# Is Egypt helping Ukraine or Russia? Leaning toward Russia

Egypt's support for Ukraine since 2022: €86m (0.02% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €1.8bn (0.45% of GDP) more than without the war. The net is 0.43% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 1.1% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 95%).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#EGY)

Leaning toward Russia by

0.43% of a year's GDP since 2022

likely toward Russia · 95%

likely from 1.1% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine · €1.7bn · ≈ 0.09%/yr

Supported Ukraine + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.43% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly more bought from Russia).

Chance toward Russia: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Supported Ukraine with

0.02%

€86m

likely from 0.10% below zero to 0.07% above zero essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.45%

€1.8bn

likely 0.01% to 1.1% toward Russia very likely · 95%

Russia kept €1.8bn (0.45% of GDP) more than without the war.

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.42% of GDP more (€1.7bn; likely from 1.0% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine)
- Egypt's own gain from trade with Russia: Egypt kept 0.03% of GDP more from its trade with Russia (€102m; likely <0.01% to 0.10% toward Russia)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## Its story in short

- Russian oil at a war-time discount After the sanctions, Russia sold it oil below world prices: about €471m over 2022–2026. What Russia kept on that oil is counted at those lower prices, in the part on fuel and goods it sold here: the sanctions working on prices, not a choice to buy less.
- Bought 52% more from Russia What it bought from Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €2.8bn in 2021, €4.2bn in 2025. Only what Russia kept on it counts in the totals.
- Sold Russia 311% more What it sold to Russia, in euros at each year's prices: €418m in 2021, €1.7bn in 2025. Only what it kept on it counts in the totals.
- Mostly from fuel buying Orange here is mostly fuel buying, not siding with Russia. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine.
- Mostly one part Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: €1.5bn of the net's €1.7bn.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices would have to be 277% larger.

## What makes up the number

Supported Ukraine with 0.02% · €86m

| Ukraine kept more from extra sales hereC | +0.02% | €79m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Its share of IMF and World Bank loansC | +<0.01% | €7m |

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.45% · €1.8bn

| Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold hereC | −0.37% | €1.5bn |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war pricesC | +0.15% | €605m |
| Russia kept more from its nuclear projects and loansC | −0.13% | €506m |
| Russian owners kept more from their firms hereD | −0.06% | €221m |
| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.05% | €209m |
| Russia kept less from weapons sold hereD | +0.03% | €133m |
| Egypt kept more from selling to RussiaC | −0.01% | €58m |
| Egypt earned an extra price from Russia because of sanctionsD | −0.01% | €52m |
| Egypt kept less from services sold to RussiaC | +<0.01% | €9m |
| Russia kept less from services sold hereC | +<0.01% | €5m |
| Its firms paid Russia more taxD | −<0.01% | €1m |
| Egypt kept more from shipping Russian oilD | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€0.51bn.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −€7m | −€294m | −€301m | −0.08% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +€20m | −€532m | −€513m | −0.21% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | +€30m | −€329m | −€299m | −0.28% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +€38m | −€344m | −€306m | −0.36% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +€6m | −€259m | −€253m | −0.43% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Support for Ukraine by type

Egypt's support for Ukraine, 2022 to August 2026, split by type. The parts add up to the map's figure.

| Military aid | – |
| --- | --- |
| Financial aid (incl. IMF and World Bank share) | €7mof which its share of IMF and World Bank lending: €7m |
| Private donations and purchases | €79m |
| Support for Ukraine (the map's figure) | €86m |

Quality of the split: D No military aid on record outside Kiel's tracker; this does not mean that no military aid was given.

[Military aid to Ukraine, every country →](https://warbalance.org/military-aid-to-ukraine-by-country/)

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €2.8bn from Russia in 2021 and €4.2bn in 2025 (+52%). It sold €0.42bn to Russia in 2021 and €1.7bn in 2025 (+311%). Before the war (2018–2021), fuel was 7.4% of what it bought from Russia. For Egypt: €605m paid below no-war prices, most of it in 2026, 8% of it on gas contracts. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

Egypt's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Crude oil | €1.9bn | €1.3bnrange €0.91bn to €1.9bn | €1.1bn | C (estimate) |
| Oil products | €0.81bn | €0.71bnrange €0.50bn to €0.95bn | €8.6bn | C (estimate) |
| Coal | €0.27bn | €0.24bnrange €0.17bn to €0.32bn | €0.63bn | C (estimate) |
| Other goods | €20.6bn | €18.7bn | – | – |
| All goods | €23.6bn | €21bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: C, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: A. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of Egypt's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Egypt. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#EGY)

## The cost of switching away from Russian energy

Russian oil bought at a war-time discount saved it about €0.47bn. This is not in the totals: shown for information.

