# Is the Faroe Islands helping Ukraine or Russia? Too close to call

The Faroe Islands' support for Ukraine since 2022: €1m (0.03% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €10m (0.29% of GDP) less than without the war. The net is 0.32% of a year's GDP toward Ukraine (likely from 4.5% toward Russia to 7.2% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#FRO)

Toward Ukraine by

0.32% of a year's GDP since 2022

too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine

likely from 4.5% toward Russia to 7.2% toward Ukraine · €11m · ≈ 0.07%/yr

Supported Ukraine + cut Russia's earnings from trade = 0.32% of GDP toward Ukraine. Mostly less kept by Russia from trade.

Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.03%

€1m

likely from 0.01% below zero to 0.04% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by

0.29%

€10m

likely from 4.5% toward Russia to 7.2% toward Ukraine too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine

Russia kept €10m (0.29% of GDP) less than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.23% of GDP less (€8m; likely from 4.4% toward Russia to 6.8% toward Ukraine)
- The Faroe Islands' own gain from trade with Russia: The Faroe Islands kept 0.05% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (€2m; likely from 0.47% toward Russia to 1.2% toward Ukraine)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- War-time fuel prices Russia kept €8m (0.21% of GDP) more because fuel prices rose with the war.
- Mostly one part Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: €12m of the net's €11m.
- Small economy A small economy (GDP €3.6bn): small sums move its % a lot. Not ranked, and drawn in the lightest shade only.
- Two different things added The net adds two different things: help given to Ukraine and the change in what Russia kept from trade. Much of what one country stopped buying, Russia sold to others.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 95% smaller, the direction would flip.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.03% · €1m

| Aid: weapons, money, loansB | +0.03% | €1m |
| --- | --- | --- |

Cut Russia's earnings from trade by 0.29% · €10m

| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.34% | €12m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.21% | €8m |
| Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | +0.11% | €4m |
| The Faroe Islands kept less from selling to RussiaC | +0.05% | €2m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2022: −€13m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | −€13m | −€13m | −0.37% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€1m | −€7m | −€6m | −0.53% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +<€1m | +€11m | +€11m | −0.22% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | +€8m | +€8m | +0.01% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | +€11m | +€11m | +0.32% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

The Faroe Islands' support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Humanitarian aid | €1m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €1m |

Quality of the split: A No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €50m from Russia in 2021 and €1m in 2025 (−97%). It sold €0.23bn to Russia in 2021 and €0.16bn in 2025 (−29%). For the Faroe Islands: €8m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## Sanctions on Russia

The Faroe Islands is a territory of Denmark. We did not check whether the sanctions of Denmark on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Faroe Islands itself; it names Denmark. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#FRO)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: €4m (0.11% of one year's GDP).

## How the number is backed

17 sources back its parts: 3 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 10 method inputs. By size, 4% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 81% modelled (C) and 15% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated UN FTS and government reports
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: estimated, imf, mirror, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### The Faroe Islands kept less from selling to Russia C

- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)

### Aid: weapons, money, loans B

- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- own estimate · [Small purchases from Russia: the no-war middle value moved up by the measured bias of 'held flat' (back-tests on rolling origins 2005-2016, CEPII BACI)](https://github.com/intelligent-cream/war-balance/blob/main/research/2026-10/gaps/cf\_models\_r47-notes.md)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Aid from countries outside the Kiel tracker: UN OCHA Financial Tracking Service and government reports](https://api.hpc.tools/v1/public/fts/flow?countryISO3=UKR&year=2022)

## Questions

### What decides the Faroe Islands' number?

Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. What decides it: if Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here were 95% smaller, the direction would flip.

### Is the Faroe Islands helping Russia?

In money terms the net is +0.32% of one year's GDP (likely from 4.5% toward Russia to 7.2% toward Ukraine; too close to call · 56% toward Ukraine). Chance toward Ukraine: 56%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €10m (0.29% of GDP) less than without the war. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### How much has the Faroe Islands given to Ukraine?

The Faroe Islands' support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €1m, 0.03% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.01% below zero to 0.04% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### Where do the numbers for the Faroe Islands come from?

17 sources back its parts, 3 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept less from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does the Faroe Islands have sanctions on Russia?

The Faroe Islands is a territory of Denmark. We did not check whether the sanctions of Denmark on Russia extend to it. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name the Faroe Islands itself; it names Denmark.

## Nearby in the ranking

Too close to call

- [DR Congo](https://warbalance.org/country/dr-congo/) · −0.09% · Essentially zero · −€63m · 64%
- [Bahamas](https://warbalance.org/country/bahamas/) · −0.10% · Essentially zero · −€13m · 68%
- [Gibraltar](https://warbalance.org/country/gibraltar/) · +0.42% · Too close to call · +€15m · 56%
- Faroe Islands+0.32% · Too close to call · +€11m · 56%
- [Slovakia](https://warbalance.org/country/slovakia/) · +0.24% · Too close to call · +€294m · 58%
- [Congo](https://warbalance.org/country/congo/) · +0.12% · Too close to call · +€18m · 54%
- [Anguilla](https://warbalance.org/country/anguilla/) · −0.12% · Too close to call · −€1m · 59%

## More about Faroe Islands

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Government aid to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/government-aid-to-ukraine/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

17 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#FRO) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

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Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/faroe-islands/