# How much has Latvia given to Ukraine since 2022?

Latvia's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.75bn (1.9% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.4bn (3.5% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€983m of €1.4bn), of which €72m gas cut off by Russia. The net is 5.6% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 3.2% to 8.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#LVA)

Toward Ukraine by

5.6% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 3.2% to 8.7% toward Ukraine · €2.2bn · ≈ 1.2%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 5.6% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less was required by EU sanctions it agreed to.

Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

1.9%

€755m

likely 1.4% to 2.8% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

3.5%

€1.4bn

likely 1.2% to 6.5% toward Ukraine very likely · 99%

Russia kept €1.4bn (3.5% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€983m of €1.4bn), of which €72m gas cut off by Russia.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.5% of GDP less (€1.4bn; likely 1.2% to 6.3% toward Ukraine)
- Latvia's own gain from trade with Russia: Latvia kept 0.05% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€20m; likely from 0.53% toward Russia to 0.41% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€49m).

## Its story in short

- Cut through EU sanctions it agreed to Of the €720m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 88% was required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member (Council Regulation 833/2014), 2% went beyond them. The other 10% was gas or oil Russia cut off itself.
- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €356m (0.92% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €352m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 93% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.2bn in 2021, €86m in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Top-10 aid giver for its size Aid to Ukraine (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid): €495m (1.3% of GDP), number 7 of 162 economies for its size.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 1.9% · €755m

| Aid: weapons, money, loansC | +0.89% | €345m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hosting refugeesC | +0.67% | €260m |
| Its share of EU aidB | +0.30% | €116m |
| Private donationsD | +0.09% | €33m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.04% | €17m |
| Latvia kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −0.02% | €9m |
| Latvia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €3m |
| Latvia kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −<0.01% | €3m |
| Latvia kept back part of its aid, spent at homeB | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €1m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 3.5% · €1.4bn

| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +2.5% | €983m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +1.7% | €671m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.92% | €356m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.08% | €30m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +0.06% | €24m |
| Latvia's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +0.06% | €24m |
| Latvia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.06% | €24m |
| Latvia kept less from selling to RussiaC | +0.04% | €15m |
| Latvia kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +0.01% | €5m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €49m

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC | +0.08% | €31m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD | +0.04% | €17m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: +€0.58bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.23bn in 2022 to €0.11bn in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€227m | −€173m | +€4m | +€57m | +0.15% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€159m | +€400m | +€15m | +€574m | +1.6% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€153m | +€411m | +€13m | +€578m | +3.1% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€115m | +€364m | +€10m | +€489m | +4.4% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€102m | +€369m | +€6m | +€477m | +5.6% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Latvia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €0.28bnrange €0.17bn to €0.51bn; Kiel: €0.65bn |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €38mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €1m |
| Humanitarian aid | €29m |
| Refugee hosting | €0.26bn |
| Share of EU aid | €0.12bn |
| Private donations and purchases | €50m |
| Money flowing back | −€18msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.76bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.2bn from Russia in 2021 and €86m in 2025 (−93%). It sold €0.70bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.59bn in 2025 (−15%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 27.6% of what it bought from Russia. For Latvia: €356m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 97% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Latvia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0.59bn | €0.86bnrange €0.63bn to €1.1bn | €2.2bn | A |
| Pipeline gas | €0.21bn | €0.22bnrange €0.16bn to €0.28bn | €0.32bn | A |
| Coal | €20m | €27mrange €20m to €35m | €57m | A |
| Other goods | €1.6bn | €1.5bn | – | – |
| All goods | €2.4bn | €2.6bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 88% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 10% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 2% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. As an EU member, Latvia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Latvia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Latvia. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#LVA)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.83bn extra from 2022 (2.1% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.35bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€49m; likely €35m to €57m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure; assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €0.15bn (December 2025, [source](https://globalsanctions.com/2026/06/latvian-financial-intelligence-unit-publishes-2025-annual-report-on-sanctions/) (search summary, to be checked against the official text)).

## Refugees from Ukraine

31,865 refugees from Ukraine, 17 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.26bn (0.67% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Latvia: €275m spent on refugees, less €15m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €727m; counted here: €345m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €0.18bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €77m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €0.32bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €125m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.85bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Latvia; what its firms kept of it, €18m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russia took €3m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely <€1m to €29m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €0.98bn (2.5% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €28m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €27m to €95m); €92m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 5 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 4 of 21 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 4 of 23 members toward Ukraine.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Lithuania](https://warbalance.org/country/lithuania/) | +11.9% · +€8.8bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Estonia](https://warbalance.org/country/estonia/) | +10.8% · +€4.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| Latvia | +5.6% · +€2.2bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Belarus](https://warbalance.org/country/belarus/) | −3.8% · −€2.7bn · Party to the war |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Netherlands](https://warbalance.org/country/netherlands/) | +5.1% · +€54.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Poland](https://warbalance.org/country/poland/) | +5.0% · +€37.8bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Denmark](https://warbalance.org/country/denmark/) | +4.0% · +€15.5bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Sweden](https://warbalance.org/country/sweden/) | +3.7% · +€20.1bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

40 sources back its parts: 13 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 4% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 59% modelled (C) and 37% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans C

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)

### Hosting refugees C

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

## Questions

### How much has Latvia given to Ukraine?

Latvia's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.75bn, 1.9% of one year's GDP (likely 1.4% to 2.8%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Does Latvia trade with Russia?

It bought €86m from Russia in 2025 (€1.2bn in 2021), and sold €0.59bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.4bn (3.5% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€983m of €1.4bn), of which €72m gas cut off by Russia.

### Is Latvia helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +5.6% of one year's GDP (likely 3.2% to 8.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.4bn (3.5% of GDP) less than without the war, mostly less Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€983m of €1.4bn), of which €72m gas cut off by Russia. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Latvia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €86m from Russia in 2025 (€1.2bn in 2021), and sold €0.59bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.75bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +5.6% of one year's GDP (likely 3.2% to 8.7% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Did Latvia cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 88% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 10% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 2% beyond what sanctions required.

### How many Ukrainian refugees does Latvia host, and what does it cost?

31,865 refugees from Ukraine, 17 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.26bn (0.67% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Latvia: €275m spent on refugees, less €15m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

### Does Latvia have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. As an EU member, Latvia applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Latvia as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Latvia. Sources: [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj); [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 5 of 32

2. [Estonia](https://warbalance.org/country/estonia/) · +10.8% · Toward Ukraine · +€4.1bn
3. [Finland](https://warbalance.org/country/finland/) · +8.5% · Toward Ukraine · +€23.1bn
4. [Moldova](https://warbalance.org/country/moldova/) · +6.9% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.1bn
5. Latvia+5.6% · Toward Ukraine · +€2.2bn
6. [Netherlands](https://warbalance.org/country/netherlands/) · +5.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€54.1bn
7. [Poland](https://warbalance.org/country/poland/) · +5.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€37.8bn
8. [Denmark](https://warbalance.org/country/denmark/) · +4.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€15.5bn

## More about Latvia

### Groups

- [EU countries](https://warbalance.org/group/eu/)
- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Share of EU aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/eu-aid-to-ukraine-by-member/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

40 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#LVA) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/latvia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/latvia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/latvia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/latvia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/latvia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/latvia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/latvia/