# Is Myanmar helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Myanmar's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€4m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €31m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€76m; the other parts take €45m off it). The net is 0.05% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#MMR)

Toward Russia by

0.05% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine · €35m · ≈ 0.01%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.05% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 65%; 90% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€4m

likely from 0.03% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.05%

€31m

likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €31m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€76m; the other parts take €45m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.05% of GDP more (€31m; likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine)
- Myanmar's own gain from trade with Russia: Myanmar kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €386m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 75% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 65%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €4m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.05% · €31m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.12% | €76m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.04% | €25m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.04% | €24m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€20m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€1m | +€6m | +€6m | +<0.01% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | −€14m | −€15m | −0.01% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€1m | −€19m | −€20m | −0.05% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€1m | +€2m | +€1m | −0.04% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€1m | −€6m | −€7m | −0.05% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Myanmar's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€4m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€4m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €7m from Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. It sold €20m to Russia in 2021 and €11m in 2025 (−46%). For Myanmar: €4m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Myanmar's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Myanmar. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#MMR)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.39bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €76m (0.12% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Laos](https://warbalance.org/country/laos/) | +0.14% · +€20m · likely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| [Thailand](https://warbalance.org/country/thailand/) | +0.08% · +€0.39bn · essentially zero |
| [Bangladesh](https://warbalance.org/country/bangladesh/) | −0.01% · −€61m · essentially zero |
| Myanmar | −0.05% · −€35m · essentially zero |
| [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |
| [India](https://warbalance.org/country/india/) | −2.2% · −€70.6bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

17 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 25% modelled (C) and 75% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (85%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Russia kept less from weapons sold here D

- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is Myanmar helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 65%; 90% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €31m (0.05% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€76m; the other parts take €45m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is Myanmar's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −0.05% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 0.31% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

### How does Myanmar compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Laos +0.14%, Thailand +0.08%, Bangladesh −0.01%, Myanmar −0.05%, China −0.75%, India −2.2%.

### Where do the numbers for Myanmar come from?

17 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept less from weapons sold here: [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Myanmar have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Myanmar's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Myanmar.

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Australia](https://warbalance.org/country/australia/) · −0.04% · Essentially zero · −€607m · 76%
- [Zimbabwe](https://warbalance.org/country/zimbabwe/) · −0.05% · Essentially zero · −€17m · 55%
- [Zambia](https://warbalance.org/country/zambia/) · −0.05% · Essentially zero · −€13m · 57%
- Myanmar−0.05% · Essentially zero · −€35m · 65%
- [Dominica](https://warbalance.org/country/dominica/) · −0.06% · Essentially zero · −<€1m · 55%
- [Macao](https://warbalance.org/country/macao/) · −0.06% · Essentially zero · −€24m · 73%
- [Botswana](https://warbalance.org/country/botswana/) · −0.07% · Essentially zero · −€12m · 83%

## More about Myanmar

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

17 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#MMR) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/myanmar/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/myanmar/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/myanmar/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/myanmar/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/myanmar/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/myanmar/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/myanmar/