# Does Georgia support Russia? Leaning toward Russia

Georgia's support for Ukraine since 2022: −€7m (−0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.2bn (4.1% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 4.1% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 6.7% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#GEO)

Leaning toward Russia by

4.1% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 87%

likely from 6.7% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine · €1.2bn · ≈ 0.89%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 4.1% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

0.03%

€7m

likely from 0.48% below zero to 0.09% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by

4.1%

€1.2bn

likely from 6.6% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine likely toward Russia · 86%

Russia kept €1.2bn (4.1% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 3.7% of GDP more (€1.0bn; likely from 6.0% toward Russia to 2.7% toward Ukraine)
- Georgia's own gain from trade with Russia: Georgia kept 0.39% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€109m; likely <0.01% to 1.3% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €113m (0.41% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €88m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 88% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €809m in 2021, €1.5bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 148% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €481m in 2021, €1.2bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €852m of the net's €1.2bn.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by 0.03% · €7m

| Ukraine kept less from sales hereC | −0.05% | €14m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Hosting refugeesD | +0.04% | €10m |
| Georgia kept more from extra services sold to UkraineD | −0.02% | €4m |
| Aid: weapons, money, loansC | +<0.01% | €1m |

Probably raised Russia's earnings from trade by 4.1% · €1.2bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −3.1% | €852m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.41% | €113m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.27% | €76m |
| Georgia kept more from services sold to RussiaC | −0.13% | €35m |
| Georgia kept more from selling to RussiaC | −0.10% | €29m |
| Georgia earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.10% | €27m |
| Georgia kept more from settling Russia's tradeD | −0.06% | €16m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Georgia's companies made more profit in RussiaD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Georgia kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€0.41bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | +€3m | −€409m | −€405m | −1.5% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | −€1m | −€209m | −€210m | −2.2% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −€3m | −€244m | −€248m | −3.1% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | −€4m | −€202m | −€206m | −3.8% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | −€3m | −€87m | −€90m | −4.1% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Georgia's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Humanitarian aid | €1m |
| Refugee hosting | €10m |
| Private donations and purchases | −€14m |
| Money flowing back | −€4msubtracted |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | −€7m |

Quality of the split: C No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.81bn from Russia in 2021 and €1.5bn in 2025 (+88%). It sold €0.48bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.2bn in 2025 (+148%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 26.2% of what it bought from Russia. For Georgia: €113m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022. Depends on wages earned in Russia: remittances from Russia changed by −0.30% of GDP since 2022 (not in the totals). Against the level expected without the war: −€84m in 2022–2026 (2026: January–August) (likely −€570m to +€393m); migrants sent €1.6bn home from Russia in that time. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Georgia's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €0.33bn | €0.26bnrange €0.21bn to €0.28bn | €0.28bn | A |
| Oil products | €2.5bn | €2.3bnrange €2bn to €2.5bn | €1.2bn | A |
| Pipeline gas | €89m | €83mrange €71m to €92m | not tracked | A |
| Coal | €72m | €67mrange €59m to €74m | not tracked | A |
| Other goods | €5bn | €4.5bn | – | – |
| All goods | €8.1bn | €7.2bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: A, 2023: A, 2024: A, 2025: A, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

No. Georgia has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (25 February 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Georgia. Checked 27 October 2026.

### Sources

- [Georgian Prime Minister, 25 February 2022 (news report)](https://eurasianet.org/georgia-says-it-wont-join-international-sanctions-against-russia) · (search summary, to be checked against the official text)

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#GEO)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Replacing Russian energy cost it about €13m extra from 2022 (0.05% of one year's GDP). Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €88m. Neither is in the totals: shown for information.

## Refugees from Ukraine

25,996 refugees from Ukraine, 6.8 per 1,000 residents. Refugees counted as of 2025. Counted as support for Ukraine: €10m (0.04% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Georgia: €10m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin. Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €76m (0.27% of one year's GDP). Georgia kept more from settling Russia's trade: €16m (0.06% of one year's GDP). Georgia kept more from shipping Russian oil: €1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Armenia](https://warbalance.org/country/armenia/) | −0.17% · −€37m · likely toward Russia · 69% |
| [Azerbaijan](https://warbalance.org/country/azerbaijan/) | −2.5% · −€1.7bn · very likely · 99% |
| [Türkiye](https://warbalance.org/country/turkiye/) | −3.1% · −€32.7bn · very likely · 96% |
| Georgia | −4.1% · −€1.2bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [North Macedonia](https://warbalance.org/country/north-macedonia/) | −2.1% · −€0.30bn · likely toward Russia · 87% |
| [Serbia](https://warbalance.org/country/serbia/) | −1.4% · −€1.1bn · likely toward Russia · 84% |
| [Armenia](https://warbalance.org/country/armenia/) | −0.17% · −€37m · likely toward Russia · 69% |

## How the number is backed

35 sources back its parts: 12 official statistics, 6 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 14 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 89% modelled (C) and 11% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: estimated modelled from refugees hosted per year
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Georgia kept more from services sold to Russia C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

