# Is North Macedonia helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

North Macedonia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €61m (0.42% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €359m (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€352m of €359m). The net is 2.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 0.87% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#MKD)

Leaning toward Russia by

2.1% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 87%

likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 0.87% toward Ukraine · €298m · ≈ 0.44%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 2.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly war-time prices on gas contracts, largest in 2022).

Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.42%

€61m

likely 0.24% to 0.62% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

2.5%

€359m

likely from 4.5% toward Russia to 0.44% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 91%

Russia kept €359m (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€352m of €359m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.5% of GDP more (€359m; likely from 4.5% toward Russia to 0.43% toward Ukraine)
- North Macedonia's own gain from trade with Russia: North Macedonia kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.06% toward Russia to 0.10% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €352m (2.4% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Hosts many refugees 20,741 refugees from Ukraine, 11 per 1,000 residents.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: €352m of the net's €298m.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 85% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.42% · €61m

| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.42% | €61m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.02% | €4m |
| North Macedonia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −0.02% | €2m |
| North Macedonia kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €1m |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 2.5% · €359m

| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −2.4% | €352m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.67% | €97m |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.63% | €91m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.14bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€27m | −€169m | −€142m | −0.98% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€29m | −€132m | −€102m | −1.7% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€2m | −€53m | −€51m | −2.0% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€2m | −€34m | −€32m | −2.3% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€1m | +€29m | +€30m | −2.1% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

North Macedonia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €60mnot in Kiel's tracker |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | €4m |
| Money flowing back | −€3msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €61m |

Quality of the split: B

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.15bn from Russia in 2021 and €89m in 2025 (−43%). It sold €48m to Russia in 2021 and €70m in 2025 (+45%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 61.3% of what it bought from Russia. For North Macedonia: €352m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 99% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

North Macedonia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €13m | €13mrange €10m to €18m | not tracked | A |
| Pipeline gas | €0.76bn | €0.76bnrange €0.60bn to €1.1bn | €0.53bn | A |
| Other goods | €0.14bn | €0.15bn | – | – |
| All goods | €0.92bn | €0.92bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. North Macedonia is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists North Macedonia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by North Macedonia. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)](https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russias-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukrain-2/)
- [Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukraine-council-decision-cfsp-2026508/)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#MKD)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.11bn extra from 2022 (0.79% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Refugees from Ukraine

20,741 refugees from Ukraine, 11 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€54m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in North Macedonia; what its firms kept of it, €3m, is taken off its support.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €97m (0.67% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) | +3.3% · +€3.1bn · likely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| [Kosovo](https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/) | +1.1% · +€0.11bn · likely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| [Greece](https://warbalance.org/country/greece/) | +0.08% · +€0.18bn · essentially zero |
| [Albania](https://warbalance.org/country/albania/) | +0.07% · +€16m · essentially zero |
| [Serbia](https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/) | −1.4% · −€1.1bn · likely toward Russia · 84% |
| North Macedonia | −2.1% · −€0.30bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Serbia](https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/) | −1.4% · −€1.1bn · likely toward Russia · 84% |
| [Armenia](https://warbalance.org/country/armenia/) | −0.17% · −€37m · likely toward Russia · 69% |
| [Georgia](https://warbalance.org/country/georgia/) | −4.1% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |

## How the number is backed

25 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 10% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 74% modelled (C) and 16% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [ENTSOG Transparency Platform: metered physical gas flows at the TurkStream, Balkan and Central European border points, 2021-11 to 2026-08](https://transparency.entsog.eu/api/v1/operationalData)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)

### Ukraine kept more from extra sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [War-time gas price windfall under the pre-war no-war price paths: World Bank and IMF October-2021 forecasts, IMF/EIA/ECB January-2022 views, ICE TTF futures of mid-February 2022 and of early 2021 (TTF Cal-22 at EUR 16.7-18.1/MWh, January-March 2021); each contract's TTF/oil formula](https://www.ice.com/products/27996665/Dutch-TTF-Natural-Gas-Futures/data)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [ENTSOG Transparency Platform: metered physical gas flows at the TurkStream, Balkan and Central European border points, 2021-11 to 2026-08](https://transparency.entsog.eu/api/v1/operationalData)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is North Macedonia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −2.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 4.1% toward Russia to 0.87% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%). Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €359m (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€352m of €359m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does North Macedonia trade with Russia?

It bought €89m from Russia in 2025 (€0.15bn in 2021), and sold €70m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €359m (2.5% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€352m of €359m).

### What decides North Macedonia's number?

Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices. What decides it: if Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices were 85% smaller, the direction would flip.

### How much has North Macedonia given to Ukraine?

North Macedonia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €61m, 0.42% of one year's GDP (likely 0.24% to 0.62%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### How does North Macedonia compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bulgaria +3.3%, Kosovo +1.1%, Greece +0.08%, Albania +0.07%, Serbia −1.4%, North Macedonia −2.1%.

### Where do the numbers for North Macedonia come from?

25 sources back its parts, 5 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does North Macedonia have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. North Macedonia is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists North Macedonia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by North Macedonia. Sources: [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)](https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russias-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukrain-2/); [Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukraine-council-decision-cfsp-2026508/).

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Gambia](https://warbalance.org/country/gambia/) · −1.5% · Leaning toward Russia · −€33m · 88%
- [Hong Kong](https://warbalance.org/country/hong-kong/) · −1.6% · Leaning toward Russia · −€5.8bn · 97%
- [Djibouti](https://warbalance.org/country/djibouti/) · −1.6% · Leaning toward Russia · −€59m · 89%
- North Macedonia−2.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€298m · 87%
- [Senegal](https://warbalance.org/country/senegal/) · −2.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€600m · 76%
- [Burkina Faso](https://warbalance.org/country/burkina-faso/) · −3.9% · Leaning toward Russia · −€749m · 92%
- [Georgia](https://warbalance.org/country/georgia/) · −4.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.2bn · 87%

## More about North Macedonia

### Groups

- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Extra services sold to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-ukraine/)
- [Extra sales to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/sales-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

25 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#MKD) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/north-macedonia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/north-macedonia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/north-macedonia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/north-macedonia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/north-macedonia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/north-macedonia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/north-macedonia/