# How much has Switzerland given to Ukraine since 2022?

Switzerland's support for Ukraine since 2022: €8.3bn (0.97% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.6bn (0.18% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.5bn of €1.6bn); Russia also lost €2bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 1.0% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.44% to 1.4% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#CHE)

Toward Ukraine by

1.0% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.44% to 1.4% toward Ukraine · €8.7bn · ≈ 0.22%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.0% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly war-time prices on gas contracts.

Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.97%

€8.3bn

likely 0.82% to 1.2% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.18%

€1.6bn

likely from 0.73% toward Russia to 0.15% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 86%

Russia kept €1.6bn (0.18% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.5bn of €1.6bn).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.26% of GDP more (€2.2bn; likely from 0.79% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine)
- Switzerland's own gain from trade with Russia: Switzerland kept 0.07% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€618m; likely from 0.07% toward Russia to 0.16% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.23% of GDP in returns (€2.0bn).

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €1.5bn (0.17% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Bought 67% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.7bn in 2021, €2.8bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.23% of a year's GDP (€2.0bn; likely €1.5bn to €2.2bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
- Mostly one part Hosting refugees: €6.5bn of the net's €8.7bn.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.97% · €8.3bn

| Hosting refugeesC | +0.76% | €6.5bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.16% | €1.4bn |
| Private donationsC | +0.07% | €567m |
| Switzerland kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −0.02% | €141m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €29m |
| Switzerland kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D | −<0.01% | €5m |
| Switzerland kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Switzerland kept part of others' aid, spent hereD | −<0.01% | €1m |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.18% · €1.6bn

| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.17% | €1.5bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Switzerland's companies made less profit in RussiaC | +0.07% | €575m |
| Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD | −0.06% | €498m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.06% | €492m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxC | +0.04% | €343m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €199m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.01% | €122m |
| Switzerland kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +0.01% | €116m |
| Switzerland earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.01% | €100m |
| Switzerland kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €50m |
| Switzerland kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €23m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.23% in returns · €2.0bn

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC | +0.13% | €1.1bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereC | +0.10% | €846m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€2.1bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €1.6bn in 2022 to €1.7bn in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€1.6bn | −€670m | +€141m | +€1.1bn | +0.13% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€1.8bn | −€530m | +€559m | +€1.8bn | +0.34% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€1.7bn | −€163m | +€566m | +€2.1bn | +0.59% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€1.7bn | −€412m | +€441m | +€1.8bn | +0.79% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€1.4bn | +€200m | +€262m | +€1.9bn | +1.0% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Switzerland's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €0mKiel: €0m |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €0.18bnof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €29m |
| Humanitarian aid | €1.2bn |
| Refugee hosting | €6.5bn |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.57bn |
| Money flowing back | −€0.15bnsubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €8.3bn |

Quality of the split: A

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.8bn in 2025 (+67%). It sold €3.1bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.5bn in 2025 (−19%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 26.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Switzerland: €1.5bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023, 100% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Switzerland's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Pipeline gas | €0.62bn | €0.59bnrange €0.31bn to €0.95bn | €0.13bn | A |
| Other goods | €12.6bn | €14bn | – | – |
| All goods | €13.2bn | €14.5bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Switzerland is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Switzerland as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Switzerland. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [FINMA, 28 February 2022: Federal Council adopts EU sanctions; amendment of SR 946.231.176.72](https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2022/02/20220228-sr-946-231-176-72/)
- [SECO, 'Switzerland adopts EU sanctions against Russia', 28 February 2022](https://seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/seco/nsb-news.msg-id-87386.html) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#CHE)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.76bn extra from 2022 (0.09% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: 0.23% of a year's GDP (€2.0bn; likely €1.5bn to €2.2bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €7.3bn (June 2026, [source](https://iz.ru/en/node/2149609) (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €9.1bn (1 June 2026, [source](https://iz.ru/en/node/2149609) (search summary, to be checked against the official text)).

## Refugees from Ukraine

72,410 refugees from Ukraine, 8.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €6.5bn (0.76% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Switzerland: €6.6bn spent on refugees, less €144m, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €22,616 per refugee per year (286,792 refugee-years).

