# Is Singapore helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

Singapore's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.12bn (0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Singapore moved €2.2bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Singapore kept more from selling to Russia). The net is 0.41% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 75%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#SGP)

Leaning toward Russia by

0.41% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 75%

likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine · €2.0bn · ≈ 0.09%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.41% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: 75%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.02%

€119m

likely 0.01% to 0.08% essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.44%

€2.2bn

likely from 1.6% toward Russia to 0.71% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 78%

Singapore moved €2.2bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Singapore kept more from selling to Russia).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.40% of GDP more (€2.0bn; likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 0.76% toward Ukraine)
- Singapore's own gain from trade with Russia: Singapore kept 0.04% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€215m; likely from 0.35% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€46m).

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €932m (0.19% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €605m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 75%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.02% · €119m

| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €107m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €11m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €2m |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.44% · €2.2bn

| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.19% | €932m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.14% | €690m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.07% | €332m |
| Singapore kept more from shipping Russian oilC | −0.05% | €264m |
| Singapore kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €19m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €18m |
| Singapore's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €15m |
| Singapore kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €15m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €46m

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyD | +<0.01% | €46m |
| --- | --- | --- |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€1.4bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €82m in 2022 to €7m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€82m | +€830m | +€5m | +€916m | +0.18% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€14m | −€631m | +€13m | −€604m | +0.06% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€11m | −€1.5bn | +€13m | −€1.4bn | −0.23% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€7m | −€432m | +€10m | −€415m | −0.31% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€6m | −€485m | +€5m | −€475m | −0.41% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Singapore's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €11mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €11m |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.11bn |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.12bn |

Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €2.6bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.4bn in 2025 (+32%). It sold €0.41bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.12bn in 2025 (−71%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 88.3% of what it bought from Russia. For Singapore: €932m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Singapore's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.31bn | €0.25bnrange €0.17bn to €0.36bn | €0.10bn | A |
| Oil products | €13.2bn | €12.4bnrange €8.8bn to €17.1bn | €18bn | A |
| LNG | €95m | €89mrange €61m to €0.13bn | €38m | A |
| Coal | €20m | €19mrange €13m to €26m | €13m | A |
| Other goods | €1.3bn | €2.9bn | – | – |
| All goods | €14.9bn | €15.6bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Singapore has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 5 March 2022. They are export controls and financial measures, not a general sanctions regime. It applies export controls on Russia. Separately, Russia lists Singapore as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Singapore. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Singapore MFA, Sanctions and restrictions against Russia, 5 March 2022](https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2022/03/20220305-sanctions)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#SGP)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.28bn extra from 2022 (0.06% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.61bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€46m; likely €0 to €230m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€27m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Singapore; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russia took €337m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €192m to €873m; 0.07% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.69bn (0.14% of one year's GDP). Singapore kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.26bn (0.05% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €30m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €29m to €118m); €110m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Hong Kong](https://warbalance.org/country/hong-kong/) | −1.6% · −€5.8bn · likely toward Russia · 97% |
| [Mongolia](https://warbalance.org/country/mongolia/) | −6.4% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 77% |

## How the number is backed

31 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 64% modelled (C) and 36% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)

### Singapore kept more from shipping Russian oil C

- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)

### Private donations D

- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

## Questions

### Is Singapore helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.41% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 0.75% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 75%). Chance toward Russia: 75%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Singapore moved €2.2bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Singapore kept more from selling to Russia). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Singapore still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 88.3% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €3.4bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €2.6bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### Does Singapore trade with Russia?

It bought €3.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€2.6bn in 2021), and sold €0.12bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Singapore moved €2.2bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Singapore kept more from selling to Russia).

### Does Singapore help Russia get around sanctions?

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €30m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €29m to €118m); €110m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### How much has Singapore given to Ukraine?

Singapore's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.12bn, 0.02% of one year's GDP (likely 0.01% to 0.08%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### How much did Singapore give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €82m; 2023 €14m; 2024 €11m; 2025 €7m; 2026 (to August) €6m. In total since 2022: €0.12bn (likely 0.01% to 0.08%).

### Does Singapore have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Singapore has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 5 March 2022. They are export controls and financial measures, not a general sanctions regime. It applies export controls on Russia. Separately, Russia lists Singapore as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Singapore. Sources: [Singapore MFA, Sanctions and restrictions against Russia, 5 March 2022](https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-Photos/2022/03/20220305-sanctions); [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001).

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Sao Tome and Principe](https://warbalance.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe/) · −0.29% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2m · 71%
- [Kenya](https://warbalance.org/country/kenya/) · −0.31% · Leaning toward Russia · −€333m · 90%
- [Eritrea](https://warbalance.org/country/eritrea/) · −0.32% · Leaning toward Russia · −€7m · 68%
- Singapore−0.41% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2.0bn · 75%
- [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) · −0.43% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.7bn · 95%
- [Marshall Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/marshall-islands/) · −0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2m · 78%
- [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) · −0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€3.5bn · 97%

## More about Singapore

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

31 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#SGP) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/singapore/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/singapore/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/singapore/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/singapore/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/singapore/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/singapore/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/singapore/