# Is Malaysia helping Russia? What the money flows show

Malaysia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €3m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €2.5bn (0.65% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.64% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.19% to 1.2% toward Russia; very likely · 99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#MYS)

Toward Russia by

0.64% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 99%

likely 0.19% to 1.2% toward Russia · €2.5bn · ≈ 0.14%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.64% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (largest part: more fuel bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€3m

likely from 0.01% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.65%

€2.5bn

likely 0.19% to 1.2% toward Russia very likely · 99%

Russia kept €2.5bn (0.65% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.63% of GDP more (€2.4bn; likely 0.17% to 1.2% toward Russia)
- Malaysia's own gain from trade with Russia: Malaysia kept 0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€52m; likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €486m (0.13% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €433m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €610m It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €610m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €485m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €3m

| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €10m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €8m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.65% · €2.5bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.32% | €1.2bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.19% | €729m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.13% | €486m |
| Malaysia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.02% | €59m |
| Malaysia kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €16m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €8m |
| Malaysia kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €6m |
| Malaysia kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.72bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€1m | −€692m | −€693m | −0.18% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€2m | −€723m | −€721m | −0.37% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€4m | −€603m | −€599m | −0.53% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€2m | −€225m | −€227m | −0.59% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | −€224m | −€224m | −0.64% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Malaysia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €10mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €10m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€7m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €3m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.94bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.4bn in 2025 (+48%). It sold €0.79bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.69bn in 2025 (−12%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 72.0% of what it bought from Russia. For Malaysia: €486m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Malaysia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.23bn | €0.20bnrange €0.16bn to €0.26bn | €0.12bn | A |
| Oil products | €3.7bn | €3.5bnrange €2.8bn to €4.5bn | €6.3bn | A |
| Coal | €2.1bn | €1.9bnrange €1.5bn to €2.4bn | €2.7bn | A |
| Other goods | €2.1bn | €2.6bn | – | – |
| All goods | €8.1bn | €8.3bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Malaysia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Malaysia. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#MYS)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.22bn extra from 2022 (0.06% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.43bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.73bn (0.19% of one year's GDP). Malaysia kept more from shipping Russian oil: €2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €610m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €454m to €1.1bn); €104m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 19 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Brunei](https://warbalance.org/country/brunei/) | +3.1% · +€0.45bn · likely toward Ukraine · 85% |
| [Thailand](https://warbalance.org/country/thailand/) | +0.08% · +€0.39bn · essentially zero |
| [Indonesia](https://warbalance.org/country/indonesia/) | −0.20% · −€2.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| Malaysia | −0.64% · −€2.5bn · very likely · 99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Sri Lanka](https://warbalance.org/country/sri-lanka/) | −0.87% · −€0.70bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Maldives](https://warbalance.org/country/maldives/) | −0.41% · −€25m · very likely · >99% |
| [Fiji](https://warbalance.org/country/fiji/) | −0.35% · −€18m · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

29 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 7 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 69% modelled (C) and 31% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Malaysia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Malaysia kept less from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

## Questions

### Is Malaysia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.64% of one year's GDP (likely 0.19% to 1.2% toward Russia; very likely · 99%). Chance toward Russia: 99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €2.5bn (0.65% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Malaysia trade with Russia?

It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.94bn in 2021), and sold €0.69bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €2.5bn (0.65% of GDP) more than without the war.

### Does Malaysia still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 72.0% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.4bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €0.94bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### How much has Malaysia given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €3m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

### How does Malaysia compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Brunei +3.1%, Thailand +0.08%, Indonesia −0.20%, Malaysia −0.64%. In the map's ranking: number 19 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Malaysia come from?

29 sources back its parts, 6 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Malaysia have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Malaysia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Malaysia.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 19 of 32

22. [Jamaica](https://warbalance.org/country/jamaica/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€94m
21. [South Africa](https://warbalance.org/country/south-africa/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€1.8bn
20. [Brazil](https://warbalance.org/country/brazil/) · −0.51% · Toward Russia · −€10.1bn
19. Malaysia−0.64% · Toward Russia · −€2.5bn
- [Niue](https://warbalance.org/country/niue/) · −0.67% · Toward Russia · −<€1m
18. [Côte d'Ivoire](https://warbalance.org/country/cote-divoire/) · −0.71% · Toward Russia · −€525m
- [Vanuatu](https://warbalance.org/country/vanuatu/) · −0.74% · Toward Russia · −€8m

## More about Malaysia

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

29 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#MYS) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/malaysia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/malaysia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/malaysia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/malaysia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/malaysia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/malaysia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/malaysia/