## Companies, Russia and Russian owners

Russian owners kept more from their firms here: €0.22bn (0.06% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is leaning toward Russia, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Palestine](https://warbalance.org/country/palestine/) | +0.09% · +€15m · essentially zero |
| [Israel](https://warbalance.org/country/israel/) | +<0.01% · +€1m · essentially zero |
| [Sudan](https://warbalance.org/country/sudan/) | −0.21% · −€94m · too close to call · 54% toward Russia |
| Egypt | −0.43% · −€1.7bn · likely toward Russia · 95% |
| [Libya](https://warbalance.org/country/libya/) | −6.6% · −€2.8bn · very likely · 99% |

### In its region, with the same chance and direction: the nearest net shares of GDP

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Kenya](https://warbalance.org/country/kenya/) | −0.31% · −€0.33bn · likely toward Russia · 90% |
| [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) | −0.71% · −€3.5bn · likely toward Russia · 97% |
| [Mauritania](https://warbalance.org/country/mauritania/) | −0.12% · −€12m · likely toward Russia · 68% |
| [Namibia](https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/) | −0.83% · −€0.10bn · likely toward Russia · 77% |

## How the number is backed

30 sources back its parts: 6 official statistics, 8 research reports, 0 press reports and 3 of this project's own estimates, plus 13 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 82% modelled (C) and 18% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated includes shipping and insuring Russian oil (estimate)
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Sold to Ukraine: reported reported 2021-2025
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: estimated allocated by company counts and investment

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)

### Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its nuclear projects and loans C

- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)

### Russian owners kept more from their firms here D

- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- research · [Russian oil exports lost to Ukraine's strikes on refineries, ports and the Druzhba pipeline, 2022-2026 (IEA Oil Market Reports, Kpler, KSE Institute, Reuters)](https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/2b89a47b-34a2-40e0-90ff-68f7ccd80715/-13MAY2026\_\_OilMarketReport\_publicversion.pdf)
- research · [Russia's 2023 gasoline and diesel export ban: decree No. 1537 (21 Sep 2023), exemptions and the export volumes lost (Reuters/LSEG, Bloomberg/Vortexa, Interfax, Enerdata)](https://hydrocarbonprocessing.com/news/2023/10/russian-seaborne-diesel-exports-fell-by-20-in-early-october/)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087)
- research · [Company exits from Russia and Russian-owned companies abroad: Russian budget data, KSE and Yale exit lists, company reports, Bank of Russia balance of payments](https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/KSE\_Assessing-Foreign-Companies-Losses-in-Russia.pdf)
- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- research · [Russian arms exports by buyer: Rosoboronexport and FSVTS statements, SIPRI fact sheets, contract reporting (S-400, Su-35, Su-57)](https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/fs\_2603\_at\_2025.pdf)
- method input · [Expected trade with Ukraine without the war: rolling back-tests on Ukraine's own history and on analogue partners (IMF WEO vintages, IMF DOTS)](https://db.nomics.world/IMF/DOT)
- method input · [Ukraine's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Ukrstat, company reports, KSE Institute](https://stat.gov.ua/sites/default/files/2026-09/yearbook\_24e.pdf)
- own estimate · [Purchases from Ukraine against what Ukraine could export: Ukraine's exports by product group and partner (UN Comtrade, State Customs Service of Ukraine), ECB exchange rates](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS)
- official · [Re-exports through trade hubs (UAE, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan and others): UN Comtrade re-export flags and matched product trade](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=784&period=2023&partnerCode=643&flowCode=RX&cmdCode=AG2)
- official · [GDP gaps (UNSD, UN WPP, CEPAL), Russia's import gap by country of origin, Hong Kong gold composition](https://population.un.org/wpp/assets/Excel%20Files/1\_Indicator%20%28Standard%29/EXCEL\_FILES/1\_General/WPP2024\_GEN\_F01\_DEMOGRAPHIC\_INDICATORS\_COMPACT.xlsx)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Genuinely extra share of money earned: production ramp-ups and trade-redirection studies; value kept in the economy (the earlier rule): OECD Trade in Value Added (TiVA, 2025 edition)](https://sdmx.oecd.org/sti-public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_TIVA\_MAINSH@DF\_MAINSH,1.1/EXGR\_DVA..BTE+C+C19+C25+C26+C28+C302T309+GTN+H50+I.W.PT\_EXGR.A?startPeriod=2018&format=csv)
- method input · [Sellers' net gain per euro of sales (taxes on production plus profit above a normal return of 5% a year above inflation after company tax, plus the country's risk premium): OECD STAN database, 2025 edition, by country and industry; Damodaran country risk premiums](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.STI.PIE,DSD\_STAN@DF\_STAN\_2025,1.0/A..C+C19+C25+C252+C26+C28+C30+C303+C304+H50+I+GTN+K+K65+\_T.P1+D29X39+B2A3N+B2A3G+P51C+D1.V.XDC?startPeriod=2017&endPeriod=2024&format=csv)
- method input · [money-rule and cost-view constants from data: firm-level redirection studies, Kiel item coding of EU-level military aid, lenders' funding costs, EU, UK and Canadian estimates of duties waived](https://web.archive.org/web/20230606033537/https://repec.iza.org/dp16146.pdf)
- official · [Sanctions premium on Russia's imports: UN Comtrade HS6 unit values to Russia against the rest of the world, CEPII, BOFIT and CEPR studies](https://www.cepii.fr/PDF\_PUB/pb/2025/pb2025-50.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Loans at economic value: Kiel loan terms (maturity, interest, grace), EU regulations, Ukraine's Eurobond yields; IMF, World Bank, EBRD and CEB lending by shareholding](https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/bc5059ba-ef38-4f08-988a-746a03905a6c-Ukraine\_Support\_Tracker\_\_Release\_31.xlsx)
- research · [Company taxes in Russia: KSE checked against company reports (Raiffeisen, UniCredit, OTP, PepsiCo) and Bundesbank reinvested earnings](https://www.rbinternational.com/content/dam/rbi/ho/investors/results-reports/annual-reports/rbi/2025-02-25%202024%20RBI%20Annual%20Financial%20Report.pdf.coredownload.pdf)
- method input · [Pre-war trends for services (OECD-WTO BaTiS, Eurostat, Bank of Russia), foreign companies in Russia and Russian seaborne exports](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)
- research · [Tanker control by country: KSE Institute shadow-fleet tracker, Lloyd's List, S&P Global, Kpler and Windward reporting, US/UK/EU sanctions designations](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/KSE\_Shadow\_Fleer\_Tracker\_SEP26.pdf)

