# How much has Germany given to Ukraine since 2022?

Germany has given Ukraine €74.8bn since 2022 (1.8% of GDP). Beyond its own aid, that total includes its share of EU aid (€11.6bn) and the cost of hosting refugees (€35.5bn). The Kiel Institute counts €30.8bn in bilateral aid.

Russia kept €72.6bn (1.7% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €21.9bn gas cut off by Russia; Russia also lost €5.3bn of return on Russian money frozen there. The net is 3.7% of GDP toward Ukraine.

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#DEU)

Toward Ukraine by

3.7% of a year's GDP since 2022

very likely · >99%

likely 2.6% to 5.0% toward Ukraine · €153bn · ≈ 0.78%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade + froze Russian money = 3.7% of GDP toward Ukraine. About half support for Ukraine, half less kept by Russia from trade. Much of what Russia kept less is gas Russia cut off itself.

Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

1.8%

€74.8bn

likely 1.6% to 2.3% very likely · >99%

Trade with Russia

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

1.7%

€72.6bn

likely 0.74% to 3.0% toward Ukraine very likely · >99%

Russia kept €72.6bn (1.7% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €21.9bn gas cut off by Russia.

- Of which Russia's gain: Russia kept 1.5% of GDP less (€64.6bn; likely 0.56% to 2.8% toward Ukraine)
- Of which Germany's own gain from trade with Russia: Germany kept 0.19% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€8.0bn; likely 0.06% to 0.32% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% of GDP in returns (€5.3bn).

## Its story in short

- Gas cut off by Russia Much of what Russia kept less is gas Russia cut off itself. Of which gas Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of transit: €21.9bn
- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €16.5bn (0.39% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Bought 96% less from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €35.7bn in 2021, €1.4bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 65% less What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €28.8bn in 2021, €10.1bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Top-10 aid giver for its size Of its €74.8bn of support, aid (weapons, money, loans as gifts, its share of EU aid) is €40.6bn (0.97% of GDP), number 9 of 162 economies for its size.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 1.8% · €74.8bn

| Hosting refugees C | +0.85% | €35.5bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aid: weapons, money, loans B | +0.62% | €25.9bn |
| Its share of EU aid B | +0.28% | €11.6bn |
| Undisclosed military aid D | +0.04% | €1.7bn |
| Private donations C | +0.03% | €1.3bn |
| Germany kept back part of its refugee spending C | −0.02% | €804m |
| Germany kept back part of its aid, spent at home C | −<0.01% | €252m |
| Ukraine kept more from extra sales here C | +<0.01% | €158m |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loans C | +<0.01% | €133m |
| Germany kept more from extra sales to Ukraine C | −<0.01% | €110m |
| Germany kept more from extra services sold to Ukraine C | −<0.01% | €90m |
| Germany kept part of others' aid, spent here C | −<0.01% | €89m |
| Germany kept part of aid spent here (energy, rebuilding) C | −<0.01% | €46m |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 1.7% · €72.6bn

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C | +1.7% | €69.9bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C | −0.39% | €16.5bn |
| Its firms paid Russia less tax C | +0.13% | €5.4bn |
| Germany's companies made less profit in Russia B | +0.13% | €5.3bn |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries Down estimate | +0.10% | €4.3bn |
| Germany earned less from Russian oil and gas stakes D | +0.05% | €2.2bn |
| Russian owners kept less from their firms here C | +0.03% | €1.3bn |
| Germany kept less from selling to Russia C | +0.02% | €1.0bn |
| Germany earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctions C | −0.01% | €580m |
| Russia kept less from services sold here C | +<0.01% | €223m |
| Germany kept less from services sold to Russia C | +<0.01% | €145m |
| Germany kept more from shipping Russian oil D | −<0.01% | €51m |

