# Is Oman helping Russia? What the money flows show

Oman's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€15m (−0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.4bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€788m of €1.4bn). The net is 1.4% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.64% to 2.3% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#OMN)

Toward Russia by

1.4% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.64% to 2.3% toward Russia · €1.4bn · ≈ 0.30%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 1.4% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.02%

€15m

likely <0.01% to 0.06% below zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

1.4%

€1.4bn

likely 0.63% to 2.3% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Russia kept €1.4bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€788m of €1.4bn).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.4% of GDP more (€1.4bn; likely 0.63% to 2.3% toward Russia)
- Oman's own gain from trade with Russia: Oman kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€4m; likely <0.01% to 0.08% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 56% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.02% · €15m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.01% | €15m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Oman kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €1m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 1.4% · €1.4bn

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.78% | €788m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.53% | €530m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.07% | €66m |
| Oman kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Oman kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.32bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€3m | −€301m | −€305m | −0.30% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€2m | −€319m | −€321m | −0.62% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€3m | −€235m | −€238m | −0.86% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€4m | −€249m | −€253m | −1.1% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€3m | −€284m | −€287m | −1.4% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Oman's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€15m |
| Money flowing back | −€1msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€15m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.43bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.38bn in 2025 (−12%). It sold €4m to Russia in 2021 and €7m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 7.9% of what it bought from Russia. For Oman: €66m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Oman's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €58m | €47mrange €32m to €70m | not tracked | A |
| Oil products | €0.83bn | €0.76bnrange €0.49bn to €1.2bn | €0.92bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €38m | €36mrange €24m to €54m | €30m | A |
| Other goods | €0.82bn | €1.2bn | – | – |
| All goods | €1.7bn | €2.1bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Oman's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Oman. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#OMN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €42m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€49m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Oman; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.79bn (0.78% of one year's GDP). Oman kept more from shipping Russian oil: €2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 12 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. Gulf states: number 1 of 2 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Saudi Arabia](https://warbalance.org/country/saudi-arabia/) | −0.30% · −€3.5bn · very likely · 99% |
| [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) | −0.71% · −€3.5bn · likely toward Russia · 97% |
| Oman | −1.4% · −€1.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Yemen](https://warbalance.org/country/yemen/) | −5.2% · −€0.46bn · very likely · 99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Tanzania](https://warbalance.org/country/tanzania/) | −1.1% · −€0.82bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Ghana](https://warbalance.org/country/ghana/) | −0.92% · −€0.68bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Mauritius](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritius/) | −0.86% · −€0.11bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Côte d'Ivoire](https://warbalance.org/country/cote-divoire/) | −0.71% · −€0.52bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

23 sources back its parts: 4 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 44% modelled (C) and 56% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Oman kept more from shipping Russian oil D

- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is Oman helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −1.4% of one year's GDP (likely 0.64% to 2.3% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.4bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€788m of €1.4bn). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Oman trade with Russia?

It bought €0.38bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.43bn in 2021), and sold €7m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.4bn (1.4% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€788m of €1.4bn).

### How does Oman compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Saudi Arabia −0.30%, United Arab Emirates −0.71%, Oman −1.4%, Yemen −5.2%. In the map's ranking: number 12 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Oman come from?

23 sources back its parts, 4 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Oman have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Oman's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Oman.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 12 of 32

15. [Sri Lanka](https://warbalance.org/country/sri-lanka/) · −0.87% · Toward Russia · −€698m
14. [Ghana](https://warbalance.org/country/ghana/) · −0.92% · Toward Russia · −€678m
13. [Tanzania](https://warbalance.org/country/tanzania/) · −1.1% · Toward Russia · −€821m
12. Oman−1.4% · Toward Russia · −€1.4bn
11. [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) · −1.5% · Toward Russia · −€236m
10. [India](https://warbalance.org/country/india/) · −2.2% · Toward Russia · −€70.6bn
- [Palau](https://warbalance.org/country/palau/) · −2.4% · Toward Russia · −€6m

## More about Oman

### Groups

- [Gulf states](https://warbalance.org/group/gulf-states/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Extra sales to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/sales-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

23 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#OMN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/oman/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/oman/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/oman/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/oman/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/oman/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/oman/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/oman/