# Is Kenya helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

Kenya's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€9m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €323m (0.30% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€286m of €323m). The net is 0.31% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.59% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 90%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#KEN)

Leaning toward Russia by

0.31% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 90%

likely from 0.59% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine · €333m · ≈ 0.07%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.31% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 90%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€9m

likely from 0.04% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.30%

€323m

likely from 0.58% toward Russia to 0.10% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 89%

Russia kept €323m (0.30% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€286m of €323m).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.30% of GDP more (€323m; likely from 0.58% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine)
- Kenya's own gain from trade with Russia: Kenya kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (<€1m; likely from 0.02% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €286m of the net's €333m.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 90%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €9m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €9m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.30% · €323m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesC | −0.27% | €286m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.03% | €36m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.13bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€2m | −€132m | −€134m | −0.13% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −<€1m | −€115m | −€115m | −0.23% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€2m | −€37m | −€39m | −0.27% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€3m | −€17m | −€20m | −0.29% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€2m | −€23m | −€25m | −0.31% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Kenya's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€9m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€9m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.27bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.30bn in 2025 (+10%). It sold €81m to Russia in 2021 and €0.11bn in 2025 (+34%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 0.28% of what it bought from Russia. For Kenya: <€1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Kenya's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0m | €0.25bnrange €0.15bn to €0.40bn | €7m | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €2m | €1mrange €1m to €2m | €2m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €1.9bn | €1.8bn | – | – |
| All goods | €1.9bn | €2bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Kenya's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kenya. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#KEN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €18m extra from 2022 (0.02% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.29bn (0.27% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Ethiopia](https://warbalance.org/country/ethiopia/) | +<0.01% · +€6m · essentially zero |
| [Uganda](https://warbalance.org/country/uganda/) | −0.07% · −€33m · essentially zero |
| Kenya | −0.31% · −€0.33bn · likely toward Russia · 90% |
| [Tanzania](https://warbalance.org/country/tanzania/) | −1.1% · −€0.82bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) | −0.43% · −€1.7bn · likely toward Russia · 95% |
| [Mauritania](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritania/) | −0.12% · −€12m · likely toward Russia · 68% |
| [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) | −0.71% · −€3.5bn · likely toward Russia · 97% |
| [Namibia](https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/) | −0.83% · −€0.10bn · likely toward Russia · 77% |

## How the number is backed

14 sources back its parts: 4 official statistics, 0 research reports, 0 press reports and 1 of this project's own estimates, plus 9 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries C

- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept more from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is Kenya helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.31% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.59% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 90%). Chance toward Russia: 90%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €323m (0.30% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€286m of €323m). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Kenya trade with Russia?

It bought €0.30bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.27bn in 2021), and sold €0.11bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €323m (0.30% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€286m of €323m).

### How does Kenya compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Ethiopia +<0.01%, Uganda −0.07%, Kenya −0.31%, Tanzania −1.1%.

### Where do the numbers for Kenya come from?

14 sources back its parts, 4 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T); Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Ukraine kept less from sales here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Kenya have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Kenya's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kenya.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Seychelles](https://warbalance.org/country/seychelles/) · −0.22% · Leaning toward Russia · −€4m · 80%
- [Antigua and Barbuda](https://warbalance.org/country/antigua-and-barbuda/) · −0.28% · Leaning toward Russia · −€5m · 89%
- [Sao Tome and Principe](https://warbalance.org/country/sao-tome-and-principe/) · −0.29% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2m · 71%
- Kenya−0.31% · Leaning toward Russia · −€333m · 90%
- [Eritrea](https://warbalance.org/country/eritrea/) · −0.32% · Leaning toward Russia · −€7m · 68%
- [Singapore](https://warbalance.org/country/singapore/) · −0.41% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2.0bn · 75%
- [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) · −0.43% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.7bn · 95%

## More about Kenya

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

14 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#KEN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/kenya/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/kenya/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/kenya/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/kenya/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/kenya/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/kenya/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/kenya/