Froze Russian money: Russia lost 0.13% in returns · €5.3bn

| Russia lost returns on its frozen money C | +0.08% | €3.1bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russian owners lost returns on assets frozen here D | +0.05% | €2.1bn |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: +€38.3bn. Support for Ukraine rose from €14.7bn in 2022 to €18.7bn in 2025.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Russian money frozen | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€14.7bn | −€3.2bn | +€362m | +€11.9bn | +0.28% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€14.9bn | +€21.7bn | +€1.6bn | +€38.3bn | +1.2% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€14.4bn | +€20.4bn | +€1.5bn | +€36.3bn | +2.1% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€18.7bn | +€16.9bn | +€1.1bn | +€36.7bn | +2.9% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€12.0bn | +€16.9bn | +€664m | +€29.5bn | +3.7% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Germany's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | €21.9bn range €16.4bn to €32.5bn; Kiel: €25bn |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €1.6bn of which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €133m |
| Humanitarian aid | €4.2bn |
| Refugee hosting | €35.5bn |
| Share of EU aid | €11.6bn of which military: €56m |
| Private donations and purchases | €1.5bn |
| Money flowing back | −€1.4bn subtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €74.8bn |

Quality of the split: B

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €35.7bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.4bn in 2025 (−96%). It sold €28.8bn to Russia in 2021 and €10.1bn in 2025 (−65%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 78.7% of what it bought from Russia. For Germany: €16.5bn paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 93% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Germany's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €11.7bn | €9.4bn range €7.1bn to €12.5bn | €10.4bn | A |
| Oil products | €9.8bn | €8.9bn range €6.7bn to €11.8bn | €6.4bn | B |
| Pipeline gas | €23.7bn | €21.7bn range €16.3bn to €29.2bn | €19.3bn | A |
| Coal | €1.5bn | €1.4bn range €1bn to €1.8bn | €970m | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €15.2bn | €14.1bn | – | – |
| All goods | €61.8bn | €55.5bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: B, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions, Russia's own cut-offs, or a choice

Of what Russia kept less from its trade: 30% required by EU sanctions it agreed to as a member, 31% gas that Russia cut off itself or that stopped with the end of Ukraine's gas transit, 39% beyond what sanctions required.

## Sanctions on Russia

Yes. As an EU member, Germany applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. Separately, Russia lists Germany as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Germany. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj)
- [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026)
- [US eCFR, 15 CFR Part 746 Supplement No. 3: countries excluded from certain license requirements](https://www.ecfr.gov/api/renderer/v1/content/enhanced/current/title-15?part=746)
- [Government of Russia, Order of 5 March 2022 No. 430-r (official publication, scanned)](http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202203070001)
- [ConsultantPlus, Order 430-r, current edition 'ред. от 29.10.2022'](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_411064/)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#DEU)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €34.5bn extra from 2022 (0.82% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €1.4bn. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Russian money frozen

Russian money frozen: 0.13% of a year's GDP (€5.3bn; likely €3.7bn to €6.3bn): the return Russia lost on its central-bank reserves and on Russian private assets frozen here. Not a payment, so it is on its own line, added to the net only. The return on central-bank reserves splits into: return on reserves held here, €23m; share of the return on reserves held at Euroclear and Clearstream (allocated by share of EU aid), €3.1bn. The freeze is an EU decision, so 2/3 of the return on reserves held at Euroclear (Belgium) and Clearstream (Luxembourg) goes to all EU members by their share of EU aid, and 1/3 to the host.

Amounts frozen here, for context (the map counts the return Russia lost on them, not the amounts): Bank of Russia reserves immobilised: no public figure (estimate: about €210m); assets of sanctioned people and companies frozen: €5.3bn (2025, [source](https://mind.ua/en/news/20253639-germany-has-frozen-russian-assets-worth-more-than-5-3-billion-euros)).

## Refugees from Ukraine

1,259,155 refugees from Ukraine, 15 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2026. Counted as support for Ukraine: €35.5bn (0.85% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Germany: €36.9bn spent on refugees, less €1.4bn, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €7,316 per refugee per year (4,847,344 refugee-years).

## Why this differs from the Kiel tracker

Kiel Institute's figure for its own aid: €30.8bn; counted here: €25.9bn — donated weapons at their market value; loans at their gift value, not their full amount; military aid counted when delivered, by August 2026. Loans, full amount: €16.9bn; Loans, grant equivalent: €7.5bn. Promised but not yet delivered, in the Kiel Institute's figures: €44bn. It is not counted here. Military aid allocated but not yet delivered is not counted: €6.1bn (Kiel's full allocation is the high end).

