# Is Mali helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Mali's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€3m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €16m (0.07% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.06% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#MLI)

Toward Ukraine by

0.06% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine · €14m · ≈ 0.01%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.06% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.01%

€3m

likely from 0.09% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.07%

€16m

likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €16m (0.07% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.07% of GDP less (€16m; likely from 0.42% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine)
- Mali's own gain from trade with Russia: Mali kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian forces in the country Wagner Group or Russia's Africa Corps operated here: 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026. Paid to them and taken by their firms, at Russia's gain, against 2021: €10m.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps). Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · €3m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.01% | €3m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.07% · €16m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.16% | €36m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps)D | −0.04% | €10m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.04% | €8m |
| Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD | −0.02% | €4m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: +€12m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | +€12m | +€12m | +0.05% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | +€1m | +€1m | +0.06% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€1m | −€3m | −€3m | +0.04% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€1m | +€1m | −<€1m | +0.04% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | +€5m | +€4m | +0.06% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Mali's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€3m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€3m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €55m from Russia in 2021 and €26m in 2025 (−53%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Mali: €8m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Mali's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mali. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#MLI)

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| Mali | +0.06% · +€14m · essentially zero |
| [Algeria](https://warbalance.org/country/algeria/) | +0.02% · +€36m · essentially zero |
| [Niger](https://warbalance.org/country/niger/) | −<0.01% · −€2m · essentially zero |
| [Mauritania](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritania/) | −0.12% · −€12m · likely toward Russia · 68% |
| [Côte d'Ivoire](https://warbalance.org/country/cote-divoire/) | −0.71% · −€0.52bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Senegal](https://warbalance.org/country/senegal/) | −2.1% · −€0.60bn · likely toward Russia · 76% |
| [Burkina Faso](https://warbalance.org/country/burkina-faso/) | −3.9% · −€0.75bn · likely toward Russia · 92% |

## How the number is backed

18 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 8 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 75% modelled (C) and 25% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (70%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps) D

- research · [Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/wagners-business-model-syria-and-africa-profit-and-patronage)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from weapons sold here D

- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/wagners-business-model-syria-and-africa-profit-and-patronage)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is Mali helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.06% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 57%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €16m (0.07% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is Mali's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +0.06% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.44% toward Russia to 1.0% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps).

### How does Mali compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Mali +0.06%, Algeria +0.02%, Niger −<0.01%, Mauritania −0.12%, Côte d'Ivoire −0.71%, Senegal −2.1%, Burkina Faso −3.9%.

### Where do the numbers for Mali come from?

18 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russian forces paid here (Wagner / Africa Corps): [Wagner Group / Africa Corps: RUSI (2025), The Sentry, Blood Gold Report, UN Panels of Experts, US Treasury, EU and UK sanctions designations](https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/occasional-papers/wagners-business-model-syria-and-africa-profit-and-patronage); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Mali have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Mali's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Mali.

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Albania](https://warbalance.org/country/albania/) · +0.07% · Essentially zero · +€16m · 70%
- [Timor-Leste](https://warbalance.org/country/timor-leste/) · +0.07% · Essentially zero · +€1m · >99%
- [Trinidad and Tobago](https://warbalance.org/country/trinidad-and-tobago/) · +0.06% · Essentially zero · +€16m · 71%
- Mali+0.06% · Essentially zero · +€14m · 57%
- [Costa Rica](https://warbalance.org/country/costa-rica/) · +0.06% · Essentially zero · +€45m · 69%
- [New Zealand](https://warbalance.org/country/new-zealand/) · +0.05% · Essentially zero · +€126m · 95%
- [Argentina](https://warbalance.org/country/argentina/) · +0.05% · Essentially zero · +€311m · 94%

## More about Mali

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

18 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#MLI) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/mali/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/mali/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/mali/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/mali/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/mali/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/mali/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/mali/