# Does Norway trade with Russia, and how much has it given Ukraine?

Norway's support for Ukraine since 2022: €12.8bn (2.5% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2.0bn (0.40% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 2.9% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 2.4% to 3.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#NOR)

Toward Ukraine by

2.9% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 2.4% to 3.7% toward Ukraine · €14.8bn · ≈ 0.63%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 2.9% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. What Russia kept less was partly required by sanctions, partly beyond them.

Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

2.5%

€12.8bn

likely 2.1% to 3.2% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.40%

€2.0bn

likely 0.08% to 0.75% toward Ukraine very likely · 98%

Russia kept €2.0bn (0.40% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.39% of GDP less (€2.0bn; likely 0.14% to 0.73% toward Ukraine)
- Norway's own gain from trade with Russia: Norway kept 0.02% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€77m; likely from 0.19% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Partly its sanctions, partly beyond them Of the €2.0bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 41% was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 59% went beyond them.
- Bought 89% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €2.0bn in 2021, €218m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Top-10 aid giver for its size Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €8.5bn (1.7% of GDP), number 4 of 162 economies for its size.
- Hosts many refugees 86,255 refugees from Ukraine, 15 per 1,000 residents.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 2.5% · €12.8bn

| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +1.7% | €8.4bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hosting refugeesC | +0.88% | €4.4bn |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €94m |
| Norway kept back part of its aid, spent at homeC | −0.01% | €65m |
| Norway kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −0.01% | €54m |
| Norway kept part of others' aid, spent hereC | −<0.01% | €22m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €17m |
| Norway kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C | −<0.01% | €8m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €8m |
| Norway kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Norway kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €5m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.40% · €2.0bn

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.39% | €2.0bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Norway's companies made less profit in RussiaC | +0.03% | €156m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +0.02% | €125m |
| Norway kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −0.02% | €112m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.02% | €79m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €48m |
| Norway kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €21m |
| Norway kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €12m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €4m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€3.2bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €1.4bn in 2022 to €2.8bn in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€1.4bn | +€162m | +€1.6bn | +0.32% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€2.1bn | +€550m | +€2.6bn | +0.84% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€2.7bn | +€492m | +€3.2bn | +1.5% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€2.8bn | +€430m | +€3.2bn | +2.1% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€3.8bn | +€406m | +€4.2bn | +2.9% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Norway's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €4.4bnrange €2.6bn to €7.1bn; Kiel: €7.5bn |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €2.1bnof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €17m |
| Humanitarian aid | €2bn |
| Refugee hosting | €4.4bn |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.10bn |
| Money flowing back | −€0.16bnsubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €12.8bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €2bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.22bn in 2025 (−89%). It sold €0.38bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.10bn in 2025 (−73%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 27.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Norway: €79m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 14% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Norway's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0.58bn | €0.52bnrange €0.46bn to €0.59bn | €0.55bn | A |
| LNG | €46m | €43mrange €38m to €48m | €45m | A |
| Coal | €15m | €14mrange €13m to €16m | not tracked | A |
| Other goods | €1.9bn | €1.8bn | – | – |
| All goods | €2.5bn | €2.3bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 41% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 59% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Norway is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Norway as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Norway. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Norway, Regulation of 15 August 2014 No. 1076 and government release on the 10th package](https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/new-sanctions-against-russia-implemented-in-norwegian-law/id2970907/) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)
- [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1351, 29 June 2026](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/06/29/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-destabilising-activities-20261351/) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#NOR)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.25bn extra from 2022 (0.05% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €31m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.

## Refugees from Ukraine

86,255 refugees from Ukraine, 15 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €4.4bn (0.88% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Norway: €4.5bn spent on refugees, less €126m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €11.5bn; counted here: €8.4bn — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €20.2bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €2.0bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€2.6bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Norway; what its firms kept of it, €0.16bn, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Norway's companies made less profit in Russia: €0.16bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia less tax: €0.13bn (0.02% of one year's GDP). Russia took €1.7bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €1.0bn to €3.4bn; 0.34% of a year's GDP.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 14 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. NATO members: number 12 of 23 members toward Ukraine.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Finland](https://warbalance.org/country/finland/) | +8.5% · +€23.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Sweden](https://warbalance.org/country/sweden/) | +3.7% · +€20.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| Norway | +2.9% · +€14.8bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [United Kingdom](https://warbalance.org/country/united-kingdom/) | +1.8% · +€58.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Iceland](https://warbalance.org/country/iceland/) | +1.2% · +€0.35bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/) | +1.0% · +€8.7bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Moldova](https://warbalance.org/country/moldova/) | +6.9% · +€1.1bn · very likely · 97% |

