# Is Saudi Arabia helping Russia? What the money flows show

Saudi Arabia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.36bn (0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €3.9bn (0.33% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.30% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.08% to 0.52% toward Russia; very likely · 99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#SAU)

Toward Russia by

0.30% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 99%

likely 0.08% to 0.52% toward Russia · €3.5bn · ≈ 0.06%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.30% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.03%

€359m

likely <0.01% to 0.05% essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.33%

€3.9bn

likely 0.11% to 0.55% toward Russia very likely · 99%

Russia kept €3.9bn (0.33% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.33% of GDP more (€3.8bn; likely 0.11% to 0.55% toward Russia)
- Saudi Arabia's own gain from trade with Russia: Saudi Arabia kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€20m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €1.3bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 212% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.1bn in 2021, €3.5bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €4.2bn of the net's €3.5bn.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.03% · €359m

| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.03% | €366m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €38m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €31m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.33% · €3.9bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.36% | €4.2bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.04% | €478m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €76m |
| Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD | −<0.01% | €25m |
| Saudi Arabia kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €16m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €13m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €5m |
| Saudi Arabia's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Saudi Arabia kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Saudi Arabia kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.96bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €13m in 2022 to €8m in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€13m | −€180m | −€167m | −0.01% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€293m | −€1.1bn | −€818m | −0.09% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€46m | −€1.0bn | −€965m | −0.17% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€8m | −€928m | −€920m | −0.25% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€1m | −€626m | −€627m | −0.30% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Saudi Arabia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €30mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €30m |
| Humanitarian aid | €0.37bn |
| Private donations and purchases | −€38m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.36bn |

Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.1bn from Russia in 2021 and €3.5bn in 2025 (+212%). It sold €69m to Russia in 2021 and €67m in 2025 (−2%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 15.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Saudi Arabia: €478m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Saudi Arabia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0m | €0m | €25m | – |
| Oil products | €6.3bn | €6bnrange €4.4bn to €7.7bn | €17bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €79m | €75mrange €54m to €0.10bn | €4m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €7.5bn | €9.5bn | – | – |
| All goods | €13.9bn | €15.5bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Saudi Arabia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Saudi Arabia. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#SAU)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €1.3bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 27 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. Gulf states: number 2 of 2 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Kuwait](https://warbalance.org/country/kuwait/) | +<0.01% · +€1m · essentially zero |
| [Qatar](https://warbalance.org/country/qatar/) | −0.02% · −€32m · essentially zero |
| [Iraq](https://warbalance.org/country/iraq/) | −0.22% · −€0.57bn · very likely · 96% |
| Saudi Arabia | −0.30% · −€3.5bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) | −0.35% · −€0.18bn · very likely · 97% |
| [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) | −0.71% · −€3.5bn · likely toward Russia · 97% |
| [Oman](https://warbalance.org/country/oman/) | −1.4% · −€1.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Yemen](https://warbalance.org/country/yemen/) | −5.2% · −€0.46bn · very likely · 99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) | −0.35% · −€0.18bn · very likely · 97% |
| [Iraq](https://warbalance.org/country/iraq/) | −0.22% · −€0.57bn · very likely · 96% |
| [Iran](https://warbalance.org/country/iran/) | −0.44% · −€1.9bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Sierra Leone](https://warbalance.org/country/sierra-leone/) | −0.14% · −€9m · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

30 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 7% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 91% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)

### Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)

## Questions

### Is Saudi Arabia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.30% of one year's GDP (likely 0.08% to 0.52% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €3.9bn (0.33% of GDP) more than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Saudi Arabia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €3.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.1bn in 2021), and sold €67m to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.36bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −0.30% of one year's GDP (likely 0.08% to 0.52% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does Saudi Arabia trade with Russia?

It bought €3.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.1bn in 2021), and sold €67m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €3.9bn (0.33% of GDP) more than without the war.

### How much has Saudi Arabia given to Ukraine?

Saudi Arabia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.36bn, 0.03% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 0.05%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### How much did Saudi Arabia give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €13m; 2023 €0.29bn; 2024 €46m; 2025 €8m; 2026 (to August) −€1m. In total since 2022: €0.36bn (likely <0.01% to 0.05%).

### How does Saudi Arabia compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Kuwait +<0.01%, Qatar −0.02%, Iraq −0.22%, Saudi Arabia −0.30%, Jordan −0.35%, United Arab Emirates −0.71%, Oman −1.4%, Yemen −5.2%. In the map's ranking: number 27 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Does Saudi Arabia have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Saudi Arabia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Saudi Arabia.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 27 of 32

28. [Iraq](https://warbalance.org/country/iraq/) · −0.22% · Toward Russia · −€568m
- [Solomon Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/solomon-islands/) · −0.27% · Toward Russia · −€4m
- [Samoa](https://warbalance.org/country/samoa/) · −0.29% · Toward Russia · −€3m
27. Saudi Arabia−0.30% · Toward Russia · −€3.5bn
- [Tonga](https://warbalance.org/country/tonga/) · −0.31% · Toward Russia · −€2m
26. [Fiji](https://warbalance.org/country/fiji/) · −0.35% · Toward Russia · −€18m
25. [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) · −0.35% · Toward Russia · −€183m

## More about Saudi Arabia

### Groups

- [Gulf states](https://warbalance.org/group/gulf-states/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

30 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#SAU) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/saudi-arabia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/saudi-arabia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/saudi-arabia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/saudi-arabia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/saudi-arabia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/saudi-arabia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/saudi-arabia/