# Is Iraq helping Russia? What the money flows show

Iraq's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€57m (−0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €511m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m; the other parts take €55m off it). The net is 0.22% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely <0.01% to 0.59% toward Russia; very likely · 96%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#IRQ)

Toward Russia by

0.22% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · 96%

likely <0.01% to 0.59% toward Russia · €568m · ≈ 0.05%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.22% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.02%

€57m

likely from 0.11% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.20%

€511m

likely from 0.56% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 94%

Russia kept €511m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m; the other parts take €55m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.20% of GDP more (€508m; likely from 0.56% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)
- Iraq's own gain from trade with Russia: Iraq kept <0.01% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€2m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €566m of the net's €568m.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.02% · €57m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.02% | €62m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €4m |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.20% · €511m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.22% | €566m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansB | +0.14% | €372m |
| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.13% | €328m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.01% | €28m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.01% | €28m |
| Russian owners kept less from their firms hereC | +<0.01% | €18m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Iraq kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.29bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€21m | −€265m | −€286m | −0.11% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€7m | −€206m | −€213m | −0.19% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€13m | −€42m | −€55m | −0.21% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€8m | −€28m | −€37m | −0.23% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€8m | +€31m | +€22m | −0.22% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Iraq's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €4mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €4m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€62m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€57m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €12m from Russia in 2021 and €0.32bn in 2025 (+2620%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 5.5% of what it bought from Russia. For Iraq: €28m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Iraq's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €0.11bn | €0.44bnrange €0.12bn to €0.91bn | €0.14bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €1.3bn | €0.90bn | – | – |
| All goods | €1.4bn | €1.3bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Iraq's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Iraq. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#IRQ)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €22m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.57bn (0.22% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 28 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Kuwait](https://warbalance.org/country/kuwait/) | +<0.01% · +€1m · essentially zero |
| Iraq | −0.22% · −€0.57bn · very likely · 96% |
| [Saudi Arabia](https://warbalance.org/country/saudi-arabia/) | −0.30% · −€3.5bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) | −0.35% · −€0.18bn · very likely · 97% |
| [Iran](https://warbalance.org/country/iran/) | −0.44% · −€1.9bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Syria](https://warbalance.org/country/syria/) | −1.0% · −€0.20bn · too close to call · 64% toward Russia |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Sierra Leone](https://warbalance.org/country/sierra-leone/) | −0.14% · −€9m · very likely · >99% |
| [Saudi Arabia](https://warbalance.org/country/saudi-arabia/) | −0.30% · −€3.5bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) | −0.35% · −€0.18bn · very likely · 97% |
| [Iran](https://warbalance.org/country/iran/) | −0.44% · −€1.9bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

24 sources back its parts: 4 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 26% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 32% modelled (C) and 42% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans B

- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)

### Ukraine kept less from sales here C

- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- research · [Iraq EITI 2021-2023 (PCLD remuneration and tax tables) and Alrosa IFRS 2021/2025 (Catoca dividends)](https://eiti.org/document/25590)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)

## Questions

### Is Iraq helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.22% of one year's GDP (likely <0.01% to 0.59% toward Russia; very likely · 96%). Chance toward Russia: 96%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €511m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m; the other parts take €55m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Iraq trade with Russia?

It bought €0.32bn from Russia in 2025 (€12m in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €511m (0.20% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€566m; the other parts take €55m off it).

### How does Iraq compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Kuwait +<0.01%, Iraq −0.22%, Saudi Arabia −0.30%, Jordan −0.35%, Iran −0.44%, Syria −1.0%. In the map's ranking: number 28 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Iraq come from?

24 sources back its parts, 4 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans: [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087); Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Iraq have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Iraq's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Iraq.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 28 of 32

30. [Sierra Leone](https://warbalance.org/country/sierra-leone/) · −0.14% · Toward Russia · −€9m
- [Nauru](https://warbalance.org/country/nauru/) · −0.19% · Toward Russia · −<€1m
29. [Indonesia](https://warbalance.org/country/indonesia/) · −0.20% · Toward Russia · −€2.6bn
28. Iraq−0.22% · Toward Russia · −€568m
- [Solomon Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/solomon-islands/) · −0.27% · Toward Russia · −€4m
- [Samoa](https://warbalance.org/country/samoa/) · −0.29% · Toward Russia · −€3m
27. [Saudi Arabia](https://warbalance.org/country/saudi-arabia/) · −0.30% · Toward Russia · −€3.5bn

## More about Iraq

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Rosatom projects and Russian state loans](https://warbalance.org/rosatom-and-russian-state-loans/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad](https://warbalance.org/russian-owned-companies-abroad/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

24 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#IRQ) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/iraq/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/iraq/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/iraq/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/iraq/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/iraq/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/iraq/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/iraq/