# Does Serbia support Russia? Leaning toward Russia

Serbia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.1bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.0bn of €1.1bn). The net is 1.4% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 3.6% toward Russia to 1.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 84%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#SRB)

Leaning toward Russia by

1.4% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 84%

likely from 3.6% toward Russia to 1.3% toward Ukraine · €1.1bn · ≈ 0.31%/yr

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 1.4% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on gas contracts).

Chance toward Russia: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by

<0.01%

€2m

likely from 0.10% below zero to 0.04% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

1.4%

€1.1bn

likely from 3.6% toward Russia to 1.3% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 83%

Russia kept €1.1bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.0bn of €1.1bn).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.3% of GDP more (€942m; likely from 3.3% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine)
- Serbia's own gain from trade with Russia: Serbia kept 0.15% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€111m; likely from 0.70% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €1.0bn (1.4% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian-owned firms here Russian owners kept €84m (0.11% of GDP) more from their firms here.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: €1.0bn of the net's €1.1bn.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

## What makes up the number

Earned more from Ukraine's war effort than it gave, by <0.01% · €2m

| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.02% | €16m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Serbia kept more from arms Ukraine bought hereD | −0.02% | €12m |
| Serbia kept part of others' aid, spent hereD | −0.01% | €10m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €3m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €3m |
| Serbia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Serbia kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €1m |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 1.4% · €1.1bn

| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −1.4% | €1.0bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.32% | €234m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.12% | €87m |
| Russian owners kept more from their firms hereC | −0.11% | €84m |
| Serbia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.09% | €69m |
| Serbia kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −0.05% | €34m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.01% | €10m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.01% | €9m |
| Serbia's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €7m |
| Serbia kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Serbia kept less from selling to RussiaD | +<0.01% | €6m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.95bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€1m | −€950m | −€949m | −1.3% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€2m | −€260m | −€262m | −1.6% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€4m | +€13m | +€9m | −1.6% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | +<€1m | +€1m | −1.6% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€2m | +€144m | +€145m | −1.4% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Serbia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Humanitarian aid | €3m |
| Refugee hosting | €3m |
| Private donations and purchases | €16m |
| Money flowing back | −€24msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€2m |

Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.2bn in 2025 (−13%). It sold €0.79bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.59bn in 2025 (−25%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.3% of what it bought from Russia. For Serbia: €1.0bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023, 85% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Serbia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €1bn | €0.91bnrange €0.69bn to €1.1bn | not tracked | A |
| Oil products | €97m | €92mrange €69m to €0.12bn | not tracked | A |
| Pipeline gas | €4.2bn | €4.1bnrange €2.9bn to €5.3bn | €5bn | A |
| Coal | €21m | €21mrange €15m to €26m | not tracked | A |
| Other goods | €2.6bn | €2.5bn | – | – |
| All goods | €7.9bn | €7.6bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

No. Serbia has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2025). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Serbia. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Serbia and EU alignment on Russia (news report)](https://n1info.rs/english/news/serbia-fails-to-align-with-two-new-eu-measures-against-russia/) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#SRB)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €33m extra from 2022 (0.04% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Refugees from Ukraine

16,142 refugees from Ukraine, 2.5 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €3m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Serbia: €3m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.78bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Serbia; what its firms kept of it, €24m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €84m (0.11% of one year's GDP).

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €87m (0.12% of one year's GDP). Serbia kept more from settling Russia's trade: €7m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €37m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €30m to €68m); €12m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) | +3.3% · +€3.1bn · likely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| [Romania](https://warbalance.org/country/romania/) | +2.8% · +€8.9bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Croatia](https://warbalance.org/country/croatia/) | +1.5% · +€1.2bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Kosovo](https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/) | +1.1% · +€0.11bn · likely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| [Bosnia and Herzegovina](https://warbalance.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/) | +0.56% · +€0.14bn · likely toward Ukraine · 85% |
| [Montenegro](https://warbalance.org/country/montenegro/) | +0.37% · +€25m · likely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| Serbia | −1.4% · −€1.1bn · likely toward Russia · 84% |
| [North Macedonia](https://warbalance.org/country/north-macedonia/) | −2.1% · −€0.30bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |
| [Hungary](https://warbalance.org/country/hungary/) | −6.0% · −€11.4bn · very likely · 97% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [North Macedonia](https://warbalance.org/country/north-macedonia/) | −2.1% · −€0.30bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |
| [Armenia](https://warbalance.org/country/armenia/) | −0.17% · −€37m · likely toward Russia · 69% |
| [Georgia](https://warbalance.org/country/georgia/) | −4.1% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |

## How the number is backed

39 sources back its parts: 14 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 86% modelled (C) and 14% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [ENTSOG Transparency Platform: metered physical gas flows at the TurkStream, Balkan and Central European border points, 2021-11 to 2026-08](https://transparency.entsog.eu/api/v1/operationalData)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russian owners kept more from their firms here C

- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)

### Serbia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [War-time gas price windfall under the pre-war no-war price paths: World Bank and IMF October-2021 forecasts, IMF/EIA/ECB January-2022 views, ICE TTF futures of mid-February 2022 and of early 2021 (TTF Cal-22 at EUR 16.7-18.1/MWh, January-March 2021); each contract's TTF/oil formula](https://www.ice.com/products/27996665/Dutch-TTF-Natural-Gas-Futures/data)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [ENTSOG Transparency Platform: metered physical gas flows at the TurkStream, Balkan and Central European border points, 2021-11 to 2026-08](https://transparency.entsog.eu/api/v1/operationalData)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)

## Questions

### Does Serbia support Russia?

In money terms the net is −1.4% of one year's GDP (likely from 3.6% toward Russia to 1.3% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 84%). Chance toward Russia: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.1bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.0bn of €1.1bn). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Serbia trade with Russia?

It bought €1.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.4bn in 2021), and sold €0.59bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.1bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price spike (€1.0bn of €1.1bn).

### Does Serbia still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 55.3% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.2bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €1.4bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### Does Serbia help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €37m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €30m to €68m); €12m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### How does Serbia compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bulgaria +3.3%, Romania +2.8%, Croatia +1.5%, Kosovo +1.1%, Bosnia and Herzegovina +0.56%, Montenegro +0.37%, Serbia −1.4%, North Macedonia −2.1%, Hungary −6.0%.

### Where do the numbers for Serbia come from?

39 sources back its parts, 14 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Serbia have sanctions on Russia?

No. Serbia has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2025). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Serbia. Sources: [Serbia and EU alignment on Russia (news report)](https://n1info.rs/english/news/serbia-fails-to-align-with-two-new-eu-measures-against-russia/) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) · −0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€3.5bn · 97%
- [Namibia](https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/) · −0.83% · Leaning toward Russia · −€100m · 77%
- [Mozambique](https://warbalance.org/country/mozambique/) · −0.85% · Leaning toward Russia · −€165m · 68%
- Serbia−1.4% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.1bn · 84%
- [Gambia](https://warbalance.org/country/gambia/) · −1.5% · Leaning toward Russia · −€33m · 88%
- [Hong Kong](https://warbalance.org/country/hong-kong/) · −1.6% · Leaning toward Russia · −€5.8bn · 97%
- [Djibouti](https://warbalance.org/country/djibouti/) · −1.6% · Leaning toward Russia · −€59m · 89%

## More about Serbia

### Groups

- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Compared with

- [Hungary vs Serbia](https://warbalance.org/compare/hungary-vs-serbia/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad](https://warbalance.org/russian-owned-companies-abroad/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-spent-in-other-countries/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

39 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#SRB) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/serbia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/serbia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/serbia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/serbia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/serbia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/serbia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/