# Is the Marshall Islands helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

The Marshall Islands' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (0.19% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). The Marshall Islands moved €2m (0.90% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (The Marshall Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly income from shipping and insuring Russian oil (€2m of €2m)). The net is 0.71% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 2.9% toward Russia to 0.88% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 78%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#MHL)

Leaning toward Russia by

0.71% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 78%

likely from 2.9% toward Russia to 0.88% toward Ukraine · €2m · ≈ 0.15%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.71% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.19%

<€1m

likely 0.06% to 0.39% very likely · 99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.90%

€2m

likely from 3.1% toward Russia to 0.68% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 83%

The Marshall Islands moved €2m (0.90% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (The Marshall Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly income from shipping and insuring Russian oil (€2m of €2m)).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0% of GDP less (€0; about 0)
- The Marshall Islands' own gain from trade with Russia: The Marshall Islands kept 0.90% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely from 3.1% toward Russia to 0.68% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Ships Russian oil The Marshall Islands kept €2m (0.90% of GDP) more from shipping and insuring Russian oil.
- Rough data: mostly estimates 83% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.
- Mostly one part The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil: €2m of the net's €2m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €251m): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil. What decides it: if The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil were 79% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.19% · <€1m

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.90% · €2m

| The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −0.90% | €2m |
| --- | --- | --- |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The one year with a net amount of note was 2023: −€1m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.08% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −€1m | −€1m | −0.31% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | −€1m | −<€1m | −0.46% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.63% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | −<€1m | −<€1m | −0.71% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

The Marshall Islands' support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | €1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €1m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought <€1m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of the Marshall Islands' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Marshall Islands. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#MHL)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil: €2m (0.90% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

5 sources back its parts: 0 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 0 of this project's own estimates, plus 4 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 0% modelled (C) and 100% rough indications (D). No data: Russian oil bought via other countries · Fuel and goods bought from Russia · Sales to Russia · War-time fuel prices. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil D

- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)

## Questions

### Is the Marshall Islands helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.71% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.9% toward Russia to 0.88% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 78%). Chance toward Russia: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree. The Marshall Islands moved €2m (0.90% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (The Marshall Islands kept more from selling to Russia, mostly income from shipping and insuring Russian oil (€2m of €2m)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### What decides the Marshall Islands' number?

Chance toward Russia: 78%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil. What decides it: if The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil were 79% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Where do the numbers for the Marshall Islands come from?

5 sources back its parts, 0 of them official statistics. By part: The Marshall Islands kept more from shipping Russian oil: [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does the Marshall Islands have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of the Marshall Islands' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Marshall Islands.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Eritrea](https://warbalance.org/country/eritrea/) · −0.32% · Leaning toward Russia · −€7m · 68%
- [Singapore](https://warbalance.org/country/singapore/) · −0.41% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2.0bn · 75%
- [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) · −0.43% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.7bn · 95%
- Marshall Islands−0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2m · 78%
- [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) · −0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€3.5bn · 97%
- [Namibia](https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/) · −0.83% · Leaning toward Russia · −€100m · 77%
- [Mozambique](https://warbalance.org/country/mozambique/) · −0.85% · Leaning toward Russia · −€165m · 68%

## More about Marshall Islands

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

5 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#MHL) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/marshall-islands/