# Is DR Congo helping Russia or Ukraine? The net is essentially zero

DR Congo's support for Ukraine since 2022: <€1m (<0.01% of one year's GDP: its aid, refugee hosting, private donations and its other parts of support, net of money flowing back). Russia kept €63m (0.09% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€95m; the other parts take €32m off it). The net is 0.09% of a year's GDP toward Russia (likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.60% toward Ukraine; essentially zero).

[Open in the map →](https://warbalance.org/#COD)

Toward Russia by

0.09% of a year's GDP since 2022

essentially zero

likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.60% toward Ukraine · €63m · ≈ 0.02%/yr

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war + raised Russia's earnings from trade = 0.09% of GDP toward Russia. Mostly toward Russia (mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere).

Chance toward Russia: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree.

Support for Ukraine

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by

<0.01%

<€1m

about 0 essentially zero

Russia's earnings from trade

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by

0.09%

€63m

likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.60% toward Ukraine essentially zero

Russia kept €63m (0.09% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€95m; the other parts take €32m off it).

- Russia's gain: Russia kept 0.09% of GDP more (€63m; likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.60% toward Ukraine)
- DR Congo's own gain from trade with Russia: DR Congo kept <0.01% of GDP less from its trade with Russia (<€1m; about 0)

The two lines add up to Russia's earnings from trade; their ranges do not.

## What decides this number

Chance toward Russia: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war. Here the size of the net is the finding, not its direction: likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.60% toward Ukraine.

## What makes up the number

Bought less from Ukraine than without the war; below zero by <0.01% · <€1m

Raised Russia's earnings from trade by 0.09% · €63m

| Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countriesDown estimate | −0.14% | €95m |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold hereC | +0.10% | €64m |
| Russia kept more from war-time fuel pricesC | −0.05% | €31m |
| Russia kept more from services sold hereC | −<0.01% | €1m |

+ toward Ukraine, − toward Russia (in support for Ukraine, − is money it earned back or bought less from Ukraine than without the war). Letters: A reported, B measured estimate, C modelled estimate, D rough indication.

## By year

The year with the largest net amount was 2023: −€29m. The yearly amounts are small against the range of the total, so their side from one year to the next is not a finding.

| Year | Support for Ukraine | Trade: toward Ukraine (+) / toward Russia (−) | Net | Net since 2022 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/) | −<€1m | −€19m | −€20m | −0.03% |
| [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/) | +<€1m | −€29m | −€29m | −0.07% |
| [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/) | −<€1m | −€11m | −€11m | −0.09% |
| [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/) | +<€1m | −€6m | −€6m | −0.10% |
| [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)\* | +<€1m | +€3m | +€3m | −0.09% |

Each year's amount: + toward Ukraine, − toward Russia. \*2026: to August.

## Trade with Russia before and after

It bought €0.15bn from Russia in 2021 and €0.12bn in 2025 (−22%). It sold <€1m to Russia in 2021 and €0m in 2025. For DR Congo: €31m paid above no-war prices, most of it in 2022, 71% of it on gas contracts. Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. These are sales values at each year's prices; the totals count what the seller kept on them.

## What it bought from Russia, by fuel

DR Congo's purchases from Russia, 2022 to August 2026, by fuel: by its own customs records (CIF), on the map's basis (the Russian border price, FOB) and by CREA's tracker (ship data). The map's figure is the total on the map's basis.

| Fuel | Customs (CIF) | Map basis (FOB) | Tracker (CREA) | Quality |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Oil products | no customs record | €0.16bnrange €83m to €0.34bn | €75m | D (estimate) |
| Other goods | – | €0.47bn | – | – |
| All goods | – | €0.63bn | – | – |

Quality by year: 2022: D, 2023: C, 2024: C, 2025: C, 2026, January to August: D. C and D are estimates.

[Every buyer, by fuel →](https://warbalance.org/russian-oil-gas-buyers/#by-fuel)

## Sanctions on Russia

We found no sanctions of DR Congo's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name DR Congo. Checked 27 October 2026.

[Every country's sanctions on Russia →](https://warbalance.org/countries-with-sanctions-on-russia/#COD)

## Indirect channels: hubs, refined oil, shipping

Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: €95m (0.14% of one year's GDP).

## Compared with its neighbours and groups

Its direction is essentially zero, so the map's ranking gives it no number.