## How the number is backed

34 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 54% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 44% modelled (C) and 2% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)

### Hosting refugees C

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)

### Norway's companies made less profit in Russia C

- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia less tax D

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)

## Questions

### How much has Norway given to Ukraine?

Norway's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €12.8bn, 2.5% of one year's GDP (likely 2.1% to 3.2%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Does Norway trade with Russia?

It bought €0.22bn from Russia in 2025 (€2bn in 2021), and sold €0.10bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €2.0bn (0.40% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Is Norway helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +2.9% of one year's GDP (likely 2.4% to 3.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2.0bn (0.40% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Norway–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €0.22bn from Russia in 2025 (€2bn in 2021), and sold €0.10bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €12.8bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +2.9% of one year's GDP (likely 2.4% to 3.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Did Norway cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 41% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 59% beyond what sanctions required.

### How much did Norway give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €1.4bn; 2023 €2.1bn; 2024 €2.7bn; 2025 €2.8bn; 2026 (to August) €3.8bn. In total since 2022: €12.8bn (likely 2.1% to 3.2%).

### Does Norway have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Norway is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Norway as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Norway. Sources: [Norway, Regulation of 15 August 2014 No. 1076 and government release on the 10th package](https://www.regjeringen.no/en/whats-new/new-sanctions-against-russia-implemented-in-norwegian-law/id2970907/) (search summary, to be checked against the official text); [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/1351, 29 June 2026](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/06/29/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-destabilising-activities-20261351/) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 14 of 32

11. [Cyprus](https://warbalance.org/country/cyprus/) · +3.6% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.2bn
12. [Luxembourg](https://warbalance.org/country/luxembourg/) · +3.5% · Toward Ukraine · +€2.9bn
13. [Belgium](https://warbalance.org/country/belgium/) · +3.4% · Toward Ukraine · +€20.3bn
14. Norway+2.9% · Toward Ukraine · +€14.8bn
15. [Romania](https://warbalance.org/country/romania/) · +2.8% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.9bn
16. [Czechia](https://warbalance.org/country/czechia/) · +2.6% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.0bn
17. [United Kingdom](https://warbalance.org/country/united-kingdom/) · +1.8% · Toward Ukraine · +€58.4bn

## More about Norway

### Groups

- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Compared with

- [Germany vs Norway](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-norway/)
- [United States vs Norway](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-norway/)
- [Netherlands vs Norway](https://warbalance.org/compare/netherlands-vs-norway/)
- [United Kingdom vs Norway](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-kingdom-vs-norway/)
- [France vs Norway](https://warbalance.org/compare/france-vs-norway/)
- [Poland vs Norway](https://warbalance.org/compare/poland-vs-norway/)
- [Norway vs Italy](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-italy/)
- [Norway vs Denmark](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-denmark/)
- [Norway vs Sweden](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-sweden/)
- [Norway vs Canada](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-canada/)
- [Norway vs Spain](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-spain/)
- [Norway vs Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-switzerland/)
- [Norway vs Ireland](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-ireland/)
- [Norway vs Belgium](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-belgium/)
- [Norway vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-japan/)
- [Norway vs Finland](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-finland/)
- [Norway vs Czechia](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-czechia/)
- [Norway vs Austria](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-austria/)
- [Norway vs Romania](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-romania/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Aid to Ukraine spent at home](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-spent-at-home/)
- [Refugee spending kept in the host economy](https://warbalance.org/refugee-spending-in-host-economies/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Other countries' aid to Ukraine spent here](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-spent-in-other-countries/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

34 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#NOR) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/norway/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/norway/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/norway/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/norway/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/norway/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/norway/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/norway/