### Georgia kept more from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- official · [Official trade and services statistics and tourism counts for countries with wide ranges (Belstat, NBG, TÜİK, stat.uz, INSS)](https://cbr.ru/Collection/Collection/File/43429/External\_Trade\_in\_Services\_2021.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- method input · [Russian gas prices per country: Eurostat Comext and UN Comtrade unit values, published contract prices, oil-formula estimates](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/comext/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/DS-045409?format=JSON&freq=M&partner=RU&product=271121&product=271111&flow=1&indicators=VALUE\_IN\_EUROS&indicators=QUANTITY\_IN\_100KG&sinceTimePeriod=2021-01)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- research · [Payment agents settling Russia's trade: Bank of Russia balance of payments, Russian Finance Ministry and customs letters on agent commissions, press and sanctions reporting](https://www.cbr.ru/vfs/eng/statistics/credit\_statistics/bop/bal\_of\_payments\_standart\_e.xlsx)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Refugee hosting cost: national budget figures where reported, otherwise refugees hosted per year x cost per refugee calibrated on those budgets](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/api/dissemination/statistics/1.0/data/migr\_asytpsm?citizen=UA&sex=T&age=TOTAL&unit=PER)
- official · [Refugees' taxes and contributions: Czech Labour Ministry, Polish Ministry of Finance, Lithuanian ministry, OECD and IAB employment data; Poland's Aid Fund (BGK) spending](https://mpsv.gov.cz/cms/documents/960141c9-77fe-a2a0-08eb-0935789a6a7e/TZ\_bilance\_UA\_24022025.pdf)
- official · [Refugees' work and the industries they work in: Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit (Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, 30 Jan 2026), CBS (Oekraiense vluchtelingen, 1 Nov 2025, Tabel 4), ZUS and PAP (Poland), MPSV (Czechia), OECD-EMN employment rates; OECD STAN output and labour cost](https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Migration/Personen-nach-Staatsangehoerigkeiten/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf)
- official · [Services sold to Ukraine: Eurostat bop\_its6\_det (partner UA), OECD-WTO BaTiS, National Bank of Ukraine services imports and card spending abroad](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/bop\_its6\_det/default/table)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)
- official · [Profits of foreign companies in Russia and foreign partners' income from Russian oil and gas: KSE Institute / B4Ukraine #LeaveRussia, OECD direct-investment income by partner, company reports](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ENG\_What-are-the-financial-results-of-foreign-business-in-Russia-in-2023\_final.pdf)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)

## Questions

### Does Georgia support Russia?

In money terms the net is −4.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 6.7% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%). Chance toward Russia: 87%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.2bn (4.1% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Georgia trade with Russia?

It bought €1.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.81bn in 2021), and sold €1.2bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.2bn (4.1% of GDP) more than without the war.

### Georgia–Russia relations: what do the numbers show?

In money terms: it bought €1.5bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.81bn in 2021), and sold €1.2bn to Russia; its support for Ukraine since 2022 is €7m; and the net, with what Russia kept from trade against a world without the war, is −4.1% of one year's GDP (likely from 6.7% toward Russia to 2.4% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 87%). Diplomacy, security ties and politics are not in these numbers.

### Does Georgia help Russia get around sanctions?

Trade hub: goods re-exported to Russia count for the countries that made them, and Russian goods it passes on for the final buyers; it keeps its trading margin.

### How does Georgia compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Armenia −0.17%, Azerbaijan −2.5%, Türkiye −3.1%, Georgia −4.1%.

### How many Ukrainian refugees does Georgia host, and what does it cost?

25,996 refugees from Ukraine, 6.8 per 1,000 residents. Counted as support for Ukraine: €10m (0.04% of one year's GDP), the public cost of hosting refugees from 2022, after the host's gain on the work refugees do. For Georgia: €10m spent on refugees, less <€1m, its gain on the work refugees did here.

### Does Georgia have sanctions on Russia?

No. Georgia has not imposed sanctions of its own on Russia, and its government has said so publicly (25 February 2022). Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Georgia. Sources: [Georgian Prime Minister, 25 February 2022 (news report)](https://eurasianet.org/georgia-says-it-wont-join-international-sanctions-against-russia) (search summary, to be checked against the official text).

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [North Macedonia](https://warbalance.org/country/north-macedonia/) · −2.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€298m · 87%
- [Senegal](https://warbalance.org/country/senegal/) · −2.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€600m · 76%
- [Burkina Faso](https://warbalance.org/country/burkina-faso/) · −3.9% · Leaning toward Russia · −€749m · 92%
- Georgia−4.1% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.2bn · 87%
- [Central African Republic](https://warbalance.org/country/central-african-republic/) · −4.8% · Leaning toward Russia · −€115m · 92%
- [Mongolia](https://warbalance.org/country/mongolia/) · −6.4% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.2bn · 77%
32. [Papua New Guinea](https://warbalance.org/country/papua-new-guinea/) · −0.08% · Toward Russia · −€22m

## More about Georgia

### Groups

- [Re-export hubs and sanctions evasion](https://warbalance.org/group/russia-trade-hubs/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Payment agents settling Russia's trade](https://warbalance.org/payment-agents-for-russian-trade/)
- [Extra services sold to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-ukraine/)
- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)
- [Company profits in Russia](https://warbalance.org/company-profits-in-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

35 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#GEO) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/georgia/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/georgia/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/georgia/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/georgia/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/georgia/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/georgia/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/georgia/