# Is Namibia helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

Namibia's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €100m (0.83% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€146m; the other parts take €45m off it). The net is 0.83% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.7% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 77%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#NAM)

Leaning toward Russia by

0.83% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 77%

likely from 1.7% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine · €100m · ≈ 0.18%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.83% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.83%

€100m

likely from 1.8% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 77%

Russia kept €100m (0.83% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€146m; the other parts take €45m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.83% of GDP more (€100m; likely from 1.7% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine)
- Namibia's own gain from trade with Russia: Namibia kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to <0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Rough data: mostly estimates 73% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €146m of the net's €100m.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 69% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · <€1m

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.83% · €100m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −1.2% | €146m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.41% | €50m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.03% | €4m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€35m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.02% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −€35m | −€35m | −0.27% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | −0.27% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −€31m | −€31m | −0.52% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | −€37m | −€37m | −0.83% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €31m from Russia in 2021 and €31m in 2025 (−1%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €8m in 2025. For Namibia: €4m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Namibia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Namibia. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#NAM)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.15bn (1.2% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Angola](https://warbalance.org/country/angola/) | +0.25% · +€0.26bn · likely toward Ukraine · 92% |
| [Zambia](https://warbalance.org/country/zambia/) | −0.05% · −€13m · essentially zero |
| [Botswana](https://warbalance.org/country/botswana/) | −0.07% · −€12m · essentially zero |
| [South Africa](https://warbalance.org/country/south-africa/) | −0.49% · −€1.8bn · very likely · >99% |
| Namibia | −0.83% · −€0.10bn · likely toward Russia · 77% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Mozambique](https://warbalance.org/country/mozambique/) | −0.85% · −€0.16bn · likely toward Russia · 68% |
| [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) | −0.71% · −€3.5bn · likely toward Russia · 97% |
| [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) | −0.43% · −€1.7bn · likely toward Russia · 95% |
| [Kenya](https://warbalance.org/country/kenya/) | −0.31% · −€0.33bn · likely toward Russia · 90% |

## How the number is backed

11 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 27% modelled (C) and 73% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

## Questions

### Is Namibia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.83% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.7% toward Russia to 1.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 77%). Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €100m (0.83% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€146m; the other parts take €45m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### What decides Namibia's number?

Chance toward Russia: 77%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 69% smaller, the direction would flip.

### How does Namibia compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Angola +0.25%, Zambia −0.05%, Botswana −0.07%, South Africa −0.49%, Namibia −0.83%.

### Where do the numbers for Namibia come from?

11 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Namibia have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Namibia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Namibia.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) · −0.43% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.7bn · 95%
- [Marshall Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/marshall-islands/) · −0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2m · 78%
- [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) · −0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€3.5bn · 97%
- Namibia−0.83% · Leaning toward Russia · −€100m · 77%
- [Mozambique](https://warbalance.org/country/mozambique/) · −0.85% · Leaning toward Russia · −€165m · 68%
- [Serbia](https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/) · −1.4% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.1bn · 84%
- [Gambia](https://warbalance.org/country/gambia/) · −1.5% · Leaning toward Russia · −€33m · 88%

## More about Namibia

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

11 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#NAM) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/namibia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/namibia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/namibia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/namibia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/namibia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/namibia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/