## Why the government's own figure differs

Germany's federal government reports over €43.3bn in bilateral civil support and about €57.6bn in military support, as of 30 June 2026. Its military figure counts funds set aside for later years as well as what was delivered. It counts loans and guarantees at their face value. It leaves out its share of EU aid. Of the cost of hosting refugees it counts what the federal government paid, not the spending of states and municipalities. War Balance counts support delivered from 2022 to August 2026, valued as described in the method: weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value, its share of EU aid and the cost of hosting refugees, minus money flowing back. For Germany that comes to €74.8bn. Source: [Bundesregierung: Bilaterale Unterstützungsleistungen der Bundesregierung für die Ukraine und Menschen aus der Ukraine (Stand 30.06.2026)](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/schwerpunkte/krieg-in-der-ukraine/deutschland-hilft-der-ukraine-2160274).

## Money flowing back from the war effort

€21.4bn of aid and of Ukraine's purchases was spent in Germany; what its firms kept of it, €1.4bn, is taken off its support.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Its firms paid Russia less tax: €5.4bn (0.13% of one year's GDP). Germany's companies made less profit in Russia: €5.3bn (0.13% of one year's GDP). Germany earned less from Russian oil and gas stakes: €2.2bn (0.05% of one year's GDP). Russian owners kept less from their firms here: €1.3bn (0.03% of one year's GDP). Russia took €14.1bn from companies of this country (seizures and forced sales); not in the totals. Likely €10.0bn to €20.8bn; 0.34% of a year's GDP.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €4.3bn (0.10% of one year's GDP). Germany kept more from shipping Russian oil: €51m (<0.01% of one year's GDP). Sold Russia goods its weapons need (chips, electronics, machine tools on the Common High Priority List): €278m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely €264m to €914m); €859m in 2021. Shown as a marker, not added to the totals.

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

In the map's ranking: number 10 of 32 economies toward Ukraine, as a share of GDP. EU countries: number 9 of 21 members toward Ukraine. G7: number 1 of 7 members toward Ukraine. NATO members: number 9 of 23 members toward Ukraine.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Netherlands](https://warbalance.org/country/netherlands/) | +5.1% · +€54.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Poland](https://warbalance.org/country/poland/) | +5.0% · +€37.8bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Denmark](https://warbalance.org/country/denmark/) | +4.0% · +€15.5bn · very likely · >99% |
| Germany | +3.7% · +€153bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Luxembourg](https://warbalance.org/country/luxembourg/) | +3.5% · +€2.9bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Belgium](https://warbalance.org/country/belgium/) | +3.4% · +€20.3bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Czechia](https://warbalance.org/country/czechia/) | +2.6% · +€8bn · very likely · 97% |
| [France](https://warbalance.org/country/france/) | +1.6% · +€43.6bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Switzerland](https://warbalance.org/country/switzerland/) | +1.0% · +€8.7bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Austria](https://warbalance.org/country/austria/) | +0.45% · +€2.1bn · likely toward Ukraine · 68% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Sweden](https://warbalance.org/country/sweden/) | +3.7% · +€20.1bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Cyprus](https://warbalance.org/country/cyprus/) | +3.6% · +€1.2bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Luxembourg](https://warbalance.org/country/luxembourg/) | +3.5% · +€2.9bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Belgium](https://warbalance.org/country/belgium/) | +3.4% · +€20.3bn · very likely · >99% |

## How the number is backed

47 sources back its parts: 15 official statistics, 11 research reports, 0 press reports and 5 of this project's own estimates, plus 16 method inputs. By size, 23% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 72% modelled (C) and 5% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: reported Kiel Institute, to 31 Aug 2026, incl. EU share
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported national budget figures
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported KSE country figures
- Money flowing back: estimated each euro followed to the economy where it was spent

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- own estimate · [EU refiners' fuel exports made from Russian crude: refinery export shares, CREA tracker crude volumes, each refiner's UN Comtrade HS 2710 exports by partner (2021)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=440&period=2021&cmdCode=2710&flowCode=X)

