# Is Togo helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call

Togo's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (−0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €41m (0.46% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€41m of €41m). The net is 0.48% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 50% toward Russia).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#TGO)

Toward Russia by

0.48% of a year's GDP since 2022

too close to call · 50% toward Russia

likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine · €43m · ≈ 0.10%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.48% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.02%

€2m

likely from 0.18% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.46%

€41m

likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine too close to call: the middle value is toward Russia, but the simulations lean slightly toward Ukraine (51%)

Russia kept €41m (0.46% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€41m of €41m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.45% of GDP more (€41m; likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine)
- Togo's own gain from trade with Russia: Togo kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; likely <0.01% to 0.03% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €18m (0.20% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €10m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 51% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €41m of the net's €43m.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here would have to be 236% larger.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.02% · €2m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.02% | €2m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.46% · €41m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.46% | €41m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.20% | €18m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.20% | €18m |
| Togo kept more from selling to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€26m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | +€3m | +€3m | +0.03% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | −€3m | −€3m | +<0.01% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | −€26m | −€26m | −0.29% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€1m | −€11m | −€12m | −0.43% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | −€5m | −€5m | −0.48% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Togo's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€2m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€2m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €32m from Russia in 2021 and €24m in 2025 (−27%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €13m in 2025. For Togo: €18m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Togo's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €1.2bn | €0.17bnrange €0.12bn to €0.23bn | €1.2bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €0m | €0m | – | – |
| All goods | €1.2bn | €0.17bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Togo's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Togo. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#TGO)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €13m extra from 2022 (0.14% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €41m (0.46% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Benin](https://warbalance.org/country/benin/) | −0.36% · −€65m · too close to call · 56% toward Russia |
| Togo | −0.48% · −€43m · too close to call · 50% toward Russia |
| [Ghana](https://warbalance.org/country/ghana/) | −0.92% · −€0.68bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Burkina Faso](https://warbalance.org/country/burkina-faso/) | −3.9% · −€0.75bn · likely toward Russia · 92% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Benin](https://warbalance.org/country/benin/) | −0.36% · −€65m · too close to call · 56% toward Russia |
| [Sudan](https://warbalance.org/country/sudan/) | −0.21% · −€94m · too close to call · 54% toward Russia |
| [Morocco](https://warbalance.org/country/morocco/) | −0.13% · −€0.18bn · too close to call · 59% toward Russia |
| [Syria](https://warbalance.org/country/syria/) | −1.0% · −€0.20bn · too close to call · 64% toward Russia |

## How the number is backed

22 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 49% modelled (C) and 51% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Togo kept more from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [fuel hubs and flag registries (Eurostat oil balances, UN Comtrade own and partner records, port bunker sales), laundered-oil caps from fuel use, Belgian company tax 2022](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_cb\_oil?format=JSON&siec=O4600&geo=NL&unit=THS\_T&nrg\_bal=IMP&nrg\_bal=EXP&nrg\_bal=INTMARB&nrg\_bal=GID\_OBS&nrg\_bal=TO\_RPI\_RO&nrg\_bal=FC\_E)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)

## Questions

### Is Togo helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.48% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.5% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 50% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €41m (0.46% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€41m of €41m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### What decides Togo's number?

Chance toward Russia: 50%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here would have to be 236% larger.

### Does Togo help Russia get around sanctions?

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers.

### How does Togo compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Benin −0.36%, Togo −0.48%, Ghana −0.92%, Burkina Faso −3.9%.

### Where do the numbers for Togo come from?

22 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Togo have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Togo's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Togo.

## Nearby in the ranking

Too close to call

- [Benin](https://warbalance.org/country/benin/) · −0.36% · Too close to call · −€65m · 56%
- [Tajikistan](https://warbalance.org/country/tajikistan/) · −0.40% · Too close to call · −€46m · 58%
- [Saint Vincent and the Grenadines](https://warbalance.org/country/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines/) · −0.41% · Too close to call · −€4m · 61%
- Togo−0.48% · Too close to call · −€43m · 50%
- [Saint Kitts and Nevis](https://warbalance.org/country/saint-kitts-and-nevis/) · −0.55% · Too close to call · −€5m · 61%
- [Syria](https://warbalance.org/country/syria/) · −1.0% · Too close to call · −€200m · 64%
- [Mauritania](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritania/) · −0.12% · Leaning toward Russia · −€12m · 68%

## More about Togo

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

22 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#TGO) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/togo/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/togo/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/togo/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/togo/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/togo/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/togo/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/togo/