# Does India support Russia? What the money flows show

India's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€0.15bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €70.5bn (2.2% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 2.2% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#IND)

Toward Russia by

2.2% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia · €70.6bn · ≈ 0.46%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 2.2% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€146m

likely from 0.03% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

2.2%

€70.5bn

likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia very likely · >99%

Russia kept €70.5bn (2.2% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 2.2% of GDP more (€71.1bn; likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia)
- India's own gain from trade with Russia: India kept 0.02% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€629m; likely from 0.04% toward Russia to 0.06% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €24.1bn over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 527% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €6.8bn in 2021, €42.8bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 56% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €2.9bn in 2021, €4.5bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €1.4bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €247m. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €146m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €183m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €39m |
| India kept part of others' aid, spent hereC | −<0.01% | €4m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +<0.01% | €3m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 2.2% · €70.5bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −2.5% | €82.2bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.34% | €11.0bn |
| India earned less from Russian oil and gas stakesC | +0.04% | €1.2bn |
| India earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsC | −0.01% | €342m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereC | +<0.01% | €193m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxC | −<0.01% | €130m |
| India's companies made more profit in RussiaC | −<0.01% | €121m |
| Russia kept less from its nuclear projects and loansD | +<0.01% | €107m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €65m |
| India kept more from shipping Russian oilC | −<0.01% | €53m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −<0.01% | €52m |
| India kept more from selling to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €41m |
| India kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −<0.01% | €25m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2024: −€19.5bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€40m | −€13.2bn | −€13.2bn | −0.40% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€6m | −€15.1bn | −€15.1bn | −0.87% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€10m | −€19.5bn | −€19.5bn | −1.5% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€58m | −€12.4bn | −€12.4bn | −1.8% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€32m | −€10.3bn | −€10.3bn | −2.2% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

India's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €0mKiel: €0m |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €39mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €39m |
| Humanitarian aid | €3m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€0.18bn |
| Money flowing back | −€4msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€0.14bn |

Quality of the split: A

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## India–Russia trade

It bought €6.8bn from Russia in 2021 and €42.8bn in 2025 (+527%). It sold €2.9bn to Russia in 2021 and €4.5bn in 2025 (+56%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 42.6% of what it bought from Russia. For India: €11.0bn paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

India's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €195bn | €121bnrange €83.3bn to €157bn | €150bn | A |
| Oil products | €16.8bn | €15.1bnrange €10.6bn to €19.4bn | €19bn | A |
| LNG | €0.35bn | €0.32bnrange €0.22bn to €0.42bn | €0.49bn | A |
| Coal | €18.7bn | €17.3bnrange €12.2bn to €22.2bn | €17.4bn | A |
| Other goods | €34.4bn | €39.8bn | – | – |
| All goods | €265bn | €194bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

### Crude oil by year

| Year | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2022 | €24.2bn | €15.4bn | €18.7bn | A |
| 2023 | €45bn | €26.2bn | €35.5bn | A |
| 2024 | €48.7bn | €31.2bn | €38.4bn | A |
| 2025 | €40.2bn | €26.1bn | €31.9bn | A |
| 2026, January to August | €37bn | €22bn | €25.5bn | A |

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

No. India has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (July 2025). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name India. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Indian MEA spokesperson on the EU's 18th package, July 2025 (news report)](https://scroll.in/latest/1084674/india-does-not-subscribe-to-unilateral-measures-says-mea-on-fresh-european-sanctions-on-russia) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#IND)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €73m extra from 2022 (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €24.1bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€0.13bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in India; what its firms kept of it, €4m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

India earned less from Russian oil and gas stakes: €1.2bn (0.04% of one year's GDP). Its firms paid Russia more tax: €0.13bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP). India's companies made more profit in Russia: €0.12bn (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. India kept more from shipping Russian oil: €53m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €52m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €996m to €2.4bn); €53m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 10 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP. BRICS: number 1 of 6 members toward Russia.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Bangladesh](https://warbalance.org/country/bangladesh/) | −0.01% · −€61m · essentially zero |
| [Myanmar](https://warbalance.org/country/myanmar/) | −0.05% · −€35m · essentially zero |
| [Pakistan](https://warbalance.org/country/pakistan/) | −0.07% · −€0.24bn · essentially zero |
| [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |
| India | −2.2% · −€70.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Bhutan](https://warbalance.org/country/bhutan/) | −2.5% · −€71m · very likely · >99% |
| [Nepal](https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/) | −2.5% · −€0.97bn · very likely · >99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Nepal](https://warbalance.org/country/nepal/) | −2.5% · −€0.97bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) | −1.5% · −€0.24bn · very likely · 98% |
| [Sri Lanka](https://warbalance.org/country/sri-lanka/) | −0.87% · −€0.70bn · very likely · >99% |
| [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

