# Is Tajikistan helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call

Tajikistan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €46m (0.39% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€137m; the other parts take €92m off it). The net is 0.40% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 58% toward Russia).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#TJK)

Toward Russia by

0.40% of a year's GDP since 2022

too close to call · 58% toward Russia

likely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine · €46m · ≈ 0.09%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.40% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on oil, largest in 2022).

Chance toward Russia: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€1m

likely from 0.14% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.39%

€46m

likely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine too close to call · 58% toward Russia

Russia kept €46m (0.39% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€137m; the other parts take €92m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.38% of GDP more (€44m; likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine)
- Tajikistan's own gain from trade with Russia: Tajikistan kept 0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; likely from 1.0% toward Russia to 0.15% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €137m (1.2% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €49m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 93% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €982m in 2021, €1.9bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €77m It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €0. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: €137m of the net's €46m.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 34% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €1m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.39% · €46m

| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −1.2% | €137m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.55% | €64m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.29% | €33m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.03% | €3m |
| Tajikistan kept more from selling to RussiaD | −0.02% | €2m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.02% | €2m |
| Tajikistan kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +0.02% | €2m |
| Tajikistan's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.19bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | −€189m | −€189m | −1.6% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | +€84m | +€83m | −0.91% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | +€48m | +€48m | −0.50% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | −€10m | −€10m | −0.58% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | +€21m | +€21m | −0.40% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Tajikistan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€1m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.98bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.9bn in 2025 (+93%). It sold €56m to Russia in 2021 and €95m in 2025 (+70%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 22.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Tajikistan: €137m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 7% of it on gas contracts. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by +80.7% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: +€9.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely +€4.7bn to +€15.2bn); migrants sent €20.9bn home from Russia in that time. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Tajikistan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0.61bn | €0.56bnrange €0.48bn to €0.61bn | not tracked | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €5.1bn | €6.8bn | – | – |
| All goods | €5.8bn | €7.3bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Tajikistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tajikistan. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#TJK)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €43m extra from 2022 (0.37% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €49m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €3m (0.03% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €44m to €163m); €0 in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| Tajikistan | −0.40% · −€46m · too close to call · 58% toward Russia |
| [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) | −1.5% · −€0.24bn · very likely · 98% |
| [Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/country/uzbekistan/) | −4.1% · −€4.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Kyrgyzstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kyrgyzstan/) | −10.0% · −€1.4bn · very likely · 97% |

## How the number is backed

27 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 97% modelled (C) and 3% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (97%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Russia kept less from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Tajikistan kept more from selling to Russia D

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

## Questions

### Is Tajikistan helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.40% of one year's GDP (likely from 4.3% toward Russia to 4.5% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 58% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €46m (0.39% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€137m; the other parts take €92m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Tajikistan trade with Russia?

It bought €1.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.98bn in 2021), and sold €95m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €46m (0.39% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€137m; the other parts take €92m off it).

### What decides Tajikistan's number?

Chance toward Russia: 58%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 34% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Does Tajikistan help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €44m to €163m); €0 in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### How does Tajikistan compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Tajikistan −0.40%, China −0.75%, Afghanistan −1.5%, Uzbekistan −4.1%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%.

### Where do the numbers for Tajikistan come from?

27 sources back its parts, 6 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept less from services sold here: [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Tajikistan have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Tajikistan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Tajikistan.

## Nearby in the ranking

Too close to call

- [Cabo Verde](https://warbalance.org/country/cabo-verde/) · −0.17% · Too close to call · −€4m · 56%
- [Sudan](https://warbalance.org/country/sudan/) · −0.21% · Too close to call · −€94m · 54%
- [Benin](https://warbalance.org/country/benin/) · −0.36% · Too close to call · −€65m · 56%
- Tajikistan−0.40% · Too close to call · −€46m · 58%
- [Saint Vincent and the Grenadines](https://warbalance.org/country/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines/) · −0.41% · Too close to call · −€4m · 61%
- [Togo](https://warbalance.org/country/togo/) · −0.48% · Too close to call · −€43m · 50%
- [Saint Kitts and Nevis](https://warbalance.org/country/saint-kitts-and-nevis/) · −0.55% · Too close to call · −€5m · 61%

## More about Tajikistan

### Groups

- [Central Asia](https://warbalance.org/group/central-asia/)
- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

27 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#TJK) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/tajikistan/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/tajikistan/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/tajikistan/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/tajikistan/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/tajikistan/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/tajikistan/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/tajikistan/