# How much has Malta given to Ukraine since 2022?

Malta's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.11bn (0.52% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €121m (0.58% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 1.2% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely <0.01% to 2.5% toward Ukraine; very likely · 95%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#MLT)

Toward Ukraine by

1.2% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 95%

likely <0.01% to 2.5% toward Ukraine · €248m · ≈ 0.26%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 1.2% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.

Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.52%

€107m

likely 0.31% to 1.1% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.58%

€121m

likely from 0.59% toward Russia to 1.8% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 77%

Russia kept €121m (0.58% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.71% of GDP less (€147m; likely from 0.27% toward Russia to 1.9% toward Ukraine)
- Malta's own gain from trade with Russia: Malta kept 0.12% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€26m; likely from 0.76% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% of GDP in returns (€20m).

## Its story in short

- Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €130m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 12% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 88% went beyond them.
- Ships Russian oil Malta kept €36m (0.17% of GDP) more from shipping and insuring Russian oil.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.52% · €107m

| Hosting refugeesD | +0.26% | €53m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of EU aidB | +0.23% | €48m |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €5m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.01% | €2m |
| Malta kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Malta kept more from extra services sold to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €1m |

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.58% · €121m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.54% | €111m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesC | +0.20% | €42m |
| Malta kept more from shipping Russian oilC | −0.17% | €36m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.07% | €15m |
| Malta kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +0.05% | €10m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.05% | €9m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.10% in returns · €20m

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC | +0.06% | €13m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD | +0.03% | €7m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€61m. Support for Ukraine rose from €19m in 2022 to €23m in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€19m | −€9m | +€1m | +€12m | +0.06% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€24m | +€31m | +€6m | +€61m | +0.35% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€25m | +€25m | +€6m | +€56m | +0.62% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€23m | +€30m | +€4m | +€57m | +0.90% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€16m | +€44m | +€2m | +€62m | +1.2% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Malta's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €0mKiel: €0m |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €1mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €1m |
| Humanitarian aid | €2m |
| Refugee hosting | €53m |
| Share of EU aid | €48m |
| Private donations and purchases | €5m |
| Money flowing back | −€2msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.11bn |

Quality of the split: A

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €50m from Russia in 2021 and €3m in 2025 (−95%). It sold €9m to Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025. For Malta: €15m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 12% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 88% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. As an EU member, Malta applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Malta as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Malta. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#MLT)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €29m extra from 2022 (0.14% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: 0.10% of a year's GDP (€20m; likely €14m to €23m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.

## Refugees from Ukraine

2,695 refugees from Ukraine, 4.7 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €53m (0.26% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Malta: €55m spent on refugees, less €2m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €42m (0.20% of one year's GDP). Malta kept more from shipping Russian oil: €36m (0.17% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 23 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 20 of 21 members toward Ukraine.

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Spain](https://warbalance.org/country/spain/) | +1.1% · +€16.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Portugal](https://warbalance.org/country/portugal/) | +1.3% · +€3.5bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Croatia](https://warbalance.org/country/croatia/) | +1.5% · +€1.2bn · very likely · >99% |
| [France](https://warbalance.org/country/france/) | +1.6% · +€43.6bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

31 sources back its parts: 10 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 12 method inputs. By size, 14% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 67% modelled (C) and 18% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Hosting refugees D

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

### Its share of EU aid B

- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

### Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries C

- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)

### Malta kept more from shipping Russian oil C

- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- method input · [fuel hubs and flag registries (Eurostat oil balances, UN Comtrade own and partner records, port bunker sales), laundered-oil caps from fuel use, Belgian company tax 2022](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_cb\_oil?format=JSON&siec=O4600&geo=NL&unit=THS\_T&nrg\_bal=IMP&nrg\_bal=EXP&nrg\_bal=INTMARB&nrg\_bal=GID\_OBS&nrg\_bal=TO\_RPI\_RO&nrg\_bal=FC\_E)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)

## Questions

### Does Malta help Russia get around sanctions?

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers.

### How much has Malta given to Ukraine?

Malta's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.11bn, 0.52% of one year's GDP (likely 0.31% to 1.1%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Is Malta helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +1.2% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 2.5% toward Ukraine; very likely · 95%). Chance toward Ukraine: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €121m (0.58% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Did Malta cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 12% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 88% beyond what sanctions required.

### How much did Malta give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €19m; 2023 €24m; 2024 €25m; 2025 €23m; 2026 (to August) €16m. In total since 2022: €0.11bn (likely 0.31% to 1.1%).

### How many Ukrainian refugees does Malta host, and what does it cost?

2,695 refugees from Ukraine, 4.7 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €53m (0.26% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Malta: €55m spent on refugees, less €2m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

### Does Malta have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. As an EU member, Malta applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Malta as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Malta. Sources: [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj); [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 23 of 32

20. [France](https://warbalance.org/country/france/) · +1.6% · Toward Ukraine · +€43.6bn
21. [Croatia](https://warbalance.org/country/croatia/) · +1.5% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.2bn
22. [Portugal](https://warbalance.org/country/portugal/) · +1.3% · Toward Ukraine · +€3.5bn
23. Malta+1.2% · Toward Ukraine · +€248m
24. [Iceland](https://warbalance.org/country/iceland/) · +1.2% · Toward Ukraine · +€348m
25. [Spain](https://warbalance.org/country/spain/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€16.6bn
26. [South Korea](https://warbalance.org/country/south-korea/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€18.1bn

## More about Malta

### Groups

- [EU countries](https://warbalance.org/group/eu/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Share of EU aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/eu-aid-to-ukraine-by-member/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Frozen Russian private assets](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-private-assets/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Refugee spending kept in the host economy](https://warbalance.org/refugee-spending-in-host-economies/)
- [Extra services sold to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

31 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#MLT) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/malta/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/malta/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/malta/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/malta/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/malta/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/malta/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/malta/