# Is Greece helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

Greece's support for Ukraine since 2022: €1.4bn (0.65% of one year's GDP: its aid, its EU share, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Greece moved €1.6bn (0.70% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Greece kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.4bn; the other parts take €879m off it)); Russia also lost €0.29bn of return on reserves frozen there. The net is 0.08% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#GRC)

Toward Ukraine by

0.08% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine · €175m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 0.08% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly toward Russia.

Chance toward Ukraine: 53%; 80% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.65%

€1.4bn

likely 0.45% to 1.2% very likely · >99%

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.70%

€1.6bn

likely from 3.1% toward Russia to 1.9% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 69%

Greece moved €1.6bn (0.70% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Greece kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.4bn; the other parts take €879m off it)).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.13% of GDP more (€287m; likely from 2.1% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine)
- Greece's own gain from trade with Russia: Greece kept 0.57% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€1.3bn; likely 0.05% to 2.0% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Russian money frozen: Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€288m).

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €2.4bn (1.1% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €687m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 63% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €3.5bn in 2021, €1.3bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Froze Russian money Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€288m; likely €207m to €338m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.
- Ships Russian oil Greece kept €1.5bn (0.68% of GDP) more from shipping and insuring Russian oil.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 53%; 80% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.65% · €1.4bn

| Its share of EU aidB | +0.31% | €688m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hosting refugeesD | +0.19% | €417m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.09% | €190m |
| Undisclosed military aidD | +0.04% | €100m |
| Private donationsD | +0.02% | €48m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.02% | €39m |
| Greece kept more from extra sales to UkraineC | −<0.01% | €22m |
| Greece kept part of others' aid, spent hereC | −<0.01% | €16m |
| Greece kept back part of its refugee spendingC | −<0.01% | €14m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €12m |
| Greece kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding)C | −<0.01% | €3m |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.70% · €1.6bn

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +1.5% | €3.4bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −1.1% | €2.4bn |
| Greece kept more from shipping Russian oilB | −0.68% | €1.5bn |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.56% | €1.2bn |
| Greece's companies made less profit in RussiaD | +0.07% | €160m |
| Greece kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +0.03% | €77m |
| Greece kept less from selling to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €18m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €17m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxC | −<0.01% | €5m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €288m

| Russia lost returns on its frozen moneyC | +0.08% | €185m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen hereD | +0.05% | €102m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€3bn. Support for Ukraine fell from €0.42bn in 2022 to €0.24bn in 2025. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€419m | −€3.5bn | +€21m | −€3.0bn | −1.4% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€300m | +€213m | +€92m | +€605m | −1.1% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€296m | +€424m | +€79m | +€800m | −0.73% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€241m | +€200m | +€60m | +€501m | −0.51% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€183m | +€1.1bn | +€36m | +€1.3bn | +0.08% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Greece's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €0.29bnrange €0.14bn to €0.91bn; Kiel: €0.17bn |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €11mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €11m |
| Refugee hosting | €0.42bn |
| Share of EU aid | €0.69bnof which military: €4m |
| Private donations and purchases | €87m |
| Money flowing back | −€55msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €1.4bn |

Quality of the split: C

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €3.5bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.3bn in 2025 (−63%). It sold €0.22bn to Russia in 2021 and €95m in 2025 (−56%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 85.1% of what it bought from Russia. For Greece: €2.4bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 82% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Greece's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.23bn | €14mrange €0m to €70m | €0.42bn | A |
| Oil products | €4.8bn | €4.4bnrange €4bn to €5bn | €5.7bn | A |
| Pipeline gas | €3.4bn | €3.2bnrange €3bn to €3.6bn | €0.79bn | A |
| LNG | €0.55bn | €0.52bnrange €0.48bn to €0.58bn | €0.60bn | A |
| Coal | €7m | €7mrange €6m to €8m | €3m | A |
| Other goods | €1.6bn | €6.4bn | – | – |
| All goods | €10.6bn | €14.6bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. As an EU member, Greece applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Greece as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Greece. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#GRC)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €2.6bn extra from 2022 (1.2% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.69bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€288m; likely €207m to €338m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only.

No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.

