# Is Kyrgyzstan helping Russia? What the money flows show

Kyrgyzstan's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Kyrgyzstan moved €1.4bn (10.0% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to Russia). The net is 10.0% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.77% to 18.7% toward Russia; very likely · 97%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#KGZ)

Toward Russia by

10.0% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 97%

likely 0.77% to 18.7% toward Russia · €1.4bn · ≈ 2.1%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 10.0% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€1m

likely from 0.25% below zero to 0.03% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

10.0%

€1.4bn

likely 0.76% to 18.7% toward Russia very likely · 97%

Kyrgyzstan moved €1.4bn (10.0% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to Russia).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 8.9% of GDP more (€1.3bn; likely from 16.9% toward Russia to 0.22% toward Ukraine)
- Kyrgyzstan's own gain from trade with Russia: Kyrgyzstan kept 1.1% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€158m; likely 0.35% to 3.7% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €675m (4.8% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €220m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 90% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.5bn in 2021, €2.9bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 216% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €277m in 2021, €875m in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €77m It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €9m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €1m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 10.0% · €1.4bn

| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −4.8% | €675m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −3.7% | €529m |
| Kyrgyzstan kept more from settling Russia's tradeC | −0.63% | €89m |
| Russia kept more from gold and hidden paymentsD | −0.50% | €71m |
| Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to RussiaC | −0.35% | €50m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.23% | €33m |
| Kyrgyzstan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.12% | €17m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.09% | €13m |
| Kyrgyzstan kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −0.02% | €2m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.47bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | −€107m | −€108m | −0.76% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −€81m | −€81m | −1.3% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | −€469m | −€469m | −4.7% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€1m | −€393m | −€394m | −7.4% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | −€363m | −€364m | −10.0% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Kyrgyzstan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€1m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.5bn from Russia in 2021 and €2.9bn in 2025 (+90%). It sold €0.28bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.87bn in 2025 (+216%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 40.6% of what it bought from Russia. For Kyrgyzstan: €675m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2024. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by +2.4% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: +€336m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€2.0bn to +€2.3bn); migrants sent €11.5bn home from Russia in that time. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Kyrgyzstan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €3.5bn | €3.2bnrange €2.7bn to €3.9bn | not tracked | C (estimate) |
| Pipeline gas | €0.29bn | €0.27bnrange €0.22bn to €0.32bn | not tracked | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €6.1bn | €7.8bn | – | – |
| All goods | €9.8bn | €11.3bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Kyrgyzstan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kyrgyzstan. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#KGZ)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €21m extra from 2022 (0.15% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.22bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Kyrgyzstan kept more from settling Russia's trade: €89m (0.63% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments: €71m (0.50% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €13m (0.09% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €69m to €161m); €2m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 1 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. Central Asia: number 1 of 2 members toward Russia. Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion: number 1 of 4 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kazakhstan/) | +0.02% · +€55m · essentially zero |
| [Tajikistan](https://warbalance.org/country/tajikistan/) | −0.40% · −€46m · too close to call · 58% toward Russia |
| [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/country/uzbekistan/) | −4.1% · −€4.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| Kyrgyzstan | −10.0% · −€1.4bn · very likely · 97% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/country/uzbekistan/) | −4.1% · −€4.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Nepal](https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/) | −2.5% · −€0.97bn · very likely · >99% |
| [India](https://warbalance.org/country/india/) | −2.2% · −€70.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) | −1.5% · −€0.24bn · very likely · 98% |

## How the number is backed

28 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 93% modelled (C) and 7% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [EAEU members' own statistics of trade with Russia: Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Armstat; EEC member-pair tables 2015-2021](https://stat.gov.kg/ru/publications/vzaimnaya-torgovlya-tovarami-kyrgyzskoj-respubliki-s-gosudarstvami-chlenami-evrazijskogo-ekonomicheskogo-soyuza/)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Kyrgyzstan kept more from settling Russia's trade C

- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)

### Russia kept more from gold and hidden payments D

- research · [Gold and hidden payment channels to Russia not in customs data: Swissaid, Reuters, Hong Kong and Kyrgyz trade gaps](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)

### Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [EAEU members' own statistics of trade with Russia: Bureau of National Statistics of Kazakhstan, National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Armstat; EEC member-pair tables 2015-2021](https://stat.gov.kg/ru/publications/vzaimnaya-torgovlya-tovarami-kyrgyzskoj-respubliki-s-gosudarstvami-chlenami-evrazijskogo-ekonomicheskogo-soyuza/)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- research · [Gold and hidden payment channels to Russia not in customs data: Swissaid, Reuters, Hong Kong and Kyrgyz trade gaps](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is Kyrgyzstan helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −10.0% of one year's GDP (likely 0.77% to 18.7% toward Russia; very likely · 97%). Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Kyrgyzstan moved €1.4bn (10.0% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to Russia). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Kyrgyzstan help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €77m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €69m to €161m); €2m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### Does Kyrgyzstan trade with Russia?

It bought €2.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.5bn in 2021), and sold €0.87bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Kyrgyzstan moved €1.4bn (10.0% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Kyrgyzstan kept more from selling to Russia).

### How does Kyrgyzstan compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Kazakhstan +0.02%, Tajikistan −0.40%, China −0.75%, Uzbekistan −4.1%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%. In the map's ranking: number 1 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Kyrgyzstan come from?

28 sources back its parts, 7 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Kyrgyzstan kept more from settling Russia's trade: [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Kyrgyzstan have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Kyrgyzstan's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kyrgyzstan.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 1 of 32

4. [Yemen](https://warbalance.org/country/yemen/) · −5.2% · Toward Russia · −€462m
3. [Hungary](https://warbalance.org/country/hungary/) · −6.0% · Toward Russia · −€11.4bn
2. [Libya](https://warbalance.org/country/libya/) · −6.6% · Toward Russia · −€2.8bn
1. Kyrgyzstan−10.0% · Toward Russia · −€1.4bn

## More about Kyrgyzstan

### Groups

- [Central Asia](https://warbalance.org/group/central-asia/)
- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Gold and hidden payments to Russia](https://warbalance.org/gold-and-hidden-payments-to-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

28 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#KGZ) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/kyrgyzstan/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/kyrgyzstan/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/kyrgyzstan/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/kyrgyzstan/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/kyrgyzstan/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/kyrgyzstan/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/kyrgyzstan/