# How much has Moldova given to Ukraine since 2022?

Moldova's support for Ukraine since 2022: €93m (0.61% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €967m (6.3% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas Russia cut off itself (€425m of €967m). The net is 6.9% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 1.7% to 13.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · 97%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#MDA)

Toward Ukraine by

6.9% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 97%

likely 1.7% to 13.7% toward Ukraine · €1.1bn · ≈ 1.5%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 6.9% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade. Much of what Russia kept less is gas Russia cut off itself.

Chance toward Ukraine: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.61%

€93m

likely from 0.40% below zero to 1.2% above zero likely above zero · 81%

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

6.3%

€967m

likely 1.2% to 13.0% toward Ukraine very likely · 96%

Russia kept €967m (6.3% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas Russia cut off itself (€425m of €967m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 6.3% of GDP less (€963m; likely 1.3% to 13.0% toward Ukraine)
- Moldova's own gain from trade with Russia: Moldova kept 0.03% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€4m; likely from 1.3% toward Russia to 0.30% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Gas cut off by Russia Much of what Russia kept less is gas Russia cut off itself. Of which gas Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of transit: €425m
- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €383m (2.5% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Bought 78% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €833m in 2021, €182m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Hosts many refugees 148,995 refugees from Ukraine, 62 per 1,000 residents.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €1.0bn of the net's €1.1bn.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.61% · €93m

| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.47% | €72m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hosting refugeesC | +0.27% | €41m |
| Moldova kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −0.10% | €15m |
| Moldova kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC | −0.07% | €11m |
| Private donationsD | +0.04% | €7m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.01% | €2m |
| Moldova kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −<0.01% | €1m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 6.3% · €967m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +6.6% | €1.0bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −2.5% | €383m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +2.2% | €331m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.08% | €12m |
| Moldova kept less from selling to RussiaC | +0.04% | €6m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.02% | €3m |
| Moldova's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −0.01% | €2m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€0.35bn. The yearly net amount changed side: 2022 −€0.17bn, 2023 +€0.33bn, 2024 +€0.35bn, 2025 +€0.29bn, 2026\* +€0.27bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€24m | −€194m | −€170m | −1.1% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€19m | +€307m | +€326m | +1.0% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€21m | +€327m | +€348m | +3.3% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€19m | +€272m | +€291m | +5.2% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€10m | +€256m | +€266m | +6.9% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Moldova's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Humanitarian aid | €2m |
| Refugee hosting | €41m |
| Private donations and purchases | €79m |
| Money flowing back | −€28msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €93m |

Quality of the split: B No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.83bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.18bn in 2025 (−78%). It sold €0.23bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.12bn in 2025 (−48%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 38.9% of what it bought from Russia. For Moldova: €383m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 94% of it on gas contracts. Remittances from Russia changed by −2.6% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: −€399m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€577m to −€189m); migrants sent €318m home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Moldova's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €67m | €60mrange €46m to €79m | €7m | A |
| Pipeline gas | €0.71bn | €0.66bnrange €0.50bn to €0.87bn | €4.4bn | A |
| Coal | €73m | €64mrange €50m to €83m | €1m | A |
| Other goods | €1.1bn | €1bn | – | – |
| All goods | €2bn | €1.8bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 6% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 41% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 52% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Moldova is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Official EU reports say its alignment is incomplete. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Moldova. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Moldpres, 9 January 2026: Moldova aligns with US restrictive measures on Russian oil companies (Interinstitutional Supervisory Council decision)](https://moldpres.md/eng/politics/doc-moldova-aligns-with-restrictive-measures-imposed-by-united-states-against-russian-oil-companies)
- [Commission progress report on Moldova's alignment (news report)](https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-expects-moldova-implement-more-sanctions-russia/32677999.html) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)
- [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)](https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russias-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukrain-2/)
- [Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukraine-council-decision-cfsp-2026508/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#MDA)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.20bn extra from 2022 (1.3% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Refugees from Ukraine

148,995 refugees from Ukraine, 62 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €41m (0.27% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Moldova: €68m spent on refugees, less €27m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€1.6bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Moldova; what its firms kept of it, €28m, is taken off its support.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.33bn (2.2% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 4 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| Moldova | +6.9% · +€1.1bn · very likely · 97% |
| [Romania](https://warbalance.org/country/romania/) | +2.8% · +€8.9bn · very likely · 99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Norway](https://warbalance.org/country/norway/) | +2.9% · +€14.8bn · very likely · >99% |
| [United Kingdom](https://warbalance.org/country/united-kingdom/) | +1.8% · +€58.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Iceland](https://warbalance.org/country/iceland/) | +1.2% · +€0.35bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/) | +1.0% · +€8.7bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

34 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 82% modelled (C) and 18% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Ukraine kept more from extra sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Hosting refugees C

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [War-time gas price windfall under the pre-war no-war price paths: World Bank and IMF October-2021 forecasts, IMF/EIA/ECB January-2022 views, ICE TTF futures of mid-February 2022 and of early 2021 (TTF Cal-22 at EUR 16.7-18.1/MWh, January-March 2021); each contract's TTF/oil formula](https://www.ice.com/products/27996665/Dutch-TTF-Natural-Gas-Futures/data)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

## Questions

### Does Moldova trade with Russia?

It bought €0.18bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.83bn in 2021), and sold €0.12bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €967m (6.3% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas Russia cut off itself (€425m of €967m).

### How much has Moldova given to Ukraine?

Moldova's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €93m, 0.61% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.40% below zero to 1.2% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Is Moldova helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +6.9% of one year's GDP (likely 1.7% to 13.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · 97%). Chance toward Ukraine: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €967m (6.3% of GDP) less than without the war, largely gas Russia cut off itself (€425m of €967m). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Moldova–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €0.18bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.83bn in 2021), and sold €0.12bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €93m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +6.9% of one year's GDP (likely 1.7% to 13.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · 97%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Did Moldova cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 6% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 41% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 52% beyond what sanctions required.

### How many Ukrainian refugees does Moldova host, and what does it cost?

148,995 refugees from Ukraine, 62 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €41m (0.27% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Moldova: €68m spent on refugees, less €27m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

### Does Moldova have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Moldova is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. Official EU reports say its alignment is incomplete. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Moldova. Sources: [Moldpres, 9 January 2026: Moldova aligns with US restrictive measures on Russian oil companies (Interinstitutional Supervisory Council decision)](https://moldpres.md/eng/politics/doc-moldova-aligns-with-restrictive-measures-imposed-by-united-states-against-russian-oil-companies); [Commission progress report on Moldova's alignment (news report)](https://www.rferl.org/a/eu-expects-moldova-implement-more-sanctions-russia/32677999.html) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 4 of 32

1. [Lithuania](https://warbalance.org/country/lithuania/) · +11.9% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.8bn
2. [Estonia](https://warbalance.org/country/estonia/) · +10.8% · Toward Ukraine · +€4.1bn
3. [Finland](https://warbalance.org/country/finland/) · +8.5% · Toward Ukraine · +€23.1bn
4. Moldova+6.9% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.1bn
5. [Latvia](https://warbalance.org/country/latvia/) · +5.6% · Toward Ukraine · +€2.2bn
6. [Netherlands](https://warbalance.org/country/netherlands/) · +5.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€54.1bn
7. [Poland](https://warbalance.org/country/poland/) · +5.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€37.8bn

## More about Moldova

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Extra sales to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/sales-to-ukraine/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Extra services sold to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-ukraine/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

34 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#MDA) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/moldova/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/moldova/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/moldova/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/moldova/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/moldova/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/moldova/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/moldova/