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €1.4bn; counted here: €1.4bn — loans at their gift value, not their full amount. Loans, full amount: €0.10bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €25m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €4.4bn. It is not counted here.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.49bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Switzerland; what its firms kept of it, €0.15bn, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Switzerland's companies made less profit in Russia: €0.58bn (0.07% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €0.34bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russia took €1.6bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €924m to €3.7bn; 0.19% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €0.50bn (0.06% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.20bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Switzerland kept more from shipping Russian oil: €23m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €19m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €17m to €74m); €60m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 27 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Germany](https://warbalance.org/country/germany/) | +3.7% · +€153bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Italy](https://warbalance.org/country/italy/) | +1.6% · +€34.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| [France](https://warbalance.org/country/france/) | +1.6% · +€43.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| Switzerland | +1.0% · +€8.7bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Austria](https://warbalance.org/country/austria/) | +0.45% · +€2.1bn · likely toward Ukraine · 68% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Iceland](https://warbalance.org/country/iceland/) | +1.2% · +€0.35bn · very likely · >99% |
| [United Kingdom](https://warbalance.org/country/united-kingdom/) | +1.8% · +€58.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Norway](https://warbalance.org/country/norway/) | +2.9% · +€14.8bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Moldova](https://warbalance.org/country/moldova/) | +6.9% · +€1.1bn · very likely · 97% |

## How the number is backed

37 sources back its parts: 14 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 9% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 85% modelled (C) and 6% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported national budget figures
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures

### Sources, by part

### Hosting refugees C

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

### Russia lost returns on its frozen money C

- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)

### Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen here C

- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- research · [Gold and hidden payment channels to Russia not in customs data: Swissaid, Reuters, Hong Kong and Kyrgyz trade gaps](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)

## Questions

### How much has Switzerland given to Ukraine?

Switzerland's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €8.3bn, 0.97% of one year's GDP (likely 0.82% to 1.2%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Is Switzerland helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +1.0% of one year's GDP (likely 0.44% to 1.4% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.6bn (0.18% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.5bn of €1.6bn). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Switzerland trade with Russia?

It bought €2.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €2.5bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.6bn (0.18% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.5bn of €1.6bn).

### How much Russian money is frozen in Switzerland?

Russian money frozen: 0.23% of a year's GDP (€2.0bn; likely €1.5bn to €2.2bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only. Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: €7.3bn (June 2026, [source](https://iz.ru/en/node/2149609) (search summary, to be checked against the official text)); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €9.1bn (1 June 2026, [source](https://iz.ru/en/node/2149609) (search summary, to be checked against the official text)).

### How many Ukrainian refugees does Switzerland host, and what does it cost?

72,410 refugees from Ukraine, 8.0 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €6.5bn (0.76% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Switzerland: €6.6bn spent on refugees, less €144m, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €22,616 per refugee per year (286,792 refugee-years).

### How much did Switzerland give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €1.6bn; 2023 €1.8bn; 2024 €1.7bn; 2025 €1.7bn; 2026 (to August) €1.4bn. In total since 2022: €8.3bn (likely 0.82% to 1.2%).

### Does Switzerland have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Switzerland is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Switzerland as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Switzerland. Sources: [FINMA, 28 February 2022: Federal Council adopts EU sanctions; amendment of SR 946.231.176.72](https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2022/02/20220228-sr-946-231-176-72/); [SECO, 'Switzerland adopts EU sanctions against Russia', 28 February 2022](https://seco.admin.ch/seco/en/home/seco/nsb-news.msg-id-87386.html) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 27 of 32

24. [Iceland](https://warbalance.org/country/iceland/) · +1.2% · Toward Ukraine · +€348m
25. [Spain](https://warbalance.org/country/spain/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€16.6bn
26. [South Korea](https://warbalance.org/country/south-korea/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€18.1bn
27. Switzerland+1.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.7bn
28. [Canada](https://warbalance.org/country/canada/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€10.6bn
29. [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€132bn
30. [Nigeria](https://warbalance.org/country/nigeria/) · +0.42% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.8bn

## More about Switzerland

### Compared with

- [United States vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-switzerland/)
- [Germany vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-switzerland/)
- [Netherlands vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/netherlands-vs-switzerland/)
- [United Kingdom vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-kingdom-vs-switzerland/)
- [France vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/france-vs-switzerland/)
- [Poland vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/poland-vs-switzerland/)
- [Norway vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-switzerland/)
- [Italy vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/italy-vs-switzerland/)
- [Denmark vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/denmark-vs-switzerland/)
- [Sweden vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/sweden-vs-switzerland/)
- [Canada vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-switzerland/)
- [Spain vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/spain-vs-switzerland/)
- [Switzerland vs Ireland](https://warbalance.org/compare/switzerland-vs-ireland/)
- [Switzerland vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/switzerland-vs-belgium/)
- [Switzerland vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/switzerland-vs-japan/)
- [Switzerland vs Finland](https://warbalance.org/compare/switzerland-vs-finland/)
- [Switzerland vs Czechia](https://warbalance.org/compare/switzerland-vs-czechia/)
- [Switzerland vs Austria](https://warbalance.org/compare/switzerland-vs-austria/)
- [Switzerland vs Romania](https://warbalance.org/compare/switzerland-vs-romania/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Frozen Russian private assets](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-private-assets/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Gold and hidden payments to Russia](https://warbalance.org/gold-and-hidden-payments-to-russia/)
- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

37 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#CHE) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/switzerland/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/switzerland/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/switzerland/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/switzerland/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/switzerland/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/switzerland/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/