# Is Slovenia helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Slovenia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.49bn (0.78% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €154m (0.25% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€460m; the other parts take €305m off it); Russia also lost €79m of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.66% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 88%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#SVN)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

0.66% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 88%

likely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine · €417m · ≈ 0.14%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.66% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly war-time prices on oil, largest in 2022.

Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.78%

€493m

likely 0.50% to 1.5% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.25%

€154m

likely from 1.1% toward Russia to 2.1% toward Ukraine too close to call · 58% toward Russia

Russia kept €154m (0.25% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€460m; the other parts take €305m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.20% of GDP more (€126m; likely from 0.96% toward Russia to 2.1% toward Ukraine)
- Slovenia's own gain from trade with Russia: Slovenia kept 0.05% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€28m; likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€79m).

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €460m (0.73% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€79m; likely €57m to €92m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 91% larger, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.78% · €493m

| Hosting refugeesC | +0.31% | €196m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of EU aidB | +0.30% | €188m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansC | +0.11% | €72m |
| Private donationsD | +0.04% | €27m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.01% | €8m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €3m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.25% · €154m

| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.73% | €460m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.57% | €356m |
| Slovenia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.08% | €51m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.05% | €32m |
| Slovenia's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +0.04% | €23m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €4m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €79m

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC | +0.08% | €51m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD | +0.04% | €28m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.54bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.10bn in 2022 to €98m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€105m | −€645m | +€6m | −€535m | −0.85% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€102m | +€106m | +€25m | +€233m | −0.48% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€102m | +€121m | +€22m | +€245m | −0.09% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€98m | +€80m | +€16m | +€194m | +0.22% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€86m | +€183m | +€10m | +€279m | +0.66% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Slovenia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €45mrange €2m to €0.12bn; Kiel: €0.16bn |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €3mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €3m |
| Humanitarian aid | €26m |
| Refugee hosting | €0.20bn |
| Share of EU aid | €0.19bnof which military: €1m |
| Private donations and purchases | €35m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.49bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.37bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.14bn in 2025 (−62%). It sold €0.90bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.3bn in 2025 (+43%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 74.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Slovenia: €460m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 46% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Slovenia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0.94bn | €0.85bnrange €0.74bn to €1bn | €0.98bn | A |
| Pipeline gas | €73m | €69mrange €61m to €83m | €0.80bn | A |
| Coal | €54m | €50mrange €44m to €61m | €21m | A |
| Other goods | €0.71bn | €0.87bn | – | – |
| All goods | €1.8bn | €1.8bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. As an EU member, Slovenia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Slovenia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Slovenia. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#SVN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.36bn extra from 2022 (0.57% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€79m; likely €57m to €92m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.

## Refugees from Ukraine

11,535 refugees from Ukraine, 5.4 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.20bn (0.31% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Slovenia: €196m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €185m; counted here: €72m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €0.27bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.12bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.34bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €60m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€12m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Slovenia; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russia took €15m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €6m to €39m; 0.02% of a year's GDP.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Italy](https://warbalance.org/country/italy/) | +1.6% · +€34.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Croatia](https://warbalance.org/country/croatia/) | +1.5% · +€1.2bn · very likely · >99% |
| Slovenia | +0.66% · +€0.42bn · likely toward Ukraine · 88% |
| [Austria](https://warbalance.org/country/austria/) | +0.45% · +€2.1bn · likely toward Ukraine · 68% |
| [Hungary](https://warbalance.org/country/hungary/) | −6.0% · −€11.4bn · very likely · 97% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Austria](https://warbalance.org/country/austria/) | +0.45% · +€2.1bn · likely toward Ukraine · 68% |
| [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) | +3.3% · +€3.1bn · likely toward Ukraine · 95% |

## How the number is backed

33 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 13% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 77% modelled (C) and 11% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Hosting refugees C

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

### Its share of EU aid B

- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans C

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### How much has Slovenia given to Ukraine?

Slovenia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.49bn, 0.78% of one year's GDP (likely 0.50% to 1.5%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Is Slovenia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.66% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 88%). Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €154m (0.25% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€460m; the other parts take €305m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Slovenia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €0.14bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.37bn in 2021), and sold €1.3bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.49bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.66% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.24% toward Russia to 3.1% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 88%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does Slovenia still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 74.2% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.14bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €0.37bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### Does Slovenia trade with Russia?

It bought €0.14bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.37bn in 2021), and sold €1.3bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €154m (0.25% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€460m; the other parts take €305m off it).

### What decides Slovenia's number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 91% larger, the direction would flip.

### Does Slovenia have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. As an EU member, Slovenia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Slovenia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Slovenia. Sources: [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj); [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026).

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

- [Greenland](https://warbalance.org/country/greenland/) · +1.5% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€46m · 67%
- [Kosovo](https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/) · +1.1% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€106m · 91%
- [Cameroon](https://warbalance.org/country/cameroon/) · +0.99% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€452m · 94%
- Slovenia+0.66% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€417m · 88%
- [Liberia](https://warbalance.org/country/liberia/) · +0.63% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€26m · 85%
- [Bosnia and Herzegovina](https://warbalance.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/) · +0.56% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€142m · 85%
- [Rwanda](https://warbalance.org/country/rwanda/) · +0.55% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€74m · 90%

## More about Slovenia

### Groups

- [EU countries](https://warbalance.org/group/eu/)
- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Share of EU aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/eu-aid-to-ukraine-by-member/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Frozen Russian private assets](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-private-assets/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

33 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#SVN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/slovenia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/slovenia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/slovenia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/slovenia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/slovenia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/slovenia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/slovenia/