# Is Taiwan helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Taiwan's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.20bn (0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €461m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly paying Russia less than no-war prices (€494m; the other parts take €33m off it). The net is 0.09% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#TWN)

Toward Ukraine by

0.09% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine · €659m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.09% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.03%

€197m

likely 0.02% to 0.08% essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.06%

€461m

likely from 0.35% toward Russia to 0.49% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €461m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly paying Russia less than no-war prices (€494m; the other parts take €33m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.07% of GDP less (€504m; likely from 0.34% toward Russia to 0.50% toward Ukraine)
- Taiwan's own gain from trade with Russia: Taiwan kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€42m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Sold Russia 55% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.1bn in 2021, €502m in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.03% · €197m

| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €150m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €57m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €9m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.06% · €461m

| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.07% | €494m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.02% | €133m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €125m |
| Taiwan kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €56m |
| Taiwan kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €25m |
| Taiwan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −<0.01% | €23m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +<0.01% | €14m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €12m |
| Taiwan's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €11m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.21bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.12bn in 2022 to €12m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€124m | +€91m | +€215m | +0.03% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€26m | +€189m | +€215m | +0.06% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€22m | −€171m | −€148m | +0.04% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€12m | +€82m | +€94m | +0.05% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€13m | +€271m | +€284m | +0.09% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Taiwan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €0mKiel: €0m |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €4m |
| Humanitarian aid | €53m |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.14bn |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.20bn |

Quality of the split: A

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €4bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.6bn in 2025 (−8%). It sold €1.1bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.50bn in 2025 (−55%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 63.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Taiwan: €494m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Taiwan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €5.3bn | €5bnrange €3.3bn to €7.4bn | €6.7bn | C (estimate) |
| LNG | €1.5bn | €1.4bnrange €1bn to €2bn | €1.5bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €4bn | €3.8bnrange €2.7bn to €5.5bn | €4bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €8.2bn | €7.9bn | – | – |
| All goods | €19.1bn | €18bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: B, 2024: B, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Taiwan has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 2022. They are export controls on listed high-tech goods; it has no general sanctions list. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Taiwan as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Taiwan. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Taiwan MOEA export controls on Russia and Belarus (news report)](https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4557937) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#TWN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €1.2bn extra from 2022 (0.16% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €42m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €57m; counted here: €57m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €43m. It is not counted here.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€43m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Taiwan; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russia took €3m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely <€1m to €36m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.13bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Taiwan kept more from shipping Russian oil: €56m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €378m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €160m to €722m); €339m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

## How the number is backed

29 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 5% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 61% modelled (C) and 34% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Private donations D

- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

## Questions

### Does Taiwan still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 63.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €3.6bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### How much has Taiwan given to Ukraine?

Taiwan's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.20bn, 0.03% of one year's GDP (likely 0.02% to 0.08%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Why is Taiwan's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.09% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

### Is Taiwan helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.09% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.32% toward Russia to 0.52% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €461m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly paying Russia less than no-war prices (€494m; the other parts take €33m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Taiwan trade with Russia?

It bought €3.6bn from Russia in 2025 (€4bn in 2021), and sold €0.50bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €461m (0.06% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly paying Russia less than no-war prices (€494m; the other parts take €33m off it).

### How much did Taiwan give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €0.12bn; 2023 €26m; 2024 €22m; 2025 €12m; 2026 (to August) €13m. In total since 2022: €0.20bn (likely 0.02% to 0.08%).

### Does Taiwan have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Taiwan has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 2022. They are export controls on listed high-tech goods; it has no general sanctions list. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Taiwan as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Taiwan. Sources: [Taiwan MOEA export controls on Russia and Belarus (news report)](https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4557937) (search summary, to be checked against the official text); [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746).

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Dominican Republic](https://warbalance.org/country/dominican-republic/) · +0.13% · Near zero · +€147m · 86%
- [Venezuela](https://warbalance.org/country/venezuela/) · −0.11% · Near zero · −€109m · 71%
- [Belize](https://warbalance.org/country/belize/) · −0.13% · Near zero · −€4m · 82%
- Taiwan+0.09% · Essentially zero · +€659m · 64%
- [Palestine](https://warbalance.org/country/palestine/) · +0.09% · Essentially zero · +€15m · 57%
- [Gabon](https://warbalance.org/country/gabon/) · +0.08% · Essentially zero · +€16m · 74%
- [Panama](https://warbalance.org/country/panama/) · +0.08% · Essentially zero · +€63m · 78%

## More about Taiwan

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

29 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#TWN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/taiwan/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/taiwan/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/taiwan/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/taiwan/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/taiwan/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/taiwan/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/taiwan/