# Is North Korea helping Russia? Party to the war (with Russia)

Its troops fought for Russia against Ukraine in the Kursk region from late 2024, which it confirmed in April 2025, and it supplied Russia with shells and missiles. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked. Its money numbers since 2022 come to 19.9% of one year's GDP, toward Russia (likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#PRK)

Toward Russia by

19.9% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia · €5.9bn · ≈ 4.3%/yr

Raised Russia's earnings from trade = 19.9% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Party to the war (with Russia), not ranked. Its troops fought for Russia against Ukraine in the Kursk region from late 2024, which it confirmed in April 2025, and it supplied Russia with shells and missiles. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked.

Support for Ukraine

No support for Ukraine recorded:

0%

€0

about 0

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

19.9%

€5.9bn

likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia

North Korea moved €5.9bn (19.9% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (North Korea kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€5.9bn of €5.9bn)).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.07% of GDP more (€21m; likely from 0.58% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine)
- North Korea's own gain from trade with Russia: North Korea kept 19.8% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€5.9bn; likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Party to the war Its troops fought for Russia against Ukraine in the Kursk region from late 2024, which it confirmed in April 2025, and it supplied Russia with shells and missiles. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked.
- Armed Russia: €10.0bn delivered Weapons, ammunition, drones or troops delivered to Russia: €10.0bn at full value. In the totals: €5.9bn, because what Russia paid for counts at the seller's own gain, like any sale.
- Mostly one part Weapons and troops sent to Russia: €5.9bn of the net's €5.9bn.

## What makes up the number

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 19.9% · €5.9bn

| Weapons and troops sent to RussiaC | −19.8% | €5.9bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereD | −0.06% | €18m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €3m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €2m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2025: −€2.3bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | €0 | +€3m | +€3m | +0.01% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | €0 | −€821m | −€821m | −2.8% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | €0 | −€2.3bn | −€2.3bn | −10.5% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | €0 | −€2.3bn | −€2.3bn | −18.3% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | €0 | −€478m | −€478m | −19.9% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €7m from Russia in 2021 and €40m in 2025. It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €10m in 2025. For North Korea: €2m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2026, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of North Korea's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name North Korea. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#PRK)

## How the number is backed

18 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 4 research reports, 2 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D). No data: Purchases from Ukraine. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (20%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Weapons and troops sent to Russia C

- research · [Military support to Russia: Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence, Open Source Centre, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, INSS, leaked Alabuga contracts, Russian procurement prices](https://msmt.info/api/file/download/18858)
- press · [North Korea's military value to Russia, revalued: INSS (Lim Soo-ho, 16 March 2026) and KIDA (April 2025) estimates read via the press, Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2024, 2025)](https://www.freiheit.org/north-and-south-korea/new-fnf-study-partnership-between-russia-and-north-korea)
- press · [How Russia paid for weapons and troops: INSS (via Bloomberg and The Insider), NK News, Bloomberg via Militarnyi; outdated North Korean stock: Ukraine's military intelligence via Reuters](https://theins.press/en/news/290450)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here D

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- research · [Military support to Russia: Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence, Open Source Centre, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, INSS, leaked Alabuga contracts, Russian procurement prices](https://msmt.info/api/file/download/18858)
- press · [North Korea's military value to Russia, revalued: INSS (Lim Soo-ho, 16 March 2026) and KIDA (April 2025) estimates read via the press, Friedrich Naumann Foundation (2024, 2025)](https://www.freiheit.org/north-and-south-korea/new-fnf-study-partnership-between-russia-and-north-korea)
- press · [How Russia paid for weapons and troops: INSS (via Bloomberg and The Insider), NK News, Bloomberg via Militarnyi; outdated North Korean stock: Ukraine's military intelligence via Reuters](https://theins.press/en/news/290450)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [The seller's gain on weapons sold to Russia: the Alabuga drone contract and the Shahed's cost (Defense One, The War Zone, Militarnyi), Rheinmetall's ammunition margin, North Korean shell prices (Kyiv Post)](https://www.twz.com/news-features/what-does-a-shahed-136-really-cost)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Pre-war trade trends 2012-2021 in real terms (UN Comtrade, price indices), continued with a 3-year half-life](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2012&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

## Questions

### North Korea soldiers and shells for Russia: what are they worth?

North Korea soldiers and shells, with other military supplies sent to Russia since 2022: about €10bn at full value, from the sources on Russia's panel. In the totals, what Russia paid for counts at the seller's net gain, like a sale; what it did not pay for counts in full. As a party to the war, it is listed apart and not ranked.

### Is North Korea helping Russia?

Its troops fought for Russia against Ukraine in the Kursk region from late 2024, which it confirmed in April 2025, and it supplied Russia with shells and missiles. Its money numbers are shown, but it is not ranked. In money terms the net is −19.9% of one year's GDP (likely 9.4% to 36.8% toward Russia). North Korea moved €5.9bn (19.9% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (North Korea kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€5.9bn of €5.9bn)). Weapons and troops it sent to Russia (about €10bn at full value) are listed on Russia's panel; in the totals they count at the seller's gain. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Where do the numbers for North Korea come from?

18 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Weapons and troops sent to Russia: [Military support to Russia: Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence, Open Source Centre, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, INSS, leaked Alabuga contracts, Russian procurement prices](https://msmt.info/api/file/download/18858); Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does North Korea have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of North Korea's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name North Korea.

## Nearby in the ranking

Party to the war (with Russia), not ranked. [Ranking](https://warbalance.org/ranking/)

## More about North Korea

### Compared with

- [China vs North Korea](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-north-korea/)
- [Iran vs North Korea](https://warbalance.org/compare/iran-vs-north-korea/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

18 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#PRK) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/north-korea/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/north-korea/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/north-korea/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/north-korea/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/north-korea/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/north-korea/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/north-korea/