# How much has Japan given to Ukraine since 2022?

Japan's support for Ukraine since 2022: €5.3bn (0.13% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €6.5bn (0.16% of GDP) less than without the war; Russia also lost €0.34bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.30% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.14% to 0.55% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#JPN)

Toward Ukraine by

0.30% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.14% to 0.55% toward Ukraine · €12.2bn · ≈ 0.06%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.30% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Most of what Russia kept less went beyond what sanctions required.

Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.13%

€5.3bn

likely 0.12% to 0.27% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.16%

€6.5bn

likely from <0.01% toward Russia to 0.36% toward Ukraine near zero · 94% toward Ukraine

Russia kept €6.5bn (0.16% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.17% of GDP less (€6.8bn; likely 0.03% to 0.36% toward Ukraine)
- Japan's own gain from trade with Russia: Japan kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€278m; likely from 0.08% toward Russia to 0.06% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% of GDP in returns (€344m).

## Its story in short

- Cut beyond what sanctions required Of the €7.9bn less that Russia kept from its trade, about 5% was required by sanctions it set itself (import bans of April 2022 and later, the G7 oil phase-out), 95% went beyond them.
- Bought 58% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €10.9bn in 2021, €4.5bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 58% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €6.7bn in 2021, €2.8bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.13% · €5.3bn

| Aid: weapons, money, loansC | +0.12% | €4.9bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Private donationsD | +<0.01% | €353m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €124m |
| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €54m |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €34m |
| Japan kept part of others' aid, spent hereD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Japan kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)D | −<0.01% | €1m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.16% · €6.5bn

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.19% | €7.8bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.08% | €3.2bn |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxC | +0.06% | €2.4bn |
| Japan earned more from Russian oil and gas stakesC | −0.04% | €1.7bn |
| Japan's companies made less profit in RussiaC | +0.04% | €1.6bn |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €212m |
| Japan kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €191m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €71m |
| Japan kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €15m |
| Japan kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €13m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost <0.01% in returns · €344m

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC | +<0.01% | €317m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD | +<0.01% | €27m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€3.8bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €1.1bn in 2022 to €0.37bn in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€1.1bn | −€479m | +€3m | +€626m | +0.02% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€2.0bn | +€1.8bn | +€7m | +€3.8bn | +0.11% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€1.3bn | +€1.5bn | +€35m | +€2.9bn | +0.18% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€369m | +€2.0bn | +€146m | +€2.5bn | +0.24% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€520m | +€1.7bn | +€153m | +€2.4bn | +0.30% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Japan's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €43mrange €21m to €72m; Kiel: €76m |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €3.2bnof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €0.12bn |
| Humanitarian aid | €1.7bn |
| Refugee hosting | €34m |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.30bn |
| Money flowing back | −€2msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €5.3bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €10.9bn from Russia in 2021 and €4.5bn in 2025 (−58%). It sold €6.7bn to Russia in 2021 and €2.8bn in 2025 (−58%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 65.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Japan: €3.2bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Japan's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €1.5bn | €1.2bnrange €1.1bn to €1.3bn | €1.1bn | A |
| Oil products | €0.18bn | €0.51bnrange €0.40bn to €0.61bn | €0.19bn | A |
| LNG | €16.9bn | €15.4bnrange €14.1bn to €16.8bn | €15.8bn | A |
| Coal | €4.5bn | €4.1bnrange €3.8bn to €4.5bn | €2.8bn | A |
| Other goods | €11.2bn | €10.6bn | – | – |
| All goods | €34.3bn | €31.9bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 5% required by sanctions it set itself, 95% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Japan has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 26 February 2022. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Japan as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Japan. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Japan's sanctions related to the situation in Ukraine (Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act), law-firm summary (mofa.go.jp, meti.go.jp return 403)](https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/japans-sanctions-related-situation-ukraine) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#JPN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €2.9bn extra from 2022 (0.07% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.11bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: <0.01% of a year's GDP (€344m; likely €172m to €646m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure (estimate: about €28bn); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: no public figure.

## Refugees from Ukraine

2,346 refugees from Ukraine, 0.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €34m (<0.01% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Japan: €35m spent on refugees, less €1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €14.4bn; counted here: €4.9bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; G7 loans repaid from Russian assets left out (Russia pays for them); military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €10.2bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0m. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €3.9bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €6m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.69bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Japan; what its firms kept of it, €1m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Its firms paid Russia less tax: €2.4bn (0.06% of one year's GDP). Japan earned more from Russian oil and gas stakes: €1.7bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Japan's companies made less profit in Russia: €1.6bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russia took €2.6bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €1.8bn to €3.9bn; 0.06% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.21bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Japan kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.19bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €38m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €35m to €157m); €96m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 31 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. G7: number 7 of 7 members toward Ukraine.

