# Does Israel support Russia? The net is essentially zero

Israel's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.14bn (0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €138m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€453m; the other parts take €316m off it). The net is <0.01% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#ISR)

Toward Ukraine by

<0.01% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine · €1m · ≈ <0.01%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = <0.01% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. Toward Russia: mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere.

Chance toward Ukraine: 50%; 64% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.03%

€139m

likely 0.01% to 0.08% essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.03%

€138m

likely from 0.15% toward Russia to 0.10% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €138m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€453m; the other parts take €316m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.03% of GDP more (€163m; likely from 0.13% toward Russia to 0.09% toward Ukraine)
- Israel's own gain from trade with Russia: Israel kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€26m; likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 0.04% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Rough data: mostly estimates 64% of its parts, by size, are rough indications (certainty D): treat its number as a direction, not a measurement.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 50%; 64% of the other method choices agree. Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.03% · €139m

| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €102m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hosting refugeesD | +<0.01% | €12m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansC | +<0.01% | €12m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €10m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €8m |
| Israel kept part of others' aid, spent hereD | −<0.01% | €5m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.03% · €138m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.09% | €453m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.05% | €267m |
| Its firms paid Russia less taxD | +<0.01% | €46m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €46m |
| Israel earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −<0.01% | €35m |
| Israel's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €33m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €23m |
| Israel kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €15m |
| Israel kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €12m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.56bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €87m in 2022 to €10m in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€87m | +€28m | +€115m | +0.02% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€23m | −€581m | −€558m | −0.09% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€10m | +€173m | +€183m | −0.05% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€10m | +€116m | +€126m | −0.03% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€9m | +€126m | +€135m | +<0.01% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Israel's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €8mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €8m |
| Humanitarian aid | €12m |
| Refugee hosting | €13m |
| Private donations and purchases | €0.11bn |
| Money flowing back | −€5msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.14bn |

Quality of the split: C No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.56bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.36bn in 2025 (−36%). It sold €0.67bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.42bn in 2025 (−37%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 57.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Israel: €46m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2023. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Israel's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.24bn | €0.14bnrange €95m to €0.20bn | €0.21bn | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €0.50bn | €0.40bnrange €0.26bn to €0.54bn | €1.8bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0.14bn | €0.12bnrange €72m to €0.16bn | €0.55bn | B |
| Other goods | €2.8bn | €2.5bn | – | – |
| All goods | €3.7bn | €3.2bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: B, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: C. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Israel's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Israel. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#ISR)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €0.18bn extra from 2022 (0.04% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.17bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.17bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Israel; what its firms kept of it, €5m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russia took €112m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €28m to €366m; 0.02% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.45bn (0.09% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €152m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €120m to €283m); €39m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Lebanon](https://warbalance.org/country/lebanon/) | +2.8% · +€0.58bn · likely toward Ukraine · 84% |
| [Palestine](https://warbalance.org/country/palestine/) | +0.09% · +€15m · essentially zero |
| Israel | +<0.01% · +€1m · essentially zero |
| [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) | −0.35% · −€0.18bn · very likely · 97% |
| [Egypt](https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/) | −0.43% · −€1.7bn · likely toward Russia · 95% |
| [Syria](https://warbalance.org/country/syria/) | −1.0% · −€0.20bn · too close to call · 64% toward Russia |

## How the number is backed

33 sources back its parts: 11 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 36% modelled (C) and 64% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)

### Private donations D

- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)

### Its firms paid Russia less tax D

- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

## Questions

### Does Israel support Russia?

In money terms the net is +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 50%; 64% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €138m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€453m; the other parts take €316m off it). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Israel–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €0.36bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.56bn in 2021), and sold €0.42bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.14bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### How much has Israel given to Ukraine?

Israel's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.14bn, 0.03% of one year's GDP (likely 0.01% to 0.08%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Does Israel still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 57.5% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €0.36bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €0.56bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### Does Israel trade with Russia?

It bought €0.36bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.56bn in 2021), and sold €0.42bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €138m (0.03% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€453m; the other parts take €316m off it).

### Why is Israel's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: +<0.01% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.12% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine). Near zero, and not certain mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

### Does Israel have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Israel's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Israel.

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Ethiopia](https://warbalance.org/country/ethiopia/) · +<0.01% · Essentially zero · +€6m · 51%
- [Andorra](https://warbalance.org/country/andorra/) · +<0.01% · Essentially zero · +<€1m · 53%
- [Kuwait](https://warbalance.org/country/kuwait/) · +<0.01% · Essentially zero · +€1m · 51%
- Israel+<0.01% · Essentially zero · +€1m · 50%
- [Guyana](https://warbalance.org/country/guyana/) · −<0.01% · Essentially zero · −<€1m · 68%
- [Bermuda](https://warbalance.org/country/bermuda/) · −<0.01% · Essentially zero · −<€1m · 53%
- [Niger](https://warbalance.org/country/niger/) · −<0.01% · Essentially zero · −€2m · 58%

## More about Israel

### Compared with

- [Israel vs Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/compare/israel-vs-turkiye/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

33 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#ISR) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/israel/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/israel/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/israel/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/israel/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/israel/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/israel/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/israel/