# Is Liberia helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Liberia's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (−0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €26m (0.64% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.63% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.35% toward Russia to 3.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#LBR)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

0.63% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 85%

likely from 0.35% toward Russia to 3.4% toward Ukraine · €26m · ≈ 0.13%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.63% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.01%

<€1m

likely from 0.12% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.64%

€26m

likely from 0.33% toward Russia to 3.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 86%

Russia kept €26m (0.64% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.72% of GDP less (€29m; likely from 0.23% toward Russia to 3.5% toward Ukraine)
- Liberia's own gain from trade with Russia: Liberia kept 0.08% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€3m; likely from 0.28% toward Russia to 0.08% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €6m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €30m of the net's €26m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €4.1bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 85% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.01% · <€1m

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.64% · €26m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.74% | €30m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Liberia kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −0.08% | €3m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.02% | €1m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€5m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | +€5m | +€5m | +0.13% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | +€5m | +€5m | +0.26% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | +€5m | +€5m | +0.39% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | +€4m | +€4m | +0.48% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | +€6m | +€6m | +0.63% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Liberia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€1m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €11m from Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025 (−87%). It sold €3m to Russia in 2021 and €4m in 2025. For Liberia: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Liberia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Liberia. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#LBR)

## How the number is backed

14 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 2 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 88% modelled (C) and 12% rough indications (D). No data: Russian oil bought via other countries · Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Liberia kept more from shipping Russian oil D

- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia more tax D

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

### Russia kept less from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### What decides Liberia's number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 85% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Is Liberia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.63% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.35% toward Russia to 3.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 85%). Chance toward Ukraine: 85%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €26m (0.64% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Where do the numbers for Liberia come from?

14 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Liberia kept more from shipping Russian oil: [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf); Its firms paid Russia more tax: [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Liberia have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Liberia's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Liberia.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

- [Kosovo](https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/) · +1.1% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€106m · 91%
- [Cameroon](https://warbalance.org/country/cameroon/) · +0.99% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€452m · 94%
- [Slovenia](https://warbalance.org/country/slovenia/) · +0.66% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€417m · 88%
- Liberia+0.63% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€26m · 85%
- [Bosnia and Herzegovina](https://warbalance.org/country/bosnia-and-herzegovina/) · +0.56% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€142m · 85%
- [Rwanda](https://warbalance.org/country/rwanda/) · +0.55% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€74m · 90%
- [Austria](https://warbalance.org/country/austria/) · +0.45% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€2.1bn · 68%

## More about Liberia

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

14 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#LBR) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/liberia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/liberia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/liberia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/liberia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/liberia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/liberia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/liberia/