# Is Lebanon helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Lebanon's support for Ukraine since 2022: €40m (0.19% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €538m (2.6% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 2.8% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 13.8% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 84%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#LBN)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

2.8% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 84%

likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 13.8% toward Ukraine · €578m · ≈ 0.59%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 2.8% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.19%

€40m

likely from 0.24% below zero to 0.44% above zero near zero · 77% above zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

2.6%

€538m

likely from 1.6% toward Russia to 13.6% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 82%

Russia kept €538m (2.6% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.6% of GDP less (€538m; likely from 1.6% toward Russia to 13.6% toward Ukraine)
- Lebanon's own gain from trade with Russia: Lebanon kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.02% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €234m (1.1% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €21m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €700m of the net's €578m.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 83% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.19% · €40m

| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.19% | €40m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 2.6% · €538m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +3.4% | €700m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −1.1% | €234m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.35% | €73m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€0.16bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2m | +€133m | +€135m | +0.65% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€1m | +€48m | +€49m | +0.88% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€3m | +€157m | +€160m | +1.7% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€20m | +€2m | +€22m | +1.8% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€14m | +€198m | +€212m | +2.8% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Lebanon's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | €40m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €40m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.47bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.40bn in 2025 (−14%). It sold €10m to Russia in 2021 and €6m in 2025 (−42%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 81.3% of what it bought from Russia. For Lebanon: €234m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Lebanon's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €1.3bn | €1bnrange €0.68bn to €1.4bn | €0.96bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €13m | €11mrange €8m to €14m | €9m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €0.62bn | €0.51bn | – | – |
| All goods | €1.9bn | €1.5bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Lebanon's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Lebanon. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#LBN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.17bn extra from 2022 (0.79% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €21m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€18m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Lebanon; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €73m (0.35% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| Lebanon | +2.8% · +€0.58bn · likely toward Ukraine · 84% |
| [Israel](https://warbalance.org/country/israel/) | +<0.01% · +€1m · essentially zero |
| [Syria](https://warbalance.org/country/syria/) | −1.0% · −€0.20bn · too close to call · 64% toward Russia |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Cameroon](https://warbalance.org/country/cameroon/) | +0.99% · +€0.45bn · likely toward Ukraine · 94% |
| [Rwanda](https://warbalance.org/country/rwanda/) | +0.55% · +€74m · likely toward Ukraine · 90% |
| [Angola](https://warbalance.org/country/angola/) | +0.25% · +€0.26bn · likely toward Ukraine · 92% |

## How the number is backed

19 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 93% modelled (C) and 7% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (97%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Ukraine kept more from extra sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept more from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Does Lebanon trade with Russia?

It bought €0.40bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.47bn in 2021), and sold €6m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €538m (2.6% of GDP) less than without the war.

### What decides Lebanon's number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 83% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Is Lebanon helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +2.8% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.5% toward Russia to 13.8% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 84%). Chance toward Ukraine: 84%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €538m (2.6% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How much has Lebanon given to Ukraine?

Lebanon's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €40m, 0.19% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.24% below zero to 0.44% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### How does Lebanon compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Lebanon +2.8%, Israel +<0.01%, Syria −1.0%.

### Where do the numbers for Lebanon come from?

19 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Lebanon have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Lebanon's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Lebanon.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

32. [Chile](https://warbalance.org/country/chile/) · +0.04% · Toward Ukraine · +€107m
- [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) · +3.3% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€3.1bn · 95%
- [Brunei](https://warbalance.org/country/brunei/) · +3.1% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€453m · 85%
- Lebanon+2.8% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€578m · 84%
- [Turkmenistan](https://warbalance.org/country/turkmenistan/) · +1.5% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€574m · 83%
- [Greenland](https://warbalance.org/country/greenland/) · +1.5% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€46m · 67%
- [Kosovo](https://warbalance.org/country/kosovo/) · +1.1% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€106m · 91%

## More about Lebanon

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

19 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#LBN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/lebanon/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/lebanon/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/lebanon/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/lebanon/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/lebanon/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/lebanon/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/lebanon/