### Hosting refugees C

- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Its share of EU aid B

- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Russian gas by country of final use (Eurostat imports by origin, ENTSOG flows, CREA), passed on from transit countries](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/nrg\_ti\_gas/default/table)
- own estimate · [EU refiners' fuel exports made from Russian crude: refinery export shares, CREA tracker crude volumes, each refiner's UN Comtrade HS 2710 exports by partner (2021)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=440&period=2021&cmdCode=2710&flowCode=X)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured per buyer: the buyer's own customs imports of fuel by origin (UN Comtrade, DGCI&S) x the Russian share of each origin's crude (customs; CREA and KSE Institute refinery data) x crude content](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Fuel made from Russian crude, measured from the buyers' own records: India's and the buyers' monthly customs (UN Comtrade), Türkiye's crude by origin (EPDK), EU refiners' Russian crude (Eurostat), US imports (EIA), Cyprus's and Malta's energy imports by consigning country (Eurostat), Australian Petroleum Statistics](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/nrg\_ti\_oil?geo=CY&geo=MT&siec=O4000&unit=THS\_T)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- method input · [Audit of 31 major countries against Kiel, CREA, Eurostat, national statistics and government reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [Kiel Institute, Ukraine Support Tracker Release 31 (published 8 Oct 2026)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [EU-level aid split over member states by their contribution to the EU budget (Kiel method)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Donated weapons at market value: GAO and DoD Inspector General (US drawdown valuation), UK National Audit Office, EU Peace Facility claims, used-equipment and munitions prices](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-24-106934)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- method input · [War-time gas price windfall under the pre-war no-war price paths: World Bank and IMF October-2021 forecasts, IMF/EIA/ECB January-2022 views, ICE TTF futures of mid-February 2022 and of early 2021 (TTF Cal-22 at EUR 16.7-18.1/MWh, January-March 2021); each contract's TTF/oil formula](https://www.ice.com/products/27996665/Dutch-TTF-Natural-Gas-Futures/data)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Return denied on Russia's frozen central-bank reserves: Euroclear reports, Swiss SECO, EU Commission, G7 and central bank statements; rates per currency and year](https://www.euroclear.com/newsandinsights/en/press/2026/mr-06-euroclear-delivers-strong-2025-results.html)
- research · [Return lost on Russian private assets frozen abroad: EU Commission, Belgian Treasury, OFSI, Swiss SECO, national authorities, Bank of Russia statements on securities blocked at Euroclear and Clearstream](https://finance.ec.europa.eu/eu-and-world/sanctions-restrictive-measures/sanctions-adopted-following-russias-military-aggression-against-ukraine\_en)
- research · [Undisclosed military aid beyond the Kiel tracker: Kiel policy briefs, national reports](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/Subject\_Dossiers\_Topics/Ukraine/Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker/Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_-\_Research\_Note.pdf)
- research · [Private donations to Ukraine: national donation totals (DZI, DEC, Candid) and a GDP-based model elsewhere](https://www.dzi.de/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/DZI\_PM\_16Apr2025.pdf)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [Where the money for Ukraine was spent: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker item coding (release 31), CSIS, DSCA notifications, Ukraine's Ministry of Finance, replacement purchases (DoD Inspector General, NAO, government statements)](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- own estimate · [Military aid delivered by 31 August 2026: Kiel Ukraine Support Tracker release 31 allocation rows with delivery lead times by channel; US Department of Defense (Lead IG quarterly report Q1 2026) for USAI](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)

## Questions

### How much has Germany given to Ukraine?

Germany's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €74.8bn, 1.8% of one year's GDP (likely 1.6% to 2.3%). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of EU aid, its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Does Germany trade with Russia?

It bought €1.4bn from Russia in 2025 (€35.7bn in 2021), and sold €10.1bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €72.6bn (1.7% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €21.9bn gas cut off by Russia.

### Does Germany still buy Russian oil and gas?

Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 78.7% of what it bought from Russia. In 2025 it bought €1.4bn of fuel and other goods from Russia, against €35.7bn in 2021; the section on what it bought from Russia by fuel splits it.

### Is Germany helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +3.7% of one year's GDP (likely 2.6% to 5.0% toward Ukraine; very likely · >99%). Chance toward Ukraine: >99%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €72.6bn (1.7% of GDP) less than without the war, of which €21.9bn gas cut off by Russia. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How much did Germany give Ukraine each year?

Support for Ukraine by year: 2022 €14.7bn; 2023 €14.9bn; 2024 €14.4bn; 2025 €18.7bn; 2026 (to August) €12bn. In total since 2022: €74.8bn (likely 1.6% to 2.3%).

