# Does Kazakhstan support Russia? The net is essentially zero

Kazakhstan's support for Ukraine since 2022: €20m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €35m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.02% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#KAZ)

Toward Ukraine by

0.02% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine · €55m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.02% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Russia: 60%; 10% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

<0.01%

€20m

likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.01%

€35m

likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €35m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.34% of GDP less (€813m; likely from 2.1% toward Russia to 3.0% toward Ukraine)
- Kazakhstan's own gain from trade with Russia: Kazakhstan kept 0.32% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€778m; likely from 1.6% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €1.2bn (0.50% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €1.0bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.0bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €247m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
- Russian-owned firms here Russian owners kept €687m (0.28% of GDP) more from their firms here.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 60%; 10% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with <0.01% · €20m

| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €14m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €4m |
| Kazakhstan kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €2m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.01% · €35m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +1.1% | €2.6bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.50% | €1.2bn |
| Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD | −0.28% | €687m |
| Kazakhstan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.26% | €636m |
| Kazakhstan kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −0.06% | €137m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +0.05% | €124m |
| Kazakhstan's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −0.02% | €38m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.01% | €35m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.01% | €32m |
| Kazakhstan kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €19m |
| Kazakhstan kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €14m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +<0.01% | €13m |
| Kazakhstan kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€0.36bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€2m | −€332m | −€330m | −0.14% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€5m | +€254m | +€258m | −0.03% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€4m | −€367m | −€363m | −0.18% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€7m | +€67m | +€74m | −0.15% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€2m | +€413m | +€415m | +0.02% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Kazakhstan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €4mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €4m |
| Humanitarian aid | €2m |
| Refugee hosting | €2m |
| Private donations and purchases | €14m |
| Money flowing back | −€2msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €20m |

Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €13.9bn from Russia in 2021 and €15.9bn in 2025 (+15%). It sold €5.7bn to Russia in 2021 and €5.7bn in 2025 (−1%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 9.7% of what it bought from Russia. For Kazakhstan: €1.2bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. Remittances from Russia changed by 0% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: €0 in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€145m to +€159m); migrants sent €383m home from Russia in that time. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Kazakhstan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €11m | €10mrange €9m to €12m | €1m | A |
| Oil products | €4.7bn | €4.4bnrange €4.1bn to €4.8bn | €1m | A |
| Pipeline gas | €2.1bn | €2bnrange €1.8bn to €2.2bn | not tracked | A |
| Coal | €0.39bn | €0.36bnrange €0.34bn to €0.40bn | not tracked | A |
| Other goods | €69.3bn | €64.7bn | – | – |
| All goods | €76.6bn | €71.5bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

No. Kazakhstan has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2022–2023). It has also said it will not let its territory be used to get around other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kazakhstan. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry / President Tokayev on sanctions (Interfax)](https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/86487/) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#KAZ)

## Refugees from Ukraine

4,240 refugees from Ukraine, 0.2 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €2m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Kazakhstan: €2m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.69bn (0.28% of one year's GDP). Russia took €168m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €52m to €498m; 0.07% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Kazakhstan kept more from settling Russia's trade: €0.14bn (0.06% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €35m (0.01% of one year's GDP). Kazakhstan kept more from shipping Russian oil: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.0bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €921m to €2.1bn); €53m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Turkmenistan](https://warbalance.org/country/turkmenistan/) | +1.5% · +€0.57bn · likely toward Ukraine · 83% |
| Kazakhstan | +0.02% · +€55m · essentially zero |
| [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/country/uzbekistan/) | −4.1% · −€4.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Kyrgyzstan](https://warbalance.org/country/kyrgyzstan/) | −10.0% · −€1.4bn · very likely · 97% |

## How the number is backed

37 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 72% modelled (C) and 28% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russian owners kept more from their firms here D

- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- research · [Russian-owned metals, mining and chemicals plants abroad (Rusal, NLMK, Nornickel, EuroChem): company filings and parent reports](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=A&reporter=IE&partner=RU&product=281820&flow=2&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS)

### Kazakhstan earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Kazakhstan kept more from settling Russia's trade D

- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- research · [Russian-owned metals, mining and chemicals plants abroad (Rusal, NLMK, Nornickel, EuroChem): company filings and parent reports](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=A&reporter=IE&partner=RU&product=281820&flow=2&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

## Questions

### Kazakhstan–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €15.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€13.9bn in 2021), and sold €5.7bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €20m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does Kazakhstan support Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.7% toward Russia to 2.8% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 60%; 10% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €35m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Kazakhstan help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.0bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €921m to €2.1bn); €53m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### Does Kazakhstan trade with Russia?

It bought €15.9bn from Russia in 2025 (€13.9bn in 2021), and sold €5.7bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €35m (0.01% of GDP) less than without the war.

### How much has Kazakhstan given to Ukraine?

Almost nothing that can be measured: €20m since 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

### How does Kazakhstan compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Turkmenistan +1.5%, Kazakhstan +0.02%, China −0.75%, Uzbekistan −4.1%, Kyrgyzstan −10.0%.

### Does Kazakhstan have sanctions on Russia?

No. Kazakhstan has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (2022–2023). It has also said it will not let its territory be used to get around other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Kazakhstan. Sources: [Kazakhstan Foreign Ministry / President Tokayev on sanctions (Interfax)](https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/86487/) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Philippines](https://warbalance.org/country/philippines/) · +0.04% · Essentially zero · +€175m · 75%
- [El Salvador](https://warbalance.org/country/el-salvador/) · +0.04% · Essentially zero · +€11m · 58%
- [Mexico](https://warbalance.org/country/mexico/) · +0.03% · Essentially zero · +€405m · 88%
- Kazakhstan+0.02% · Essentially zero · +€55m · 60%
- [Guatemala](https://warbalance.org/country/guatemala/) · +0.02% · Essentially zero · +€18m · 71%
- [Algeria](https://warbalance.org/country/algeria/) · +0.02% · Essentially zero · +€36m · 57%
- [Eswatini](https://warbalance.org/country/eswatini/) · +0.01% · Essentially zero · +€1m · 66%

## More about Kazakhstan

### Groups

- [Central Asia](https://warbalance.org/group/central-asia/)
- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Compared with

- [China vs Kazakhstan](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-kazakhstan/)
- [Kazakhstan vs Uzbekistan](https://warbalance.org/compare/kazakhstan-vs-uzbekistan/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad](https://warbalance.org/russian-owned-companies-abroad/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

37 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#KAZ) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/kazakhstan/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/kazakhstan/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/kazakhstan/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/kazakhstan/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/kazakhstan/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/kazakhstan/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/kazakhstan/