## Refugees from Ukraine

41,755 refugees from Ukraine, 4.0 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €0.42bn (0.19% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Greece: €449m spent on refugees, less €32m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €169m; counted here: €190m — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount. Loans, full amount: €0.99bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €0.44bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €1.2bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €107m (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€2.8bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Greece; what its firms kept of it, €55m, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Greece's companies made less profit in Russia: €0.16bn (0.07% of one year's GDP). Russia took €124m from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €50m to €298m; 0.06% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Greece kept more from shipping Russian oil: €1.5bn (0.68% of one year's GDP). Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €1.2bn (0.56% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Bulgaria](https://warbalance.org/country/bulgaria/) | +3.3% · +€3.1bn · likely toward Ukraine · 95% |
| Greece | +0.08% · +€0.18bn · essentially zero |
| [Albania](https://warbalance.org/country/albania/) | +0.07% · +€16m · essentially zero |
| [North Macedonia](https://warbalance.org/country/north-macedonia/) | −2.1% · −€0.30bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |
| [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/) | −3.1% · −€32.7bn · very likely · 96% |

## How the number is backed

45 sources back its parts: 14 official statistics, 10 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 22% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 58% modelled (C) and 19% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [ENTSOG Transparency Platform: metered physical gas flows at the TurkStream, Balkan and Central European border points, 2021-11 to 2026-08](https://transparency.entsog.eu/api/v1/operationalData)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Greece kept more from shipping Russian oil B

- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Its share of EU aid B

- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- official · [ENTSOG Transparency Platform: metered physical gas flows at the TurkStream, Balkan and Central European border points, 2021-11 to 2026-08](https://transparency.entsog.eu/api/v1/operationalData)
- own estimate · [EU refiners' fuel exports made from Russian crude: refinery export shares, CREA tracker crude volumes, each refiner's UN Comtrade HS 2710 exports by partner (2021)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=440&period=2021&cmdCode=2710&flowCode=X)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [War-time gas price windfall under the pre-war no-war price paths: World Bank and IMF October-2021 forecasts, IMF/EIA/ECB January-2022 views, ICE TTF futures of mid-February 2022 and of early 2021 (TTF Cal-22 at EUR 16.7-18.1/MWh, January-March 2021); each contract's TTF/oil formula](https://www.ice.com/products/27996665/Dutch-TTF-Natural-Gas-Futures/data)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- research · [Undisclosed military aid beyond the Kiel tracker: Kiel policy briefs, national reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/Subject\_Dossiers\_Topics/Ukraine/Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker/Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_-\_Research\_Note.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

## Questions

### How much has Greece given to Ukraine?

Greece's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €1.4bn, 0.65% of one year's GDP (likely 0.45% to 1.2%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Does Greece trade with Russia?

It bought €1.3bn from Russia in 2025 (€3.5bn in 2021), and sold €95m to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Greece moved €1.6bn (0.70% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Greece kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.4bn; the other parts take €879m off it)).

### Does Greece still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 85.1% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.3bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €3.5bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### Does Greece help Russia get around sanctions?

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers.

### Is Greece helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.08% of one year's GDP (likely from 2.3% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Ukraine: 53%; 80% of the other method choices agree. Greece moved €1.6bn (0.70% of GDP) more toward Russia than without the war (Russia kept more, and Greece kept more from selling to Russia, mostly the war-time fuel price premium, largest in 2022 (€2.4bn; the other parts take €879m off it)). The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How much Russian money is frozen in Greece?

Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€288m; likely €207m to €338m): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only. No public figure has been published for the amounts frozen here; a missing figure does not mean that nothing is frozen.

### Does Greece have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. As an EU member, Greece applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil through the EU. Separately, Russia lists Greece as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Greece. Sources: [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj); [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026).

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Gabon](https://warbalance.org/country/gabon/) · +0.08% · Essentially zero · +€16m · 74%
- [Panama](https://warbalance.org/country/panama/) · +0.08% · Essentially zero · +€63m · 78%
- [Thailand](https://warbalance.org/country/thailand/) · +0.08% · Essentially zero · +€393m · 68%
- Greece+0.08% · Essentially zero · +€175m · 53%
- [Peru](https://warbalance.org/country/peru/) · +0.07% · Essentially zero · +€187m · 80%
- [Albania](https://warbalance.org/country/albania/) · +0.07% · Essentially zero · +€16m · 70%
- [Timor-Leste](https://warbalance.org/country/timor-leste/) · +0.07% · Essentially zero · +€1m · >99%

## More about Greece

### Groups

- [EU countries](https://warbalance.org/group/eu/)
- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Share of EU aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/eu-aid-to-ukraine-by-member/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)
- [Frozen Russian private assets](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-private-assets/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Private donations to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/private-donations-to-ukraine/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

45 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#GRC) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/greece/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/greece/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/greece/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/greece/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/greece/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/greece/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/greece/