### Neighbours by land

| Country | Net, % of GDP |
| --- | --- |
| [Rwanda](https://warbalance.org/country/rwanda/) | +0.55% · +€74m · likely toward Ukraine · 90% |
| [Burundi](https://warbalance.org/country/burundi/) | +0.29% · +€10m · likely toward Ukraine · 73% |
| [Angola](https://warbalance.org/country/angola/) | +0.25% · +€0.26bn · likely toward Ukraine · 92% |
| [Congo](https://warbalance.org/country/congo/) | +0.12% · +€18m · too close to call · 54% toward Ukraine |
| [Zambia](https://warbalance.org/country/zambia/) | −0.05% · −€13m · essentially zero |
| [Uganda](https://warbalance.org/country/uganda/) | −0.07% · −€33m · essentially zero |
| DR Congo | −0.09% · −€63m · essentially zero |
| [Tanzania](https://warbalance.org/country/tanzania/) | −1.1% · −€0.82bn · very likely · >99% |
| [Central African Republic](https://warbalance.org/country/central-african-republic/) | −4.8% · −€0.12bn · likely toward Russia · 92% |

## How the number is backed

12 sources back its parts: 2 official statistics, 1 research reports, 0 press reports and 2 of this project's own estimates, plus 7 method inputs. By size, 0% of its parts are reported or measured (A–B), 50% modelled (C) and 50% rough indications (D).

### Data coverage

- Aid to Ukraine: estimated no record found: 0, with a small upper bound
- Private donations: estimated national totals or a GDP-based estimate
- Services trade with Russia: estimated Eurostat, OECD-WTO and Bank of Russia data
- Refugee hosting: reported no refugees from Ukraine recorded
- Bought from Russia: estimated partly filled: imf, reported
- Sold to Russia: estimated partner data plus an estimate of goods reaching Russia via third countries
- Bought from Ukraine: estimated partly filled: mirror, reported
- Sold to Ukraine: estimated partly filled: estimated, mirror, reported
- Energy switching cost: estimated modelled per fuel and month
- Company taxes in Russia: reported no companies operating in Russia found

### Sources, by part

### Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries D

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)

### Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here C

- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)

### Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices C

- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)

### Russia kept more from services sold here C

- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

- own estimate · [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf)
- method input · [Price levels of what was traded with Russia and Ukraine (2019-2021 = 1): each buyer's own customs unit values per fuel and for other goods, benchmark indices (CREA, World Bank, Eurostat), gas contract prices; oil at the Russian port (FOB), outliers screened](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2023&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=TOTAL&flowCode=M)
- method input · [Russia's net gain per euro of exports (taxes plus profit above a normal return): Russian Finance Ministry, company reports, IEA, Rosstat](https://minfin.gov.ru/ru/statistics/fedbud/oil)
- official · [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0)
- method input · [Checks against national and trade statistics: UAE gold and fuel, undisclosed aid, Russia's import-statistics gap, trend windows, border-priced imports](https://www.swissaid.ch/en/media/united-arab-emirates-more-than-ever-a-hub-for-conflict-gold/)
- method input · [Expected trade without the war: models back-tested on 2008, 2013 and 2016 against holding 2021 flat (UN Comtrade, World Bank WDI and commodity prices, UN voting)](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2021&partnerCode=643&flowCode=X&cmdCode=TOTAL)
- method input · [Ranges of the 2022-2026 total measured on the back-tests' cumulative errors; own bands tested on their own history for Mongolia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Moldova, Türkiye, Kenya, Peru and French Polynesia](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?reporterCode=498&period=2019&flowCode=M&partnerCode=643&cmdCode=99,2711,27,31,TOTAL)
- method input · [net-gain shares from official sector profitability (Russia: FNS/Rosstat by OKVED-2 activity; Ukraine: Derzhstat by KVED division), export duties collected and company results](https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\_doc\_LAW\_55729/df3929054ebc0ff6d666accad51e6fedca8c75fe/)
- method input · [refugee hosting budgets, remittance mirror shares, national donation totals, Hong Kong gold 2026 and OECD ITIC freight margins](https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2022/10/international-migration-outlook-2022\_140ace0e/30fe16d2-en.pdf)
- own estimate · [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf)
- research · [Tanker shipping, insurance and ship sales serving Russian oil and LNG exports: CREA, KSE Institute, S&P Global, Windward, press reports](https://sanctions.kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/ROT\_July-2026.pdf)
- official · [Services trade with Russia (tourism, transport, business services): Eurostat, OECD-WTO BaTiS, Bank of Russia](https://sdmx.oecd.org/public/rest/data/OECD.SDD.TPS,DSD\_BATIS@DF\_BATIS,1.0/.RUS...S...?startPeriod=2010&endPeriod=2021)

## Questions

### Is DR Congo helping Russia?

In money terms the net is −0.09% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.60% toward Ukraine; essentially zero). Chance toward Russia: 64%; 100% of the other method choices agree. Russia kept €63m (0.09% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€95m; the other parts take €32m off it). Most of this is fuel and food bought from Russia. Fuel is fungible and sold through many traders: the figure reflects what this economy bought, not a policy toward Russia or Ukraine. The number counts money: weapons at their money value; votes, diplomacy and intent are not in it.