37 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 100% modelled (C) and 0% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Russian crude refined in Turkey and India and exported as fuel: refinery reports, UN Comtrade, CREA, Global Witness](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=792&cmdCode=2710&flowCode=X&period=2024)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)

### Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### India earned less from Russian oil and gas stakes C

- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)

### India earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions C

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Russia kept less from weapons sold here C

- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Russian crude refined in Turkey and India and exported as fuel: refinery reports, UN Comtrade, CREA, Global Witness](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=792&cmdCode=2710&flowCode=X&period=2024)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

## Questions

### India–Russia trade: how much since 2022?

It bought €42.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€6.8bn in 2021), and sold €4.5bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €70.5bn (2.2% of GDP) more than without the war.

### Does India support Russia?

In money terms the net is −2.2% of one year's GDP (likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Russia: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €70.5bn (2.2% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### India–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €42.8bn from Russia in 2025 (€6.8bn in 2021), and sold €4.5bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €0.15bn; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −2.2% of one year's GDP (likely 1.0% to 3.2% toward Russia; very likely · >99%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does India still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 42.6% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €42.8bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €6.8bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### Does India help Russia get around sanctions?

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €1.4bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €996m to €2.4bn); €53m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### How does India compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Bangladesh −0.01%, Myanmar −0.05%, Pakistan −0.07%, China −0.75%, India −2.2%, Bhutan −2.5%, Nepal −2.5%. In the map's ranking: number 10 of 32 economies toward Russia, as a share of GDP.

### How much Russian oil does India buy?

India's customs recorded these imports of crude oil from Russia (CIF, by country of origin): 2022 €24.2bn; 2023 €45bn; 2024 €48.7bn; 2025 €40.2bn; 2026, January to August €37bn. CREA's tracker, from ship data, estimates €31.9bn for 2025. On the map's basis (the Russian border price, with Russian crude in fuel it sold on counted for the buyers of that fuel) its crude comes to €121bn for 2022 to August 2026.

### Does India have sanctions on Russia?

No. India has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (July 2025). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name India. Sources: [Indian MEA spokesperson on the EU's 18th package, July 2025 (news report)](https://scroll.in/latest/1084674/india-does-not-subscribe-to-unilateral-measures-says-mea-on-fresh-european-sanctions-on-russia) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Russia · number 10 of 32

13. [Tanzania](https://warbalance.org/country/tanzania/) · −1.1% · Toward Russia · −€821m
12. [Oman](https://warbalance.org/country/oman/) · −1.4% · Toward Russia · −€1.4bn
11. [Afghanistan](https://warbalance.org/country/afghanistan/) · −1.5% · Toward Russia · −€236m
10. India−2.2% · Toward Russia · −€70.6bn
- [Palau](https://warbalance.org/country/palau/) · −2.4% · Toward Russia · −€6m
9. [Azerbaijan](https://warbalance.org/country/azerbaijan/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€1.7bn
- [Bhutan](https://warbalance.org/country/bhutan/) · −2.5% · Toward Russia · −€71m

## More about India

### Groups

- [BRICS](https://warbalance.org/group/brics/)

### Compared with

- [India vs China](https://warbalance.org/compare/india-vs-china/)
- [Türkiye vs India](https://warbalance.org/compare/turkiye-vs-india/)
- [India vs United States](https://warbalance.org/compare/india-vs-united-states/)
- [Germany vs India](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-india/)
- [Brazil vs India](https://warbalance.org/compare/brazil-vs-india/)
- [United Kingdom vs India](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-kingdom-vs-india/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Stakes in Russian oil and gas projects](https://warbalance.org/stakes-in-russian-oil-and-gas-projects/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Rosatom projects and Russian state loans](https://warbalance.org/rosatom-and-russian-state-loans/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

37 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#IND) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/india/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/india/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/india/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/india/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/india/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/india/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/india/