# Is Laos helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Ukraine

Laos' support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €21m (0.14% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.14% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 89%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#LAO)

Leaning toward Ukraine by

0.14% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Ukraine · 89%

likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine · €20m · ≈ 0.03%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.14% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

likely from 0.01% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.14%

€21m

likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 90%

Russia kept €21m (0.14% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.14% of GDP less (€21m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine)
- Laos' own gain from trade with Russia: Laos kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €19m of the net's €20m.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.14% · €21m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.13% | €19m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.04% | €5m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.02% | €3m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€5m.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | +€2m | +€2m | +0.02% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | +€5m | +€5m | +0.05% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | +€4m | +€4m | +0.08% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | +€4m | +€4m | +0.11% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | +€5m | +€5m | +0.14% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €20m from Russia in 2021 and €2m in 2025 (−89%). It sold €1m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025. For Laos: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Laos' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Laos. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#LAO)

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€22m of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Laos; what its firms kept of it, <€1m, is taken off its support.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Ukraine, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| Laos | +0.14% · +€20m · likely toward Ukraine · 89% |
| [Thailand](https://warbalance.org/country/thailand/) | +0.08% · +€0.39bn · essentially zero |
| [Vietnam](https://warbalance.org/country/vietnam/) | −0.03% · −€0.10bn · essentially zero |
| [Myanmar](https://warbalance.org/country/myanmar/) | −0.05% · −€35m · essentially zero |
| [Cambodia](https://warbalance.org/country/cambodia/) | −0.08% · −€31m · essentially zero |
| [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Turkmenistan](https://warbalance.org/country/turkmenistan/) | +1.5% · +€0.57bn · likely toward Ukraine · 83% |
| [Brunei](https://warbalance.org/country/brunei/) | +3.1% · +€0.45bn · likely toward Ukraine · 85% |

## How the number is backed

13 sources back its parts: 1 official statistics, 3 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 71% modelled (C) and 29% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (90%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Russia kept less from weapons sold here D

- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

## Questions

### Is Laos helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.14% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.92% toward Ukraine; likely toward Ukraine · 89%). Chance toward Ukraine: 89%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €21m (0.14% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How does Laos compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Laos +0.14%, Thailand +0.08%, Vietnam −0.03%, Myanmar −0.05%, Cambodia −0.08%, China −0.75%.

### Where do the numbers for Laos come from?

13 sources back its parts, 1 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept less from weapons sold here: [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Laos have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Laos' own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Laos.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Ukraine

- [Honduras](https://warbalance.org/country/honduras/) · +0.24% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€76m · 74%
- [Suriname](https://warbalance.org/country/suriname/) · +0.21% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€8m · 86%
- [Colombia](https://warbalance.org/country/colombia/) · +0.15% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€524m · 95%
- Laos+0.14% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€20m · 89%
- [Dominican Republic](https://warbalance.org/country/dominican-republic/) · +0.13% · Near zero · +€147m · 86%
- [Venezuela](https://warbalance.org/country/venezuela/) · −0.11% · Near zero · −€109m · 71%
- [Belize](https://warbalance.org/country/belize/) · −0.13% · Near zero · −€4m · 82%

## More about Laos

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

13 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#LAO) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/laos/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/laos/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/laos/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/laos/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/laos/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/laos/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/laos/