# How much has Iceland given to Ukraine since 2022?

Iceland's support for Ukraine since 2022: €0.27bn (0.91% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €83m (0.28% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 1.2% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely 0.56% to 3.1% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#ISL)

Toward Ukraine by

1.2% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 0.56% to 3.1% toward Ukraine · €348m · ≈ 0.26%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 1.2% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly support for Ukraine. What Russia kept less was partly required by sanctions, partly beyond them.

Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.91%

€265m

likely 0.40% to 2.3% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.28%

€83m

likely from 0.09% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine likely toward Ukraine · 88%

Russia kept €83m (0.28% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.27% of GDP less (€80m; likely from 0.05% toward Russia to 1.6% toward Ukraine)
- Iceland's own gain from trade with Russia: Iceland kept 0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€3m; likely from 0.17% toward Russia to 0.05% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Partly its sanctions, partly beyond them Of the €104m less that Russia kept from its trade, about 60% was required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 40% went beyond them.
- Hosts many refugees 4,800 refugees from Ukraine, 12 per 1,000 residents.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.91% · €265m

| Hosting refugeesD | +0.59% | €171m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.31% | €90m |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €6m |
| Iceland kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −0.02% | €4m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Iceland kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −<0.01% | €1m |

Probably cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.28% · €83m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.35% | €101m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.06% | €19m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.01% | €3m |
| Iceland's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +<0.01% | €2m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Iceland kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |
| Iceland kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2025: +€88m. Support for Ukraine rose from €24m in 2022 to €76m in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€24m | +€15m | +€39m | +0.13% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€52m | +€23m | +€74m | +0.39% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€52m | +€22m | +€74m | +0.64% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€76m | +€11m | +€88m | +0.94% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€61m | +€12m | +€73m | +1.2% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Iceland's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €46mrange €35m to €55m; Kiel: €57m |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €14mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €1m |
| Humanitarian aid | €31m |
| Refugee hosting | €0.17bn |
| Private donations and purchases | €7m |
| Money flowing back | −€5msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €0.27bn |

Quality of the split: B

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €40m from Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025 (−100%). It sold €31m to Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025 (−96%). For Iceland: €3m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 60% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 40% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. Iceland is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Iceland as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Iceland. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)](https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russias-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukrain-2/)
- [Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukraine-council-decision-cfsp-2026508/)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#ISL)

## Russian money frozen

No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.

## Refugees from Ukraine

4,800 refugees from Ukraine, 12 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.17bn (0.59% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Iceland: €182m spent on refugees, less €11m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €101m; counted here: €90m — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €5m. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €6m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russia took €2m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely <€1m to €20m; <0.01% of a year's GDP.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 24 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. NATO members: number 20 of 23 members toward Ukraine.

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/) | +1.0% · +€8.7bn · very likely · >99% |
| [United Kingdom](https://warbalance.org/country/united-kingdom/) | +1.8% · +€58.4bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Norway](https://warbalance.org/country/norway/) | +2.9% · +€14.8bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Moldova](https://warbalance.org/country/moldova/) | +6.9% · +€1.1bn · very likely · 97% |

## How the number is backed

28 sources back its parts: 9 official statistics, 4 research reports, 0 press reports and 4 of this project's own estimates, plus 11 method inputs. By size, 22% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 28% modelled (C) and 49% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Hosting refugees D

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Private donations D

- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)

## Questions

### How much has Iceland given to Ukraine?

Iceland's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €0.27bn, 0.91% of one year's GDP (likely 0.40% to 2.3%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### How many Ukrainian refugees does Iceland host, and what does it cost?

4,800 refugees from Ukraine, 12 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.17bn (0.59% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Iceland: €182m spent on refugees, less €11m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

### Is Iceland helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +1.2% of one year's GDP (likely 0.56% to 3.1% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €83m (0.28% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why does War Balance differ from the Kiel tracker for Iceland?

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €101m; counted here: €90m — donated weapons at their market value; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026.

### Did Iceland cut trade with Russia because of sanctions?

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 60% required by the EU's sanctions, which it adopted itself, 40% beyond what sanctions required.

### How much did Iceland give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €24m; 2023 €52m; 2024 €52m; 2025 €76m; 2026 (to August) €61m. In total since 2022: €0.27bn (likely 0.40% to 2.3%).

### Does Iceland have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. Iceland is not in the EU but adopts the EU's sanctions on Russia under its own law. It applies export controls on Russia, and the United States lists it among the partners with controls like its own. Separately, Russia lists Iceland as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Iceland. Sources: [HR statement on alignment with Council Decision (CFSP) 2026/508 (20th package), 13 May 2026, as republished by PubAffairs Bruxelles (consilium.europa.eu blocks downloads)](https://www.pubaffairsbruxelles.eu/eu-institution-news/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russias-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukrain-2/); [Council of the EU, same statement (original URL)](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/05/13/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-alignment-of-certain-countries-concerning-restrictive-measures-in-view-of-russia-s-actions-destabilising-the-situation-in-ukraine-council-decision-cfsp-2026508/).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 24 of 32

21. [Croatia](https://warbalance.org/country/croatia/) · +1.5% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.2bn
22. [Portugal](https://warbalance.org/country/portugal/) · +1.3% · Toward Ukraine · +€3.5bn
23. [Malta](https://warbalance.org/country/malta/) · +1.2% · Toward Ukraine · +€248m
24. Iceland+1.2% · Toward Ukraine · +€348m
25. [Spain](https://warbalance.org/country/spain/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€16.6bn
26. [South Korea](https://warbalance.org/country/south-korea/) · +1.1% · Toward Ukraine · +€18.1bn
27. [Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/) · +1.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€8.7bn

## More about Iceland

### Groups

- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Refugee spending kept in the host economy](https://warbalance.org/refugee-spending-in-host-economies/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Extra services sold to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

28 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#ISL) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/iceland/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/iceland/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/iceland/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/iceland/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/iceland/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/iceland/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/iceland/