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [South Korea](https://warbalance.org/country/south-korea/) | +1.1% · +€18.1bn · very likely · 99% |

## How the number is backed

40 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 9 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 15 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 96% modelled (C) and 4% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- official · [Japan's imports from Russia by product (Ministry of Finance trade statistics via e-Stat) and Sakhalin-2 long-term LNG contracts (about 5 Mt/yr to Japanese buyers)](https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/stat-search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00350300&tstat=000001013141&cycle=1&tclass1=000001013180&tclass2=000001013182)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans C

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia less tax C

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

### Japan earned more from Russian oil and gas stakes C

- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- official · [Japan's imports from Russia by product (Ministry of Finance trade statistics via e-Stat) and Sakhalin-2 long-term LNG contracts (about 5 Mt/yr to Japanese buyers)](https://www.e-stat.go.jp/en/stat-search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00350300&tstat=000001013141&cycle=1&tclass1=000001013180&tclass2=000001013182)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

## Questions

### Japan–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €4.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€10.9bn in 2021), and sold €2.8bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €5.3bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +0.30% of one year's GDP (likely 0.14% to 0.55% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Is Japan helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.30% of one year's GDP (likely 0.14% to 0.55% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €6.5bn (0.16% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Japan still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 65.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €4.5bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €10.9bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### How much has Japan given to Ukraine?

Japan's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €5.3bn, 0.13% of one year's GDP (likely 0.12% to 0.27%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Does Japan trade with Russia?

It bought €4.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€10.9bn in 2021), and sold €2.8bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €6.5bn (0.16% of GDP) less than without the war.

### Did Japan cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 5% required by sanctions it set itself, 95% beyond what sanctions required.

### Does Japan have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Japan has sanctions on Russia under its own law, since 26 February 2022. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Japan as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Japan. Sources: [Japan's sanctions related to the situation in Ukraine (Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act), law-firm summary (mofa.go.jp, meti.go.jp return 403)](https://www.whitecase.com/insight-alert/japans-sanctions-related-situation-ukraine) (search summary, to be checked against the official text); [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 31 of 32

28. [Canada](https://warbalance.org/country/canada/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€10.6bn
29. [United States](https://warbalance.org/country/united-states/) · +0.51% · Toward Ukraine · +€132bn
30. [Nigeria](https://warbalance.org/country/nigeria/) · +0.42% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.8bn
31. Japan+0.30% · Toward Ukraine · +€12.2bn
32. [Chile](https://warbalance.org/country/chile/) · +0.04% · Toward Ukraine · +€107m
- [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) · +3.3% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€3.1bn · 95%
- [Brunei](https://warbalance.org/country/brunei/) · +3.1% · Leaning toward Ukraine · +€453m · 85%

## More about Japan

### Groups

- [G7](https://warbalance.org/group/g7/)

### Compared with

- [China vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-japan/)
- [United States vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-japan/)
- [Germany vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-japan/)
- [Netherlands vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/netherlands-vs-japan/)
- [United Kingdom vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-kingdom-vs-japan/)
- [France vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/france-vs-japan/)
- [Poland vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/poland-vs-japan/)
- [Norway vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/norway-vs-japan/)
- [Italy vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/italy-vs-japan/)
- [Denmark vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/denmark-vs-japan/)
- [Sweden vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/sweden-vs-japan/)
- [Canada vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/canada-vs-japan/)
- [Spain vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/spain-vs-japan/)
- [Switzerland vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/switzerland-vs-japan/)
- [Ireland vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/ireland-vs-japan/)
- [Belgium vs Japan](https://warbalance.org/compare/belgium-vs-japan/)
- [Japan vs Finland](https://warbalance.org/compare/japan-vs-finland/)
- [Japan vs Czechia](https://warbalance.org/compare/japan-vs-czechia/)
- [Japan vs Austria](https://warbalance.org/compare/japan-vs-austria/)
- [Japan vs Romania](https://warbalance.org/compare/japan-vs-romania/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Stakes in Russian oil and gas projects](https://warbalance.org/stakes-in-russian-oil-and-gas-projects/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

40 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#JPN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/japan/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/japan/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/japan/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/japan/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/japan/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/japan/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/japan/