# Is Niue helping Russia? What the money flows show

Niue's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept <€1m (0.67% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (<€1m of <€1m). The net is 0.67% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.30% to 1.6% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#NIU)

Toward Russia by

0.67% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.30% to 1.6% toward Russia · <€1m · ≈ 0.14%/yr

Raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.67% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

No support for Ukraine recorded:

0%

€0

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.67%

<€1m

likely 0.30% to 1.6% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Russia kept <€1m (0.67% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (<€1m of <€1m).

## Its story in short

- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 100% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: <€1m of the net's <€1m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €25m): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What makes up the number

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.67% · <€1m

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | €0 | €0 | €0 | 0% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | €0 | €0 | €0 | 0% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | €0 | €0 | €0 | 0% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | €0 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.31% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | €0 | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.67% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Sanctions on Russia

Niue is a territory of New Zealand. We did not check whether the sanctions of New Zealand on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Niue itself; it names New Zealand. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#NIU)

## Questions

### Is Niue helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.67% of one year's GDP (likely 0.30% to 1.6% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept <€1m (0.67% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (<€1m of <€1m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Niue have sanctions on Russia?

Niue is a territory of New Zealand. We did not check whether the sanctions of New Zealand on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Niue itself; it names New Zealand.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia

21. [South Africa](https://warbalance.org/country/south-africa/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€1.8bn
20. [Brazil](https://warbalance.org/country/brazil/) · −0.51% · Toward Russia · −€10.1bn
19. [Malaysia](https://warbalance.org/country/malaysia/) · −0.64% · Toward Russia · −€2.5bn
- Niue−0.67% · Toward Russia · −<€1m
18. [Côte d'Ivoire](https://warbalance.org/country/cote-divoire/) · −0.71% · Toward Russia · −€525m
- [Vanuatu](https://warbalance.org/country/vanuatu/) · −0.74% · Toward Russia · −€8m
17. [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) · −0.75% · Toward Russia · −€128bn

## More about Niue

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/niue/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/niue/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/niue/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/niue/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/niue/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/niue/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/niue/