# Is Mexico helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Mexico's support for Ukraine since 2022: €18m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €387m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.03% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#MEX)

Toward Ukraine by

0.03% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine · €405m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.03% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€18m

likely from <0.01% below zero to 0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.02%

€387m

likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €387m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.02% of GDP less (€368m; likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.07% toward Ukraine)
- Mexico's own gain from trade with Russia: Mexico kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€19m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Bought 55% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.7bn in 2021, €780m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €18m

| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €27m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €9m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.02% · €387m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.02% | €340m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +<0.01% | €19m |
| Mexico kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €11m |
| Mexico's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €10m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +<0.01% | €6m |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +<0.01% | €4m |
| Mexico kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€0.12bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2m | +€122m | +€125m | +<0.01% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€7m | +€10m | +€18m | +<0.01% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€8m | +€66m | +€74m | +0.01% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€1m | +€100m | +€99m | +0.02% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€3m | +€88m | +€90m | +0.03% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Mexico's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €27mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €27m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€9m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €18m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.78bn in 2025 (−55%). It sold €0.42bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.27bn in 2025 (−35%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 1.8% of what it bought from Russia. For Mexico: €4m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Mexico's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mexico. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#MEX)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €21m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russia took €112m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €28m to €366m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) | +0.51% · +€132bn · very likely · >99% |
| Mexico | +0.03% · +€0.41bn · essentially zero |
| [Guatemala](https://warbalance.org/country/guatemala/) | +0.02% · +€18m · essentially zero |
| [Belize](https://warbalance.org/country/belize/) | −0.13% · −€4m · near zero · 82% toward Russia |

## How the number is backed

24 sources back its parts: 5 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 92% modelled (C) and 8% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Its share of IMF and World Bank loans C

- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

### Its firms paid Russia less tax D

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

### Mexico kept less from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

### Mexico's companies made less profit in Russia D

- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Mexico–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €0.78bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €0.27bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €18m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Is Mexico helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 88%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €387m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How much has Mexico given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €18m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

### Does Mexico trade with Russia?

It bought €0.78bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.7bn in 2021), and sold €0.27bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €387m (0.02% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Why is Mexico's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

### How does Mexico compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: United States +0.51%, Mexico +0.03%, Guatemala +0.02%, Belize −0.13%.

### Does Mexico have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Mexico's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mexico.

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Argentina](https://warbalance.org/country/argentina/) · +0.05% · Essentially zero · +€311m · 94%
- [Philippines](https://warbalance.org/country/philippines/) · +0.04% · Essentially zero · +€175m · 75%
- [El Salvador](https://warbalance.org/country/el-salvador/) · +0.04% · Essentially zero · +€11m · 58%
- Mexico+0.03% · Essentially zero · +€405m · 88%
- [Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kazakhstan/) · +0.02% · Essentially zero · +€55m · 60%
- [Guatemala](https://warbalance.org/country/guatemala/) · +0.02% · Essentially zero · +€18m · 71%
- [Algeria](https://warbalance.org/country/algeria/) · +0.02% · Essentially zero · +€36m · 57%

## More about Mexico

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

24 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#MEX) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/mexico/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/mexico/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/mexico/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/mexico/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/mexico/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/mexico/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/mexico/