# How much has Nigeria given to Ukraine since 2022?

Nigeria's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€50m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.9bn (0.43% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere: structural (Dangote refinery and EU ban) (€1.4bn of €1.9bn). The net is 0.42% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.04% to 0.80% toward Ukraine; very likely · 96%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#NGA)

Toward Ukraine by

0.42% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 96%

likely 0.04% to 0.80% toward Ukraine · €1.8bn · ≈ 0.09%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.42% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.01%

€50m

likely from 0.04% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.43%

€1.9bn

likely 0.06% to 0.81% toward Ukraine very likely · 96%

Russia kept €1.9bn (0.43% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere: structural (Dangote refinery and EU ban) (€1.4bn of €1.9bn).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.43% of GDP less (€1.9bn; likely 0.06% to 0.81% toward Ukraine)
- Nigeria's own gain from trade with Russia: Nigeria kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Bought 77% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.7bn in 2021, €387m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 68% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €1.4bn of the net's €1.8bn.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €50m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.01% | €57m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €8m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.43% · €1.9bn

| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.32% | €1.4bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.12% | €531m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €40m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €3m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €2m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€0.50bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€12m | +€281m | +€269m | +0.06% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€5m | +€13m | +€8m | +0.06% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€9m | +€495m | +€487m | +0.18% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€16m | +€513m | +€497m | +0.29% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€8m | +€574m | +€566m | +0.42% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Nigeria's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €8mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €8m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€57m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€50m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.39bn in 2025 (−77%). It sold €4m to Russia in 2021 and €8m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 17.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Nigeria: €40m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Nigeria's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €1.9bn | €1.8bnrange €1.2bn to €2.6bn | €3bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0m | €0m | €2m | – |
| Other goods | €1.4bn | €1.1bn | – | – |
| All goods | €3.3bn | €2.9bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Nigeria's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Nigeria. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#NGA)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €30m. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€26m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Nigeria; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €1.4bn (0.32% of one year's GDP). Less fuel made from Russian crude bought from EU refiners: this fell when the EU banned Russian-made fuel (2023) and the country's own Dangote refinery started production (2024). A structural change in supply, not a policy.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 30 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Cameroon](https://warbalance.org/country/cameroon/) | +0.99% · +€0.45bn · likely toward Ukraine · 94% |
| Nigeria | +0.42% · +€1.8bn · very likely · 96% |
| [Niger](https://warbalance.org/country/niger/) | −<0.01% · −€2m · essentially zero |
| [Benin](https://warbalance.org/country/benin/) | −0.36% · −€65m · too close to call · 56% toward Russia |

## How the number is backed

19 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 32% modelled (C) and 68% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Its share of IMF and World Bank loans C

- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)

## Questions

### Does Nigeria trade with Russia?

It bought €0.39bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €8m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.9bn (0.43% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere: structural (Dangote refinery and EU ban) (€1.4bn of €1.9bn).

### Is Nigeria helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.42% of one year's GDP (likely 0.04% to 0.80% toward Ukraine; very likely · 96%). Chance toward Ukraine: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.9bn (0.43% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere: structural (Dangote refinery and EU ban) (€1.4bn of €1.9bn). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How does Nigeria compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Cameroon +0.99%, Nigeria +0.42%, Niger −<0.01%, Benin −0.36%. In the map's ranking: number 30 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Nigeria come from?

19 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Ukraine kept less from sales here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Nigeria have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Nigeria's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Nigeria.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 30 of 32

27. [Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/) · +1.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.7bn
28. [Canada](https://warbalance.org/country/canada/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€10.6bn
29. [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€132bn
30. Nigeria+0.42% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.8bn
31. [Japan](https://warbalance.org/country/japan/) · +0.30% · Toward Ukraine · +€12.2bn
32. [Chile](https://warbalance.org/country/chile/) · +0.04% · Toward Ukraine · +€107m
- [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) · +3.3% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€3.1bn · 95%

## More about Nigeria

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

19 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#NGA) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/nigeria/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/nigeria/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/nigeria/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/nigeria/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/nigeria/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/nigeria/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/nigeria/