# Does South Korea trade with Russia, and how much has it given Ukraine?

South Korea's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.88bn (0.05% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €17.2bn (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 1.1% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.34% to 2.0% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#KOR)

Toward Ukraine by

1.1% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 99%

likely 0.34% to 2.0% toward Ukraine · €18.1bn · ≈ 0.23%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.1% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.

Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.05%

€877m

likely 0.04% to 0.10% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

1.0%

€17.2bn

likely 0.29% to 1.9% toward Ukraine very likely · 99%

Russia kept €17.2bn (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.95% of GDP less (€16.3bn; likely 0.26% to 1.8% toward Ukraine)
- South Korea's own gain from trade with Russia: South Korea kept 0.05% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€894m; likely from 0.11% toward Russia to 0.12% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€18m).

## Its story in short

- Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €15m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 13% was required by sanctions it set itself (export controls), 87% went beyond them.
- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €3.3bn (0.19% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Bought 55% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €13.3bn in 2021, €5.9bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €17.8bn of the net's €18.1bn.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.05% · €877m

| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.03% | €509m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €351m |
| South Korea kept part of others' aid, spent hereD | −<0.01% | €56m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €43m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €29m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €1m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.0% · €17.2bn

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +1.0% | €17.8bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.19% | €3.3bn |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxC | +0.12% | €2.1bn |
| South Korea's companies made less profit in RussiaC | +0.08% | €1.4bn |
| South Korea earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsC | −0.02% | €416m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €281m |
| South Korea kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €118m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €8m |
| South Korea kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €7m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €18m

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD | +<0.01% | €18m |
| --- | --- | --- |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€4.5bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.37bn in 2022 to €62m in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€369m | +€2.1bn | +€2m | +€2.5bn | +0.14% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€202m | +€4.3bn | +€5m | +€4.5bn | +0.40% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€218m | +€4.0bn | +€5m | +€4.2bn | +0.65% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€62m | +€3.3bn | +€4m | +€3.3bn | +0.84% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€26m | +€3.6bn | +€2m | +€3.6bn | +1.1% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

South Korea's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €12mrange €9m to €14m; Kiel: €15m |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €0.18bnof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €29m |
| Humanitarian aid | €0.34bn |
| Refugee hosting | €1m |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.39bn |
| Money flowing back | −€56msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.88bn |

Quality of the split: B

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €13.3bn from Russia in 2021 and €5.9bn in 2025 (−55%). It sold €8.5bn to Russia in 2021 and €5.2bn in 2025 (−38%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 78.4% of what it bought from Russia. For South Korea: €3.3bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

South Korea's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €2.2bn | €1.8bnrange €1.4bn to €2.2bn | €1.7bn | A |
| Oil products | €1.9bn | €2.2bnrange €1.7bn to €2.8bn | €6.4bn | C (estimate) |
| LNG | €5.3bn | €4.8bnrange €3.8bn to €6bn | €5bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €15.2bn | €13.8bnrange €10.9bn to €17.2bn | €13.7bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €14.4bn | €13.6bn | – | – |
| All goods | €39.1bn | €36.3bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 13% required by sanctions it set itself, 87% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. South Korea has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 28 February 2022. They are export controls and financial measures, not a general sanctions regime. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists South Korea as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by South Korea. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Korea MOFA, 28 February 2022 announcement on export controls and SWIFT](https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m\_5676/view.do?seq=322003) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#KOR)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €5.2bn extra from 2022 (0.30% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.70bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€18m; likely €0 to €186m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €559m; counted here: €509m — loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €92m; Loans, grant equivalent: €22m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €2.4bn. It is not counted here.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€2.2bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in South Korea; what its firms kept of it, €56m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Its firms paid Russia less tax: €2.1bn (0.12% of one year's GDP). South Korea's companies made less profit in Russia: €1.4bn (0.08% of one year's GDP). Russia took €78m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €26m to €236m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.28bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). South Korea kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.12bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €273m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €257m to €1.1bn); €183m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 26 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| South Korea | +1.1% · +€18.1bn · very likely · 99% |
| [North Korea](https://warbalance.org/country/north-korea/) | −19.9% · −€5.9bn · Party to the war |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Japan](https://warbalance.org/country/japan/) | +0.30% · +€12.2bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

36 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 9 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 2% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 95% modelled (C) and 3% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia less tax C

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

### South Korea's companies made less profit in Russia C

- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

## Questions

### Does South Korea trade with Russia?

It bought €5.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€13.3bn in 2021), and sold €5.2bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €17.2bn (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Does South Korea still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 78.4% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €5.9bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €13.3bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### Is South Korea helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +1.1% of one year's GDP (likely 0.34% to 2.0% toward Ukraine; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Ukraine: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €17.2bn (1.0% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How much has South Korea given to Ukraine?

South Korea's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.88bn, 0.05% of one year's GDP (likely 0.04% to 0.10%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Did South Korea cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 13% required by sanctions it set itself, 87% beyond what sanctions required.

### How much did South Korea give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €0.37bn; 2023 €0.20bn; 2024 €0.22bn; 2025 €62m; 2026 (to August) €26m. In total since 2022: €0.88bn (likely 0.04% to 0.10%).

### Does South Korea have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. South Korea has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 28 February 2022. They are export controls and financial measures, not a general sanctions regime. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists South Korea as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by South Korea. Sources: [Korea MOFA, 28 February 2022 announcement on export controls and SWIFT](https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m\_5676/view.do?seq=322003) (search summary, to be checked against the official text); [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 26 of 32

23. [Malta](https://warbalance.org/country/malta/) · +1.2% · Toward Ukraine · +€248m
24. [Iceland](https://warbalance.org/country/iceland/) · +1.2% · Toward Ukraine · +€348m
25. [Spain](https://warbalance.org/country/spain/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€16.6bn
26. South Korea+1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€18.1bn
27. [Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/) · +1.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.7bn
28. [Canada](https://warbalance.org/country/canada/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€10.6bn
29. [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€132bn

## More about South Korea

### Compared with

- [China vs South Korea](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-south-korea/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-spent-in-other-countries/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

36 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#KOR) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/south-korea/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/south-korea/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/south-korea/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/south-korea/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/south-korea/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/south-korea/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/south-korea/