# Is Hong Kong helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

Hong Kong's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€11m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €5.7bn (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 1.6% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#HKG)

Leaning toward Russia by

1.6% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 97%

likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine · €5.8bn · ≈ 0.35%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 1.6% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly gold).

Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

€11m

likely from 0.02% below zero to <0.01% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

1.6%

€5.7bn

likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 97%

Russia kept €5.7bn (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.5% of GDP more (€5.4bn; likely from 3.5% toward Russia to 0.14% toward Ukraine)
- Hong Kong's own gain from trade with Russia: Hong Kong kept 0.10% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€349m; likely from 0.76% toward Russia to 0.04% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Bought 377% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €1.1bn in 2021, €5.4bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 65% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €4.2bn in 2021, €1.5bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia goods its weapons need: €7.5bn It sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €7.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August), at full value; at the 2021 rate it would have been about €5.8bn. The totals count only what it kept on these sales (its own gain), so they show a small part of this; the full value is shown here as a marker.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €5.0bn of the net's €5.8bn.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · €11m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −<0.01% | €11m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 1.6% · €5.7bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −1.4% | €5.0bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.11% | €406m |
| Hong Kong kept more from shipping Russian oilC | −0.05% | €195m |
| Hong Kong earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.05% | €169m |
| Hong Kong kept less from selling to RussiaC | +0.04% | €135m |
| Hong Kong kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −0.03% | €98m |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.01% | €39m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −0.01% | €38m |
| Hong Kong's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €27m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €9m |
| Hong Kong kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €6m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2025: −€1.6bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€3m | −€305m | −€307m | −0.09% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€1m | −€1.4bn | −€1.4bn | −0.48% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€2m | −€1.3bn | −€1.3bn | −0.85% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€3m | −€1.6bn | −€1.6bn | −1.3% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€2m | −€1.2bn | −€1.2bn | −1.6% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Hong Kong's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Private donations and purchases | −€11m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€11m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €1.1bn from Russia in 2021 and €5.4bn in 2025 (+377%). It sold €4.2bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.5bn in 2025 (−65%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 8.9% of what it bought from Russia. For Hong Kong: €39m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Hong Kong's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | €28m | €27mrange €8m to €48m | €0.16bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0.15bn | €0.15bnrange €50m to €0.27bn | €90m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €44.8bn | €18.9bn | – | – |
| All goods | €44.9bn | €19.1bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

No. Hong Kong has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (11 October 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Hong Kong. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Hong Kong Chief Executive, 11 October 2022 (AP report)](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hong-kong-us-sanctions-russian-owned-superyacht-rcna51642) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#HKG)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €41m extra from 2022 (0.01% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €29m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Gold transit hub: only the Russian gold that stays in Hong Kong counts here; the share passed on to mainland China is counted for China, and the share exported elsewhere for those buyers. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €0.41bn (0.11% of one year's GDP). Hong Kong kept more from shipping Russian oil: €0.20bn (0.05% of one year's GDP). Hong Kong kept more from settling Russia's trade: €98m (0.03% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €7.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €2.7bn to €11.3bn); €1.2bn in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [China](https://warbalance.org/country/china/) | −0.75% · −€128bn · very likely · >99% |
| Hong Kong | −1.6% · −€5.8bn · likely toward Russia · 97% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Singapore](https://warbalance.org/country/singapore/) | −0.41% · −€2bn · likely toward Russia · 75% |
| [Mongolia](https://warbalance.org/country/mongolia/) | −6.4% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 77% |

## How the number is backed

29 sources back its parts: 8 official statistics, 5 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 88% modelled (C) and 12% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [C&SD Trade-IDDS, Hong Kong imports of HS 7108 by origin, downloaded by the owner 2026-10-25](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/raw/hk\_tradeidds\_r44/imports\_origin\_RUS\_7108\_monthly\_2018-2026.csv)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Hong Kong kept more from shipping Russian oil C

- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)

### Hong Kong earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions D

- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)

### Hong Kong kept less from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [C&SD Trade-IDDS, Hong Kong imports of HS 7108 by origin, downloaded by the owner 2026-10-25](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/raw/hk\_tradeidds\_r44/imports\_origin\_RUS\_7108\_monthly\_2018-2026.csv)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Hong Kong's gold exports by destination (HS 7108): UN Comtrade, 2022-2025](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=344&period=2025&flowCode=X,M,RX&cmdCode=7108)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is Hong Kong helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −1.6% of one year's GDP (likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%). Chance toward Russia: 97%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €5.7bn (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Hong Kong trade with Russia?

It bought €5.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.1bn in 2021), and sold €1.5bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €5.7bn (1.6% of GDP) more than without the war.

### Hong Kong–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €5.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€1.1bn in 2021), and sold €1.5bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €11m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −1.6% of one year's GDP (likely from 3.7% toward Russia to 0.03% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 97%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does Hong Kong help Russia get around sanctions?

Gold transit hub: only the Russian gold that stays in Hong Kong counts here; the share passed on to mainland China is counted for China, and the share exported elsewhere for those buyers. Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €7.5bn in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €2.7bn to €11.3bn); €1.2bn in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

### How does Hong Kong compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: China −0.75%, Hong Kong −1.6%.

### Where do the numbers for Hong Kong come from?

29 sources back its parts, 8 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Hong Kong kept more from shipping Russian oil: [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Hong Kong have sanctions on Russia?

No. Hong Kong has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (11 October 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Hong Kong. Sources: [Hong Kong Chief Executive, 11 October 2022 (AP report)](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/hong-kong-us-sanctions-russian-owned-superyacht-rcna51642) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Mozambique](https://warbalance.org/country/mozambique/) · −0.85% · Leaning toward Russia · −€165m · 68%
- [Serbia](https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/) · −1.4% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.1bn · 84%
- [Gambia](https://warbalance.org/country/gambia/) · −1.5% · Leaning toward Russia · −€33m · 88%
- Hong Kong−1.6% · Leaning toward Russia · −€5.8bn · 97%
- [Djibouti](https://warbalance.org/country/djibouti/) · −1.6% · Leaning toward Russia · −€59m · 89%
- [North Macedonia](https://warbalance.org/country/north-macedonia/) · −2.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€298m · 87%
- [Senegal](https://warbalance.org/country/senegal/) · −2.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€600m · 76%

## More about Hong Kong

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

29 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#HKG) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/hong-kong/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/hong-kong/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/hong-kong/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/hong-kong/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/hong-kong/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/hong-kong/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/hong-kong/