# Is Gibraltar helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call

Gibraltar's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €15m (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.42% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#GIB)

Toward Ukraine by

0.42% of a year's GDP since 2022

too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine

likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine · €15m · ≈ 0.09%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.42% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.42%

€15m

likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine

Russia kept €15m (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.42% of GDP less (€15m; likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine)
- Gibraltar's own gain from trade with Russia: Gibraltar kept 0% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€0; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €6m (0.16% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €37m of the net's €15m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €3.6bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 42% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.42% · €15m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +1.0% | €37m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.44% | €16m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.16% | €6m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€8m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | −€8m | −€8m | −0.22% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | +€4m | +€4m | −0.12% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | +€6m | +€6m | +0.05% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −<€1m | +€4m | +€4m | +0.16% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −<€1m | +€9m | +€9m | +0.42% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €18m from Russia in 2021 and €22m in 2025 (+22%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and <€1m in 2025. For Gibraltar: €6m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

Gibraltar is a territory of United Kingdom. We did not check whether the sanctions of United Kingdom on Russia extend to it. Separately, Russia lists Gibraltar as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Gibraltar. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#GIB)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €16m (0.44% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

12 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 6 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 73% modelled (C) and 27% rough indications (D). No data: Sales to Russia. There is no observation of its own for the war years, so these count as zero. Why

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Services trade with Russia: missing no data and no estimate; counted as zero
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror
- Sold to Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, mirror
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf, mirror
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf, mirror
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

## Questions

### What decides Gibraltar's number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of the uncertain size of one part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 42% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Does Gibraltar help Russia get around sanctions?

Fuel trading hub: the share of laundered oil it resells is counted for its customers.

### Is Gibraltar helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.42% of one year's GDP (likely from 8.2% toward Russia to 8.7% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine). Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €15m (0.42% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Where do the numbers for Gibraltar come from?

12 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Gibraltar have sanctions on Russia?

Gibraltar is a territory of United Kingdom. We did not check whether the sanctions of United Kingdom on Russia extend to it. Separately, Russia lists Gibraltar as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Gibraltar. Sources: [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001).

## Nearby in the ranking

Too close to call

- [Cambodia](https://warbalance.org/country/cambodia/) · −0.08% · Essentially zero · −€31m · 61%
- [DR Congo](https://warbalance.org/country/dr-congo/) · −0.09% · Essentially zero · −€63m · 64%
- [Bahamas](https://warbalance.org/country/bahamas/) · −0.10% · Essentially zero · −€13m · 68%
- Gibraltar+0.42% · Too close to call · +€15m · 56%
- [Faroe Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/faroe-islands/) · +0.32% · Too close to call · +€11m · 56%
- [Slovakia](https://warbalance.org/country/slovakia/) · +0.24% · Too close to call · +€294m · 58%
- [Congo](https://warbalance.org/country/congo/) · +0.12% · Too close to call · +€18m · 54%

## More about Gibraltar

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

12 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#GIB) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/gibraltar/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/gibraltar/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/gibraltar/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/gibraltar/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/gibraltar/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/gibraltar/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/gibraltar/