# Does Iran support Russia? What the money flows show

Iran's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Iran moved €1.9bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Iran kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€1.8bn of €1.9bn)). The net is 0.44% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 0.21% to 0.69% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#IRN)

Toward Russia by

0.44% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.21% to 0.69% toward Russia · €1.9bn · ≈ 0.09%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.44% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€1m

likely from 0.02% below zero to 0.02% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.44%

€1.9bn

likely 0.21% to 0.69% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Iran moved €1.9bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Iran kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€1.8bn of €1.9bn)).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.01% of GDP less (€47m; likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 0.11% toward Ukraine)
- Iran's own gain from trade with Russia: Iran kept 0.45% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1.9bn; likely 0.24% to 0.68% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Armed Russia: €3.5bn delivered Weapons, ammunition, drones or troops delivered to Russia: €3.5bn at full value. In the totals: €1.8bn, because what Russia paid for counts at the seller's own gain, like any sale.
- Mostly one part Weapons and troops sent to Russia: €1.8bn of the net's €1.9bn.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €1m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €13m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €12m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.44% · €1.9bn

| Weapons and troops sent to RussiaC | −0.44% | €1.8bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.02% | €85m |
| Russia kept more from weapons sold hereD | −0.02% | €65m |
| Iran earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.01% | €43m |
| Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansD | +<0.01% | €40m |
| Iran kept more from selling to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €12m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €11m |
| Iran's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €7m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €5m |
| Iran kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.80bn. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€1m | −€164m | −€164m | −0.04% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€2m | −€798m | −€796m | −0.23% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€1m | −€655m | −€654m | −0.38% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€3m | −€278m | −€281m | −0.45% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€1m | +€38m | +€37m | −0.44% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Iran's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €12mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €12m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€13m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€1m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Iran–Russia trade

It bought €1.2bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.1bn in 2025 (−9%). It sold €0.49bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.96bn in 2025 (+97%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 0.20% of what it bought from Russia. For Iran: €1m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Iran's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Iran. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#IRN)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €11m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 23 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 5 of 6 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Iraq](https://warbalance.org/country/iraq/) | −0.22% · −€0.57bn · very likely · 96% |
| Iran | −0.44% · −€1.9bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [South Africa](https://warbalance.org/country/south-africa/) | −0.49% · −€1.8bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) | −0.35% · −€0.18bn · very likely · 97% |
| [Saudi Arabia](https://warbalance.org/country/saudi-arabia/) | −0.30% · −€3.5bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Iraq](https://warbalance.org/country/iraq/) | −0.22% · −€0.57bn · very likely · 96% |

## How the number is backed

31 sources back its parts: 7 official statistics, 7 research reports, 1 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 92% modelled (C) and 8% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated corrected for missing reports; only the paid share (90%) counts
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Weapons and troops sent to Russia C

- research · [Military support to Russia: Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence, Open Source Centre, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, INSS, leaked Alabuga contracts, Russian procurement prices](https://msmt.info/api/file/download/18858)
- press · [How Russia paid for weapons and troops: INSS (via Bloomberg and The Insider), NK News, Bloomberg via Militarnyi; outdated North Korean stock: Ukraine's military intelligence via Reuters](https://theins.press/en/news/290450)
- research · [The seller's gain on weapons sold to Russia: the Alabuga drone contract and the Shahed's cost (Defense One, The War Zone, Militarnyi), Rheinmetall's ammunition margin, North Korean shell prices (Kyiv Post)](https://www.twz.com/news-features/what-does-a-shahed-136-really-cost)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)

### Russia kept more from weapons sold here D

- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)

### Iran earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loans D

- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)

- research · [Military support to Russia: Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence, Open Source Centre, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, INSS, leaked Alabuga contracts, Russian procurement prices](https://msmt.info/api/file/download/18858)
- press · [How Russia paid for weapons and troops: INSS (via Bloomberg and The Insider), NK News, Bloomberg via Militarnyi; outdated North Korean stock: Ukraine's military intelligence via Reuters](https://theins.press/en/news/290450)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [The seller's gain on weapons sold to Russia: the Alabuga drone contract and the Shahed's cost (Defense One, The War Zone, Militarnyi), Rheinmetall's ammunition margin, North Korean shell prices (Kyiv Post)](https://www.twz.com/news-features/what-does-a-shahed-136-really-cost)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Trade with Russia for partners that do not report (Cuba, Venezuela, Syria, Libya, Iran...): tanker tracking, official statements](https://api.russiafossiltracker.com/v0/counter?format=csv&date\_from=2021-01-01&date\_to=2026-10-17&aggregate\_by=year,destination\_iso2,destination\_country,commodity\_group&commodity\_grouping=split\_gas\_oil&currency=EUR)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

## Questions

### Iran drones for Russia: what are they worth?

Iran drones, with other military supplies sent to Russia since 2022: about €3.5bn at full value, from the sources on Russia's panel. In the totals, what Russia paid for counts at the seller's net gain, like a sale; what it did not pay for counts in full.

### Does Iran support Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.44% of one year's GDP (likely 0.21% to 0.69% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Iran moved €1.9bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Iran kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€1.8bn of €1.9bn)). Weapons and troops it sent to Russia (about €3.5bn at full value) are listed on Russia's panel; in the totals they count at the seller's gain. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Iran–Russia trade: how much since 2022?

It bought €1.1bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.2bn in 2021), and sold €0.96bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Iran moved €1.9bn (0.44% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Iran kept more from selling to Russia, mostly weapons and troops sent to Russia (€1.8bn of €1.9bn)).

### How does Iran compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Iraq −0.22%, Iran −0.44%. In the map's ranking: number 23 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### Where do the numbers for Iran come from?

31 sources back its parts, 7 of them official statistics. By part: Weapons and troops sent to Russia: [Military support to Russia: Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence, Open Source Centre, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, INSS, leaked Alabuga contracts, Russian procurement prices](https://msmt.info/api/file/download/18858); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from weapons sold here: [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Iran have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Iran's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Iran.

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 23 of 32

26. [Fiji](https://warbalance.org/country/fiji/) · −0.35% · Toward Russia · −€18m
25. [Jordan](https://warbalance.org/country/jordan/) · −0.35% · Toward Russia · −€183m
24. [Maldives](https://warbalance.org/country/maldives/) · −0.41% · Toward Russia · −€25m
23. Iran−0.44% · Toward Russia · −€1.9bn
- [Comoros](https://warbalance.org/country/comoros/) · −0.48% · Toward Russia · −€7m
22. [Jamaica](https://warbalance.org/country/jamaica/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€94m
21. [South Africa](https://warbalance.org/country/south-africa/) · −0.49% · Toward Russia · −€1.8bn

## More about Iran

### Groups

- [BRICS](https://warbalance.org/group/brics/)

### Compared with

- [Iran vs Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/compare/iran-vs-turkiye/)
- [China vs Iran](https://warbalance.org/compare/china-vs-iran/)
- [Iran vs North Korea](https://warbalance.org/compare/iran-vs-north-korea/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Rosatom projects and Russian state loans](https://warbalance.org/rosatom-and-russian-state-loans/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

31 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#IRN) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/iran/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/iran/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/iran/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/iran/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/iran/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/iran/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/iran/