# Is South Africa helping Russia? What the money flows show

South Africa's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.8bn (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1.7bn of €1.8bn). The net is 0.49% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#ZAF)

Toward Russia by

0.49% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia · €1.8bn · ≈ 0.10%/yr

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.49% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by

<0.01%

€3m

likely from 0.01% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.49%

€1.8bn

likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Russia kept €1.8bn (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1.7bn of €1.8bn).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.48% of GDP more (€1.8bn; likely 0.19% to 0.70% toward Russia)
- South Africa's own gain from trade with Russia: South Africa kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€21m; likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1.7bn of the net's €1.8bn.

## What makes up the number

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by <0.01% · €3m

| South Africa kept part of others' aid, spent hereC | −<0.01% | €10m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €9m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €2m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.49% · €1.8bn

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC | −0.47% | €1.7bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.03% | €93m |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.01% | €55m |
| South Africa earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −<0.01% | €27m |
| South Africa's companies made less profit in RussiaC | +<0.01% | €26m |
| South Africa kept more from selling to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €19m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxC | −<0.01% | €3m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| South Africa kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.57bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2m | −€571m | −€569m | −0.15% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€2m | −€491m | −€489m | −0.29% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€1m | −€412m | −€412m | −0.40% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€5m | −€155m | −€160m | −0.44% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | −€177m | −€177m | −0.49% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

South Africa's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €9mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €9m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€2m |
| Money flowing back | −€10msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€3m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.49bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.46bn in 2025 (−6%). It sold €0.35bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.78bn in 2025 (+124%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 11.5% of what it bought from Russia. For South Africa: €55m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

South Africa's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0.13bn | €0.40bnrange €0.24bn to €0.62bn | €0.19bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0.18bn | €0.17bnrange €0.11bn to €0.25bn | €59m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €2bn | €1.9bn | – | – |
| All goods | €2.4bn | €2.5bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of South Africa's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name South Africa. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#ZAF)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €16m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.32bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in South Africa; what its firms kept of it, €10m, is taken off its support.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1.7bn (0.47% of one year's GDP). More fuel bought from refiners abroad, some of it made from Russian crude, because its own refineries closed (New Zealand's Marsden Point in 2022; South Africa's Engen and SAPREF in 2020 and 2022). A structural change in supply, not a policy.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 21 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 4 of 6 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Eswatini](https://warbalance.org/country/eswatini/) | +0.01% · +€1m · essentially zero |
| [Lesotho](https://warbalance.org/country/lesotho/) | +0.01% · +<€1m · essentially zero |
| [Zimbabwe](https://warbalance.org/country/zimbabwe/) | −0.05% · −€17m · essentially zero |
| [Botswana](https://warbalance.org/country/botswana/) | −0.07% · −€12m · essentially zero |
| South Africa | −0.49% · −€1.8bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Namibia](https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/) | −0.83% · −€0.10bn · likely toward Russia · 77% |
| [Mozambique](https://warbalance.org/country/mozambique/) | −0.85% · −€0.16bn · likely toward Russia · 68% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Iran](https://warbalance.org/country/iran/) | −0.44% · −€1.9bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) | −0.35% · −€0.18bn · very likely · 97% |
| [Saudi Arabia](https://warbalance.org/country/saudi-arabia/) | −0.30% · −€3.5bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Côte d'Ivoire](https://warbalance.org/country/cote-divoire/) | −0.71% · −€0.52bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

28 sources back its parts: 9 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 99% modelled (C) and 1% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries C

- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### South Africa earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### South Africa's companies made less profit in Russia C

- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is South Africa helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.49% of one year's GDP (likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.8bn (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1.7bn of €1.8bn). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### South Africa–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €0.46bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.49bn in 2021), and sold €0.78bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €3m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.49% of one year's GDP (likely 0.18% to 0.79% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does South Africa trade with Russia?

It bought €0.46bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.49bn in 2021), and sold €0.78bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.8bn (0.49% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€1.7bn of €1.8bn).

### How does South Africa compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Eswatini +0.01%, Lesotho +0.01%, Zimbabwe −0.05%, Botswana −0.07%, South Africa −0.49%, Namibia −0.83%, Mozambique −0.85%. In the map's ranking: number 21 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for South Africa come from?

28 sources back its parts, 9 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T); Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does South Africa have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of South Africa's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name South Africa.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 21 of 32

23. [Iran](https://warbalance.org/country/iran/) · −0.44% · Toward Russia · −€1.9bn
- [Comoros](https://warbalance.org/country/comoros/) · −0.48% · Toward Russia · −€7m
22. [Jamaica](https://warbalance.org/country/jamaica/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€94m
21. South Africa−0.49% · Toward Russia · −€1.8bn
20. [Brazil](https://warbalance.org/country/brazil/) · −0.51% · Toward Russia · −€10.1bn
19. [Malaysia](https://warbalance.org/country/malaysia/) · −0.64% · Toward Russia · −€2.5bn
- [Niue](https://warbalance.org/country/niue/) · −0.67% · Toward Russia · −<€1m

## More about South Africa

### Groups

- [BRICS](https://warbalance.org/group/brics/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-spent-in-other-countries/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

28 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#ZAF) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/south-africa/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/south-africa/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/south-africa/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/south-africa/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/south-africa/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/south-africa/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/south-africa/