## Questions

### Is Egypt helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.43% of one year's GDP (likely from 1.1% toward Russia to 0.01% toward Ukraine; likely toward Russia · 95%). Chance toward Russia: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €1.8bn (0.45% of GDP) more than without the war. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Does Egypt trade with Russia?

It bought €4.2bn from Russia in 2025 (€2.8bn in 2021), and sold €1.7bn to Russia. What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €1.8bn (0.45% of GDP) more than without the war.

### How much has Egypt given to Ukraine?

Egypt's support for Ukraine from 2022 to August 2026: €86m, 0.02% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.10% below zero to 0.07% above zero). It counts its aid (weapons at market value when delivered, loans at their gift value), its share of IMF and World Bank lending, the cost of hosting refugees, private donations, an estimate of undisclosed military aid and purchases from Ukraine against the no-war level, net of money flowing back.

### What decides Egypt's number?

Chance toward Russia: 95%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. No part flips it by shrinking; Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices would have to be 277% larger.

### How does Egypt compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Palestine +0.09%, Israel +<0.01%, Sudan −0.21%, Egypt −0.43%, Libya −6.6%.

### Where do the numbers for Egypt come from?

30 sources back its parts, 6 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept less: fuel sold below no-war prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf); Russia kept more from its nuclear projects and loans: [Rosatom projects abroad and Russia's state loans: World Bank International Debt Statistics (Russia as creditor), project and loan reporting](https://api.worldbank.org/v2/sources/6/country/all/series/DT.INT.BLAT.CD/counterpart-area/087). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does Egypt have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of Egypt's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name Egypt.

## Nearby in the ranking

Leaning toward Russia

- [Kenya](https://warbalance.org/country/kenya/) · −0.31% · Leaning toward Russia · −€333m · 90%
- [Eritrea](https://warbalance.org/country/eritrea/) · −0.32% · Leaning toward Russia · −€7m · 68%
- [Singapore](https://warbalance.org/country/singapore/) · −0.41% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2.0bn · 75%
- Egypt−0.43% · Leaning toward Russia · −€1.7bn · 95%
- [Marshall Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/marshall-islands/) · −0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€2m · 78%
- [United Arab Emirates](https://warbalance.org/country/united-arab-emirates/) · −0.71% · Leaning toward Russia · −€3.5bn · 97%
- [Namibia](https://warbalance.org/country/namibia/) · −0.83% · Leaning toward Russia · −€100m · 77%

## More about Egypt

### Groups

- [BRICS](https://warbalance.org/group/brics/)

### Its parts, ranked against other countries

- [Russia's gain on fuel and goods it sold](https://warbalance.org/russia-earnings-from-fuel-and-goods/)
- [Russia's gain from war-time fuel prices](https://warbalance.org/russia-war-time-fuel-prices/)
- [Rosatom projects and Russian state loans](https://warbalance.org/rosatom-and-russian-state-loans/)
- [Profits of Russian-owned companies abroad](https://warbalance.org/russian-owned-companies-abroad/)
- [Weapons bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/buyers-of-russian-weapons/)
- [Purchases from Ukraine vs no war](https://warbalance.org/imports-from-ukraine/)
- [Sellers' gain on sales to Russia](https://warbalance.org/exports-to-russia/)
- [Extra price Russia paid because of sanctions](https://warbalance.org/sanctions-premium-on-sales-to-russia/)
- [Services sold to Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-sold-to-russia/)
- [Share of IMF and World Bank lending to Ukraine](https://warbalance.org/imf-world-bank-lending-to-ukraine/)
- [Services bought from Russia](https://warbalance.org/services-bought-from-russia/)

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

30 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#EGY) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/egypt/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/egypt/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/egypt/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/egypt/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/egypt/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/egypt/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/egypt/