# Is Montenegro helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Montenegro's support for Ukraine since 2022: €24m (0.34% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.37% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 2.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 91%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#MNE)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

0.37% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 91%

likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 2.0% toward Ukraine · €25m · ≈ 0.08%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.37% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Most of what Russia kept less was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself.

Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.34%

€24m

likely 0.04% to 1.1% very likely · 97%

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.02%

€2m

likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 1.5% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €2m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.13% of GDP more (€9m; likely from 0.58% toward Russia to 1.1% toward Ukraine)
- Montenegro's own gain from trade with Russia: Montenegro kept 0.16% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€11m; likely <0.01% to 0.71% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Cut through sanctions it adopted Of the €34m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 63% was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 37% went beyond them.
- Hosts many refugees 12,191 refugees from Ukraine, 20 per 1,000 residents.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 51% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 83% larger, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.34% · €24m

| Hosting refugeesD | +0.24% | €16m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.17% | €12m |
| Montenegro kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −0.08% | €5m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.03% | €2m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.02% · €2m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.44% | €30m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.33% | €22m |
| Montenegro kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +0.16% | €11m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.02% | €1m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€8m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€11m | −€2m | +€8m | +0.12% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€2m | −<€1m | +€2m | +0.15% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€3m | −<€1m | +€3m | +0.19% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€5m | −€1m | +€4m | +0.24% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€3m | +€6m | +€9m | +0.37% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Montenegro's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €12mnot in Kiel's tracker |
| --- | --- |
| Refugee hosting | €16m |
| Private donations and purchases | €2m |
| Money flowing back | −€6msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €24m |

Quality of the split: B

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €10m from Russia in 2021 and €8m in 2025. It sold €2m to Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. For Montenegro: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 63% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 37% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Montenegro is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists Montenegro as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Montenegro. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)](https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russias-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukrain-2/)
- [Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukraine-council-decision-cfsp-2026508/)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#MNE)

## Refugees from Ukraine

12,191 refugees from Ukraine, 20 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €16m (0.24% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Montenegro: €18m spent on refugees, less €2m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€44m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Montenegro; what its firms kept of it, €6m, is taken off its support.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €30m (0.44% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Croatia](https://warbalance.org/country/croatia/) | +1.5% · +€1.2bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Kosovo](https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/) | +1.1% · +€0.11bn · likely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| [Bosnia and Herzegovina](https://warbalance.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/) | +0.56% · +€0.14bn · likely toward Ukraine · 85% |
| Montenegro | +0.37% · +€25m · likely toward Ukraine · 91% |
| [Albania](https://warbalance.org/country/albania/) | +0.07% · +€16m · essentially zero |
| [Serbia](https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/) | −1.4% · −€1.1bn · likely toward Russia · 84% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Bosnia and Herzegovina](https://warbalance.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/) | +0.56% · +€0.14bn · likely toward Ukraine · 85% |
| [Kosovo](https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/) | +1.1% · +€0.11bn · likely toward Ukraine · 91% |

## How the number is backed

25 sources back its parts: 8 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 12% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 37% modelled (C) and 52% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Hosting refugees D

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)

### Montenegro kept less from services sold to Russia C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### What decides Montenegro's number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. What decides it: if Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries were 83% larger, the direction would flip.

### How many Ukrainian refugees does Montenegro host, and what does it cost?

12,191 refugees from Ukraine, 20 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €16m (0.24% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Montenegro: €18m spent on refugees, less €2m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

### Is Montenegro helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.37% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.21% toward Russia to 2.0% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 91%). Chance toward Ukraine: 91%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How much has Montenegro given to Ukraine?

Montenegro's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €24m, 0.34% of one year's GDP (likely 0.04% to 1.1%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Did Montenegro cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 63% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 37% beyond what sanctions required.

### How does Montenegro compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Croatia +1.5%, Kosovo +1.1%, Bosnia and Herzegovina +0.56%, Montenegro +0.37%, Albania +0.07%, Serbia −1.4%.

### Does Montenegro have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Montenegro is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Separately, Russia lists Montenegro as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Montenegro. Sources: [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)](https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russias-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukrain-2/); [Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukraine-council-decision-cfsp-2026508/).

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

- [Bolivia](https://warbalance.org/country/bolivia/) · +0.44% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€217m · 82%
- [Cuba](https://warbalance.org/country/cuba/) · +0.37% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€78m · 65%
- [Ecuador](https://warbalance.org/country/ecuador/) · +0.37% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€411m · 89%
- Montenegro+0.37% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€25m · 91%
- [Burundi](https://warbalance.org/country/burundi/) · +0.29% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€10m · 73%
- [Angola](https://warbalance.org/country/angola/) · +0.25% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€261m · 92%
- [Honduras](https://warbalance.org/country/honduras/) · +0.24% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€76m · 74%

## More about Montenegro

### Groups

- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Extra services sold to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-ukraine/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

25 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#MNE) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/montenegro/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/montenegro/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/montenegro/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/montenegro/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/montenegro/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/montenegro/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/montenegro/