one year's GDP (likely 0.18% to 5.2% toward Russia; very likely · 96%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does Türkiye help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €501m to €2.0bn); €31m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### Does Türkiye still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 54.8% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €31.6bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €22.4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### How much has Türkiye given to Ukraine?

Türkiye's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.16bn, 0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.07% below zero to 0.07% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Does Türkiye have sanctions on Russia?

No. Türkiye has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (1 March 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Türkiye. Sources: [Turkish Foreign Minister, 1 March 2022 (news report)](https://bianet.org/haber/minister-turkey-wants-invasion-to-end-but-has-no-inclination-to-join-sanctions-against-russia-258490) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 7 of 32

- [Bhutan](https://warbalance.org/country/bhutan/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€71m
8. [Nepal](https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€974m
- [Tuvalu](https://warbalance.org/country/tuvalu/) · −2.9% · Toward Russia · −€1m
7. Türkiye−3.1% · Toward Russia · −€32.7bn
6. [Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/country/uzbekistan/) · −4.1% · Toward Russia · −€4.1bn
5. [Tunisia](https://warbalance.org/country/tunisia/) · −4.6% · Toward Russia · −€2.1bn
4. [Yemen](https://warbalance.org/country/yemen/) · −5.2% · Toward Russia · −€462m

## More about Türkiye

### Groups

- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)
- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Compared with

- [Türkiye vs India](https://warbalance.org/compare/turkiye-vs-india/)
- [China vs Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-turkiye/)
- [Iran vs Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/compare/iran-vs-turkiye/)
- [Israel vs Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/compare/israel-vs-turkiye/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Rosatom projects and Russian state loans](https://warbalance.org/rosatom-and-russian-state-loans/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

51 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#TUR) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/turkiye/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/turkiye/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/turkiye/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/turkiye/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/turkiye/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/turkiye/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/