### Why is DR Congo's net so small?

Its net is essentially zero: −0.09% of one year's GDP (likely from 0.43% toward Russia to 0.60% toward Ukraine). Not certain, mostly because of how much it would have bought from Russia without the war.

### Does DR Congo trade with Russia?

It bought €0.12bn from Russia in 2025 (€0.15bn in 2021). What counts here is the change in what Russia kept from that trade (taxes and profit, not sales) against a world without the war: Russia kept €63m (0.09% of GDP) more than without the war, mostly Russian crude in fuel bought from refiners elsewhere (€95m; the other parts take €32m off it).

### How does DR Congo compare with its neighbours?

The net as a share of one year's GDP: Rwanda +0.55%, Burundi +0.29%, Angola +0.25%, Congo +0.12%, Zambia −0.05%, Uganda −0.07%, DR Congo −0.09%, Tanzania −1.1%, Central African Republic −4.8%.

### Where do the numbers for DR Congo come from?

12 sources back its parts, 2 of them official statistics. By part: Russia kept more from its oil bought via other countries: [Laundered oil: fuel made from Russian crude, assigned to the final buyer (trading hubs pass on what they resell), valued at the Russian crude inside it](https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/CREA\_PCC\_Refined-Oil-Analysis\_19.02.2024\_Rev\_15.04.2024.pdf); Russia kept less from fuel and goods sold here: [UN Comtrade, IMF trade statistics and Eurostat: goods trade with Russia and Ukraine](https://comtradeapi.un.org/public/v1/preview/C/A/HS?period=2024&partnerCode=643&flowCode=M&cmdCode=TOTAL&customsCode=C00&motCode=0&partner2Code=0); Russia kept more from war-time fuel prices: [War-time price windfall on Russian fuel: payments minus the same volume at the prices a no-war market expected (pre-invasion forecasts and futures: IMF, World Bank, EIA, ECB, ICE)](https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/weo/2022/update/january/english/text.pdf). The map's panel lists every one, with its documents.

### Does DR Congo have sanctions on Russia?

We found no sanctions of DR Congo's own against Russia (checked 27 October 2026). This says nothing about whether firms there follow other countries' sanctions. Russia's list of “unfriendly” states does not name DR Congo.

## Nearby in the ranking

Essentially zero

- [Pakistan](https://warbalance.org/country/pakistan/) · −0.07% · Essentially zero · −€238m · 70%
- [Uganda](https://warbalance.org/country/uganda/) · −0.07% · Essentially zero · −€33m · 59%
- [Cambodia](https://warbalance.org/country/cambodia/) · −0.08% · Essentially zero · −€31m · 61%
- DR Congo−0.09% · Essentially zero · −€63m · 64%
- [Bahamas](https://warbalance.org/country/bahamas/) · −0.10% · Essentially zero · −€13m · 68%
- [Gibraltar](https://warbalance.org/country/gibraltar/) · +0.42% · Too close to call · +€15m · 56%
- [Faroe Islands](https://warbalance.org/country/faroe-islands/) · +0.32% · Too close to call · +€11m · 56%

## More about DR Congo

### Every country, by year

- [2022](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2022/)
- [2023](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2023/)
- [2024](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2024/)
- [2025](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2025/)
- [2026](https://warbalance.org/ukraine-aid-2026/)
- [All topics](https://warbalance.org/topics/)

12 sources in all; the map's panel lists every one, with its documents. [Open in the map](https://warbalance.org/#COD) · [How this is measured](https://warbalance.org/how-it-works/)

[Українська](https://warbalance.org/uk/country/dr-congo/)[Deutsch](https://warbalance.org/de/country/dr-congo/)[Français](https://warbalance.org/fr/country/dr-congo/)[Polski](https://warbalance.org/pl/country/dr-congo/)[Nederlands](https://warbalance.org/nl/country/dr-congo/)[Español](https://warbalance.org/es/country/dr-congo/)

Cite as: War Balance, figures to August 2026, https://warbalance.org/country/dr-congo/