### How many Ukrainian refugees does Germany host, and what does it cost?

1,259,155 refugees from Ukraine, 15 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €35.5bn (0.85% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Germany: €36.9bn spent on refugees, less €1.4bn, its gain on the work refugees did here. That is about €7,316 per refugee per year (4,847,344 refugee-years).

### Why does Germany's government give a different figure for its support to Ukraine?

Germany's federal government reports over €43.3bn in bilateral civil support and about €57.6bn in military support, as of 30 June 2026. Its military figure counts funds set aside for later years as well as what was delivered. It counts loans and guarantees at their face value. It leaves out its share of EU aid. Of the cost of hosting refugees it counts what the federal government paid, not the spending of states and municipalities. War Balance counts support delivered from 2022 to August 2026, valued as described in the method: weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value, its share of EU aid and the cost of hosting refugees, minus money flowing back. For Germany that comes to €74.8bn. Source: [Bundesregierung: Bilaterale Unterstützungsleistungen der Bundesregierung für die Ukraine und Menschen aus der Ukraine (Stand 30.06.2026)](https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/schwerpunkte/krieg-in-der-ukraine/deutschland-hilft-der-ukraine-2160274).

### Does Germany have sanctions on Russia?

Yes. As an EU member, Germany applies the EU's sanctions on Russia, which every member agreed to in the Council. It is part of the price cap coalition on Russian oil. Separately, Russia lists Germany as an “unfriendly” state (government order 430-r, 5 March 2022): that is Russia's own list of countries it acts against, not a sanction by Germany. Sources: [Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 (consolidated)](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2014/833/oj); [Statement of the G7 and Australia on a price cap for seaborne Russian-origin crude oil, 2 December 2022 (German Federal Foreign Office)](https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/newsroom/news/g7-australia-price-cap-seaborne-russian-origin-crude-oil/2567026).

## Nearby in the ranking

Toward Ukraine · number 10 of 32

7. [Poland](https://warbalance.org/country/poland/) · +5.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€37.8bn
8. [Denmark](https://warbalance.org/country/denmark/) · +4.0% · Toward Ukraine · +€15.5bn
9. [Sweden](https://warbalance.org/country/sweden/) · +3.7% · Toward Ukraine · +€20.1bn
10. Germany+3.7% · Toward Ukraine · +€153bn
11. [Cyprus](https://warbalance.org/country/cyprus/) · +3.6% · Toward Ukraine · +€1.2bn
12. [Luxembourg](https://warbalance.org/country/luxembourg/) · +3.5% · Toward Ukraine · +€2.9bn
13. [Belgium](https://warbalance.org/country/belgium/) · +3.4% · Toward Ukraine · +€20.3bn

## More about Germany

### Groups

- [EU countries](https://warbalance.org/group/eu/)
- [G7](https://warbalance.org/group/g7/)
- [NATO members](https://warbalance.org/group/nato/)

### Compared with

- [Germany vs France](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-france/)
- [United States vs Germany](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-states-vs-germany/)
- [United Kingdom vs Germany](https://warbalance.org/compare/united-kingdom-vs-germany/)
- [Poland vs Germany](https://warbalance.org/compare/poland-vs-germany/)
- [Germany vs India](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-india/)
- [Germany vs Italy](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-italy/)
- [Germany vs Norway](https://warbalance.org/compare/germany-vs-norway/)
- [Netherlands vs Germany](https://warbalance.org/compare/netherlands-vs-germany/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Cost of replacing Russian energy](https://warbalance.org/cost-of-replacing-russian-energy/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Share of EU aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/eu-aid-to-ukraine-by-member/)
- [Company assets seized by Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-assets-seized-by-russia/)
- [Company taxes paid in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-taxes-paid-in-russia/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)
- [Frozen Russian central bank reserves](https://warbalance.org/frozen-russian-central-bank-reserves/)
- [Companies' cost of leaving Russia](https://warbalance.org/companies-leaving-russia-exit-cost/)
- [Company profits trapped in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-trapped-in-russia/)
- [Stakes in Russian oil and gas projects](https://warbalance.org/stakes-in-russian-oil-and-gas-projects/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [Support for Ukraine by country](https://warbalance.org/support-for-ukraine/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

47 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#DEU) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/germany/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/germany/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/germany/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/germany/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/germany/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/germany/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, DOI 10.5281/zenodo.23832992, https://warbalance.org/country/germany/