# Is Suriname helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Suriname's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €8m (0.22% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.21% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 86%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#SUR)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

0.21% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 86%

likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine · €8m · ≈ 0.04%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.21% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 86%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.01%

<€1m

likely from 0.15% below zero to 0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.22%

€8m

likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 92%

Russia kept €8m (0.22% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.22% of GDP less (€8m; likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine)
- Suriname's own gain from trade with Russia: Suriname kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €8m of the net's €8m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €3.6bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 86%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 90% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · <€1m

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.22% · €8m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.23% | €8m |
| --- | --- | --- |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€2m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.05% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.10% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.15% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | +0.17% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.21% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €2m from Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. For Suriname: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2026, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Suriname's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Suriname. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#SUR)

## How the number is backed

8 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)

## Questions

### What decides Suriname's number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 86%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 90% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Is Suriname helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.21% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 86%). Chance toward Ukraine: 86%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €8m (0.22% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Where do the numbers for Suriname come from?

8 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Suriname have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Suriname's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Suriname.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

- [Burundi](https://warbalance.org/country/burundi/) · +0.29% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€10m · 73%
- [Angola](https://warbalance.org/country/angola/) · +0.25% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€261m · 92%
- [Honduras](https://warbalance.org/country/honduras/) · +0.24% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€76m · 74%
- Suriname+0.21% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€8m · 86%
- [Colombia](https://warbalance.org/country/colombia/) · +0.15% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€524m · 95%
- [Laos](https://warbalance.org/country/laos/) · +0.14% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€20m · 89%
- [Dominican Republic](https://warbalance.org/country/dominican-republic/) · +0.13% · Near zero · +€147m · 86%

## More about Suriname

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

8 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#SUR) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/suriname/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/suriname/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/suriname/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/suriname/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/suriname/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/suriname/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/suriname/