# Is Sudan helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call

Sudan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€6m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €88m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.21% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.98% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 54% toward Russia).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#SDN)

Toward Russia by

0.21% of a year's GDP since 2022

too close to call · 54% toward Russia

likely from 0.98% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine · €94m · ≈ 0.05%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.21% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.01%

€6m

likely from 0.12% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.20%

€88m

likely from 0.96% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine too close to call · 53% toward Russia

Russia kept €88m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.20% of GDP more (€88m; likely from 0.96% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine)
- Sudan's own gain from trade with Russia: Sudan kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €85m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Russian forces in the country Wagner Group or Russia's Africa Corps operated here: 2022, 2023. Paid to them and taken by their firms, at Russia's gain, against 2021: €124m.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 51% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €134m of the net's €94m.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Less paid to Russian forces here (Wagner / Africa Corps). What decides it: if Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here were 71% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €6m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.01% | €6m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.20% · €88m

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.30% | €134m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Less paid to Russian forces here (Wagner / Africa Corps)D | +0.28% | €124m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.12% | €51m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.06% | €28m |
| Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€17m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −€17m | −€17m | −0.04% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€1m | +€13m | +€12m | −0.01% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€2m | +<€1m | −€2m | −0.02% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€2m | +€9m | +€7m | −<0.01% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€1m | −€93m | −€94m | −0.21% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Sudan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€6m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€6m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.26bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.40bn in 2025 (+57%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 0.29% of what it bought from Russia. For Sudan: €28m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2026. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Sudan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0.85bn | €0.26bnrange €0.14bn to €0.40bn | €0.85bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €23m | €7mrange €4m to €11m | €25m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €6.2bn | €1.5bn | – | – |
| All goods | €7.1bn | €1.8bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Sudan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Sudan. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#SDN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €85m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €51m (0.12% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is too close to call, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Ethiopia](https://warbalance.org/country/ethiopia/) | +<0.01% · +€6m · essentially zero |
| Sudan | −0.21% · −€94m · too close to call · 54% toward Russia |
| [Eritrea](https://warbalance.org/country/eritrea/) | −0.32% · −€7m · likely toward Russia · 68% |
| [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) | −0.43% · −€1.7bn · likely toward Russia · 95% |
| [Central African Republic](https://warbalance.org/country/central-african-republic/) | −4.8% · −€0.12bn · likely toward Russia · 92% |
| [Libya](https://warbalance.org/country/libya/) | −6.6% · −€2.8bn · very likely · 99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Morocco](https://warbalance.org/country/morocco/) | −0.13% · −€0.18bn · too close to call · 59% toward Russia |
| [Benin](https://warbalance.org/country/benin/) | −0.36% · −€65m · too close to call · 56% toward Russia |
| [Togo](https://warbalance.org/country/togo/) | −0.48% · −€43m · too close to call · 50% toward Russia |
| [Syria](https://warbalance.org/country/syria/) | −1.0% · −€0.20bn · too close to call · 64% toward Russia |

## How the number is backed

19 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 49% modelled (C) and 51% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (90%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Less paid to Russian forces here (Wagner / Africa Corps) D

- research · [Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/wagners-business-model-syria-and-africa-profit-and-patronage)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/wagners-business-model-syria-and-africa-profit-and-patronage)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is Sudan helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.21% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.98% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 54% toward Russia). Chance toward Russia: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €88m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### What decides Sudan's number?

Chance toward Russia: 54%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Less paid to Russian forces here (Wagner / Africa Corps). What decides it: if Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here were 71% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Does Sudan trade with Russia?

It bought €0.40bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.26bn in 2021), and sold €1m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €88m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war.

### How does Sudan compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Ethiopia +<0.01%, Sudan −0.21%, Eritrea −0.32%, Egypt −0.43%, Central African Republic −4.8%, Libya −6.6%.

### Where do the numbers for Sudan come from?

19 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Less paid to Russian forces here (Wagner / Africa Corps): [Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/wagners-business-model-syria-and-africa-profit-and-patronage); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Sudan have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Sudan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Sudan.

## Nearby in the ranking

Too close to call

- [Paraguay](https://warbalance.org/country/paraguay/) · −0.12% · Too close to call · −€50m · 55%
- [Morocco](https://warbalance.org/country/morocco/) · −0.13% · Too close to call · −€182m · 59%
- [Cabo Verde](https://warbalance.org/country/cabo-verde/) · −0.17% · Too close to call · −€4m · 56%
- Sudan−0.21% · Too close to call · −€94m · 54%
- [Benin](https://warbalance.org/country/benin/) · −0.36% · Too close to call · −€65m · 56%
- [Tajikistan](https://warbalance.org/country/tajikistan/) · −0.40% · Too close to call · −€46m · 58%
- [Saint Vincent and the Grenadines](https://warbalance.org/country/saint-vincent-and-the-grenadines/) · −0.41% · Too close to call · −€4m · 61%

## More about Sudan

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

19 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#SDN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/sudan/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/sudan/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/sudan/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/sudan/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/sudan/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/sudan/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/sudan/